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The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help under-
stand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that 
differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as 
beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant 
writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role 
of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and 
reason. 
I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative 
views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be 
seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal ma-
chines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not 
think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary 
experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes 
sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensa-
tion, and this requires a mind. 
A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree 
between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I 
argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capaci-
ties of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, 
the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experi-
ence these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the 
metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.




Eläinten rooli mielenfilosofiassa on ensisijaisesti auttaa ymmärtämään 
ihmismieltä toimimalla esimerkkeinä kognitiosta joka eroaa omastamme 
asteeltaan tai laadultaan. Kant piti eläimiä olentoina, joilla on vain 
aistimellisuuden kyky. Tutkimalla, mitä Kant kirjoittaa eläinten koke-
muksesta, saadaan tietoa ymmärryksen ja järjen vaikutuksesta vapaan 
aistimellisuuden roolista kokemuksessa. 
Tarkastelen Kantin näkemystä myös suhteessa sitä historiallisesti lähellä 
oleviin Descartesin ja Humen vaihtoehtoisiin tapoihin lähestyä eläinten 
kokemusta. Kantin eläinkäsitys voidaan nähdä vasta-argumenttina Des-
cartesin eläinkoneopille, jonka mukaan eläimillä ei ole mieltä eivätkä ne 
ajattele. Vaikka on ajateltavissa, että jonkinlainen alkeellinen kokemus 
olisi mahdollista fysiologisella tasolla, tällainen kokemus tulee merki-
tyksellisesti vasta kun siitä on mahdollista tulla tietoiseksi, ja tähän 
vaaditaan mieli. 
Toisaalta voidaan esittää, että eläinten ja ihmisen kognitiiviset kyvyt 
eroavat vain asteeltaan. Tämä on Humen näkemys. Väitän että vaikka 
Humen ja Kantin käsitykset eläinten kognitiivisista kyvyistä eroavat 
toisistaan merkittävästi, niiden väliset erot kapenevat kun tarkastellaan 
heidän käsityksiään eläinten mahdollisesta kokemuksesta. Pohdin myös 
lyhyesti eläinmielten metafysiikan suhdetta eläinetiikkaan.




AT  Descartes’ collected works edited by Adam, Charles  
  and Tannery, Paul. 11 vols.
CSM  The Cambridge edition of Descartes’ works. 3 vols.
Discourse Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison 
et chercher la vérité dans les sciences
Meditationes Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae 
Kant’s writings:
Ak.  Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant’s collected works. 29 vols.
A/B The first and the second edition of Critique of Pure 
Reason.
BF Beantwortung der Frage, ist es eine Erfahrung, daß 
wir denken?
Anthr. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht
Collin  Collin’s Lecture Notes
FS Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Fig-
uren
Dohna  Metaphysik Dohna
GMS  Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
Herder  Metaphysik Herder
Abbreviations
JL  Jäsche Logik
KpV  Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
KrV  Kritik der reinen Vernunft
KU  Kritik der Urteiskraft
L1  Metaphysik L1
L2  Metaphysik L2
MM  Metaphysik Mrongovius
MS  Metaphysik der Sitten




EHU  Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
EPM  Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals
T  A Treatise of Human Nature
Abbreviations
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................14
1.1. What and why? .......................................................................................14
1.2. Methods and sources ..............................................................................20
1.3. Preview ....................................................................................................22
1.4. The concept of animal and theoretical framework defined ................24
1.5. Results ......................................................................................................27 
2. THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL EXPERIENCE .......................................29
2.1. The problem ............................................................................................30
2.1.1. Experience and consciousness: central concepts defined .....................30
2.1.2. Ontological and epistemological issues ...............................................38
2.1.3. The problem of animal experience in early modern philosophy ..........42
2.2.Possible solution .......................................................................................43
2.2.1. Eliminativistic view .............................................................................45
2.2.2. Assimilationistic view ..........................................................................48
2.2.3. Moderate view ......................................................................................50
2.3. The problem of animal experience in contemporary philosophy.......52
2.4. Conceptualism and nonconceptualism .................................................54
2.5. Conclusion ...............................................................................................59 
3. DESCARTES ON ANIMAL EXPERIENCE ............................................61
3.1. The foundations of dualism ...................................................................63
3.2. Descartes´ doctrine of the ‘ANIMAL MACHINE’ ..............................67
Contents
3.3. Sensations and thinking .........................................................................70
3.3.1. Sensations: four interpretations ............................................................71
3.3.2. Thinking ...............................................................................................87
3.4. Epistemic issues ......................................................................................91
3.4.1. The flexibility of behavior ....................................................................91
3.4.2. Language ..............................................................................................95
3.5. Conclusion: how should Descartes´ Doctorine of animal machines  
        be understood? .......................................................................................99 
4. KANT’S VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EXPERIENCE ..........103
4.1. The foundation of experience: The soul as the principle of life........106
4.2. The lower cognitive faculty: Sensibility .............................................. 111
4.3. The higher cognitive faculty: Undertsanding and reason ................. 115
4.4. From receptivity to the perception of spatio- temporal objects .......121
4.5. From perceptions to judgements .........................................................127
4.6.The faculties of pleasure and displeasure and of desire .....................133
4.7. Conclusion: The ingredients of experience ........................................137 
5. KANT ON ANIMAL EXPERIENCE .......................................................140
5.1. The analogue of reason: From receptivity to combination ...............143
5.1.1. Receptivity: sensible representations .................................................144
5.1.2. Combination: imagination ..................................................................149
5.2. Animal consciousness ...........................................................................156
5.2.1. No self-consciousness ........................................................................156
5.2.2. The cognitive status of animal representations ..................................162
Contents
5.3. Conceptual and nonconseptual interpretations of Kant ...................170
5.4. Conclusion .............................................................................................173
5.5. Discussion: Kant Vs. Descartes ...........................................................175
5.5.1. Animal machines and representations ................................................177
5.5.2. Kantian mechanism ............................................................................178 
6. HUME AND THE EXPERIENCE OF RATIONAL ANIMALS ...........182
6.1. Hume on animal experience ................................................................184
6.2. Aanimal reason .....................................................................................186
6.3. Is animal reason equal to human reason? ..........................................191
6.4. Comparison of the Humean and the Kantian views of animal  
       experience ..............................................................................................193
6.5. Discussion: Relevance to ethics ...........................................................199
6.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................205 







For, that [the human] has reason does not at all raise him in worth 
above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what 
instinct accomplishes for animals.
    Immanuel Kant, KpV, Ak. 5:61–2
1.1. WHAT AND WHY? 
 
In this study, my purpose is to look deeply into Kant’s view of non-
human animals.1 In particular, I will focus on how animal minds are 
different from human minds, and how this affects experience. I will do 
this by first introducing the problem of animal experience from the point 
of view of contemporary philosophy and cognitive ethology, and then 
by giving a detailed analysis of why this was Kant’s view of animals by 
contrasting it with two other views, Cartesian mechanism and Humean 
rationality. Apart from illuminating the characteristics of Kant’s view, 
they also build the context in which Kant discussed the issue of animal 
experience. A great deal of this discussion concerns the definition of 
reason. What exactly does reason do, and what cognitive operations can 
be explained as a sensible association that does not amount to the use of 
reason? The answers that Descartes, Kant and Hume give to this prob-




1  For the sake of brevity, from now on I will refer to non-human animals simply by the 
word ’animals’. I will discuss this decision in more detail in Chapter 1.4.
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1. Introduction
This study offers a detailed analysis of the mental faculties that are tradi-
tionally considered “animal” by firstly articulating some possible views 
on animal experience. The Cartesian view, for example, is provoking 
and is mentioned in many texts related to animal philosophy, rarely in 
a laudatory manner. It is, however, one possible way to conceptualize 
animal experience. It is a different matter, however, whether it should be 
seen in a Cartesian manner, and whether the view is true. 
Secondly, through these historical examples, this study discusses the 
issue of what can be known of animal experience on the whole. An 
important application of this knowledge is using it in ethical reasoning 
concerning the treatment of animals. My focus here is in the philosophy 
of mind, but I consider the possible ethical implications of this discus-
sion so important that I also want to spend some effort in this issue. 
The fact that animals are in many respects similar to humans has 
made people throughout the ages wonder how close are the similari-
ties between us. We cannot linguistically communicate with animals to 
the same extent that we can with other humans, so how can we know 
anything about the principles behind their behavior?2 Are they the same 
that we have? This study approaches this question from the viewpoint of 
early modern philosophy. 
 
 
2  Of course, the possibility of verbal communication does not straightforward imply that we 
gain profound and objective understanding concerning the principles of action. People can lie, 
or they simply might not be aware of these principles. However, if we could verbally discuss 
with a dairy cow, for instance, it would be simple to ask her point of view of her treatment at 
the hands of human beings.
16
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For the most part, this study is about the analysis of cognitive capaci-
ties and serves to give an overview of the different ways to approach 
these faculties. This theoretical understanding of cognitive capacities 
is applied to animals. Animals are seen as beings equipped with certain 
cognitive capacities, and they can serve as a touchstone for this theory: 
if animals are defined as beings that have the cognitive capacities a 
+ b + c, does this suffice to explain their behavior? I will also look at 
how Descartes, Kant and Hume argued for their views of the cognitive 
capacities that must be attributed to animals to explain their behavior. 
However, in the last resort, Descartes and Kant thought that in reality we 
can never attain certain knowledge concerning the constitution and the 
content of animal minds. 
Why, then, approach the problem of animal experience from Kant’s 
perspective? Hardly anyone can deny the importance of Kant’s careful 
and thorough analysis of human understanding that culminated in his 
Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most influential works in West-
ern philosophy. This first Critique is a detailed exposition of the three 
faculties of human reason, that is, sensibility, understanding and reason, 
defining what these faculties can do and—what is perhaps even more 
important—what they cannot do. According to Kant’s understanding, 
animal cognition is restricted to sensibility. The role of animals in Kant’s 
philosophy is thus to serve as examples of what sensible cognition is 
capable of without understanding or reason. Moreover, animal behav-
iour serves as an example of action that is based on such cognition. In 
the framework of Kant’s philosophy, animal behaviour tells us some-
thing important about the possibilities of sensible cognition. I claim that 
it offers a rich representation of the world, and it enables a variety of 
17
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behaviour from building and maintaining social relations to empirical 
learning. 
 
The alternative way to approach sensibility is to treat it as a faculty that 
becomes relevant to experience only when combined with the higher 
cognitive faculties, understanding and reason. It is important to articu-
late carefully the role of sensibility in experience, since it is crucial in 
answering the questions we are faced with when we think about what is 
unique in being a human compared to being an animal. In what respects 
is human behaviour different from animal behaviour? That is, what do 
the higher cognitive faculties add to the possibilities of action? It is often 
argued that these higher faculties entail concepts and language. Now 
we can ask, whether these skills have any impact on experience. Is, for 
example, the experience of pain essentially similar for humans and ani-
mals, or does the capacity of conceptual thought add something to it? 
 
This study is not an answer to the question, what animal experience 
really is like. That is, I think, a question a philosopher cannot answer, 
and that would require expertise from the field of cognitive ethology. 
This rather serves as a touchstone of our conceptions of animal minds 
and animal experience through the examples of early modern philoso-
phy. There are also important ethical issues related to our conception of 
what kind of experience animals can have. In particular, the question 
of animal suffering—whether animals feel pain and whether it matters 
to them—should matter to us, at least when making ethical decisions 
concerning animals. This study offers a historical background to our 
prevalent views concerning animals and, as astounding as it might seem, 
Kant’s anthropocentric ethics does in fact offer such guidelines con-
18
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cerning the treatment of animals; and, if taken seriously, questions the 
morality of many current practices of animal use. 
 
Why is it important to investigate earlier views of animals? The theory 
of evolution has given us evidence of biological as well as cognitive 
continuity between species; and the recent findings of cognitive ethol-
ogy have given us vastly new knowledge concerning animal cognitive 
capacities. Why stick with outdated views? If the primary aim was to 
investigate, for example, the necessary and sufficient mental capacities 
for the mental processes of external inputs to count as experience, then 
historical views would not be relevant but the study would have to rely 
on the best contemporary research available. My approach, however, is 
historical and theoretical, and the aim is to understand Kant’s view of 
animal experience and the role of sensibility. Furthermore, the discus-
sion concerning animal minds and the concepts that are used in this 
discussion (such as ‘perception’, ‘experience’ and ‘consciousness’) do 
have their historical background. A historical scrutiny thus helps us to 
better understand them. 
Even though the views presented in this work are historical, they all 
propose different ways to perceive animals. In some contexts, animals 
are seen and treated as Cartesian machines; in other contexts as Humean 
rational beings. Intensive broiler chicken production is an example of 
treating animals as machines with only an instrumental value whereas 
pets are often regarded as equal family members. The theory of evolu-
tion and the findings of cognitive ethology do not definitely imply a cer-
tain understanding of animal minds. Even though the theory of evolution 
suggests that there are no strict dividing lines between species, some 
19
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authors (such as Peter Carruthers and Donald Davidson) still argue that 
language makes human experience conclusively different from even the 
most developed animal experience. 
Surprisingly, there are no other studies that contrast the views of these 
three philosophers even though they are not only important views but 
also closely related to one another. Often, authors have compared the 
views of two philosophers; for example, Kant’s view on animals has 
been dealt with by comparing it with Descartes’ view (see, for example, 
Naragon 1990). Markus Wild (2006) has discussed Descartes’ view in 
contrast with Montaigne’s and Hume’s views laying focus on the differ-
ences of the views of animal minds; just like I do here. What is missing 
from Wild’s insightful work is a moderate view on animal minds, and 
Kant’s view is an excellent example of that.  
The contribution of this study to the discussion on animals in early mod-
ern philosophy is that I present here three possible ways to see animal 
minds and show how Kant defends his view against the two other views: 
the Cartesian mechanism and the Humean view of rational animals. This 
study also gives an interpretation of Kant’s theory of the roles of sensi-
bility and concepts in experience. My claim is that the role of concepts 
in perception is not as large as usually thought, and that Kant’s criteria 
for conceptual thinking are quite demanding. Moreover, this study is 
about three ways to see the role of reason in experience. It is extremely 
important in this kind of comparative study to analyze carefully what 
exactly each philosopher refers to with the word ‘reason’. I will show 
that their disagreements are not after all as huge as they first appear. It is 
stunning to realize how much the Cartesian, Kantian and Humean views 
20
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have in common despite the apparently different starting points and 
metaphysical theories. 
1.2. METHODS AND SOURCES
 
The methods in this research are conceptual. The questions presented 
will be subjected to clarification and systematic analysis by which 
inconsistencies and contradictions can be detected. In this kind of study, 
a careful and reflective reading of the relevant classics and secondary lit-
erature is essential. The primary literature consists in the works of Des-
cartes, Kant and Hume. When citing Descartes’ works, I use the abbre-
viation AT to refer to Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul 
Tannery (Paris, Vrin, 1996). In the English translations of Descartes, I 
follow The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated and edited 
by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). I will include an abbreviated title 
of the cited works. A list of abbreviations is included at the beginning of 
this work. The full titles are given in the bibliography. 
I rely on Kant’s critical works as much as possible. However, a large 
part of his discussion of animals is to be found in his lectures of meta-
physics. In using his lectures as a source, there is always the problem 
that they do not necessarily reflect Kant’s own thinking. They are based 
on the Wolffian philosophy. However, Kant does also express his own 
opinion of the subjects in question. The lectures are fruitful in look-
ing for his views on subjects such as the Cartesian doctrine of animals 
21
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as machines. In citing the first Critique, I will adhere to the standard 
notation by referring to the pages of the A- or/and B-edition. Otherwise, 
Kant’s works will be referred to by an abbreviated title and volume; and 
the page number of the Akademie-Ausgabe of his writings (abbreviated 
Ak.). A list of abbreviations is included at the beginning of this work. 
The full titles and abbreviations are given in the bibliography. Unless 
otherwise noted, the quotations are from the Cambridge edition. 
The most important passages concerning animals in Hume’s works are 
Chapter 1.3.16 (on the reason of animals) in the Treatise of Human Na-
ture and Section IX (on the reason of animals) in the Enquiry Concern-
ing Human Understanding. The page numbers of Hume’s works refer to 
the version edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge in 1894 and revised by P.H. Nid-
ditch in 1975, to which edition I refer through the abbreviation SBN. As 
for the secondary literature, I have mostly chosen texts that relate to the 
role of animals in the philosophies of these three philosophers. I present 
different interpretations of the views of Descartes and Kant’s view and 















I will start by introducing the problem of animal experience, explaining 
why it is a problem and sketching some conventional views of how it 
has been approached in current and early modern philosophy. I will also 
define the central concepts related to the problem, such as ‘conscious-
ness’, ‘experience’ and ‘representation’. 
Next, I will discuss the Cartesian view of animals. I will present four 
possible interpretations of Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines 
and argue that the key to make sense of Descartes’ doctrine of animal 
machines is the distinction between sensation perception, the former 
being unconscious and physiological and only the latter amounting to 
experience. It is, however, possible to argue that also sensations entail a 
hint of phenomenal consciousness, but this is practically the case only in 
beings equipped with thinking souls. The Cartesian view is the context 
that Kant argued against, and sketches one possible way of explaining 
animal behaviour and sensibility. 
The Cartesian view serves as a starting point for the discussion of ani-
mal experience in early modern philosophy. A great deal of the discus-
sion concerning the philosophy of animal experience since Descartes 
has been a reaction to his view. I acknowledge that Descartes did not 
create his view out of nothing; it is foremost a reaction and an objection 
especially to the Aristotelian view based on a hierarchy of souls. How-




In the fourth chapter, I present the constituent elements of experience in 
Kant’s philosophy, the lower and higher mental faculties. Special atten-
tion will be paid to the role of the threefold synthesis and the capacity 
of the imagination in the constitution of experience. These elements will 
be put into practice in the fifth chapter, which focuses on animal cogni-
tive capacities and discusses what kind of experience they allow. I will 
conclude the chapter by discussing the conceptual and nonconceptual 
interpretations of Kant while defending the nonconceptualistic reading. 
The sixth chapter sketches a third alternative to approach the issue of 
the difference between human and animal minds. I will present Hume’s 
argument for animal reason; and argue that even though the difference 
between human and animal minds is no longer seen as a difference in 
kind but a difference in degree, this degree remains quite considerable. 
In this chapter, I will also discuss the ethical implications of the view of 
animal experience in the philosophy of Kant and Hume. 
A sharp-eyed reader might have already wondered why I present the 
views of these three philosophers in a wrong chronological order. Hume 
was a predecessor of Kant and has affected Kant’s thinking—would it 
not make this study thematically and historically more logical if Hume’s 
view were presented before Kant and not after him? This is exactly what 
should be done if the intention were to give a historical overview of how 
Kant’s ideas are built on the ideas presented by his predecessors. 
My intention is, however, to focus particularly on Kant’s thinking. By 
giving his view on what the body does and what the mind does, Des-
cartes gives a starting point for Kant to argue against, since Kant sees 
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animals as an instance of why Descartes’ system does not work. This is 
why I have put Descartes before Kant. Hume’s role here is not as much 
to serve as a historical background for Kant’s view—even though it also 
is that—as to provide an alternative way to approach animal minds. All 
these three philosophers have different answers to the questions of what 





1.4. THE CONCEPT OF ANIMAL AND THEORETICAL FRAME-
WORK DEFINED 
 
Most of the central concepts will be defined in Chapter 2 but I think that 
it is appropriate to spell out some terms and theoretical assumptions al-
ready here. First of all, this study is historical and related to the philoso-
phy of mind rather than to animal philosophy, if animal philosophy is 
understood as a critical, even a political field that aims at re-evaluating 
our perceptions of animals. In this study, the role of animals is primarily 
to explicate what makes human beings humans. 
Since the focus of this study is on the views of different philosophers, 
it is not appropriate to use all the concepts consistently throughout the 
research, since that would require modifying the vocabulary of the 
philosophers. This particularly applies to the concepts of consciousness, 
thinking and reason. I will define the central terms in each relevant sec-
tion as the philosopher in question uses them. Still, I first need to define 
some of these terms as I use them. The variety of ways using the most 
25
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central concepts in the philosophy of animal minds makes reasonable 
conversation difficult. It is easy to bark up a wrong tree if it is not clear 
how each party understands the concepts referring to animal conscious-
ness. I will return to this point quite frequently. 
There is one concept that is even more central than these. That is the 
concept of animal. By animals, I mean non-human animals. I understand 
that animals do not form a uniform whole in contrast to humans and that 
humans are one species of animals among others, each species hav-
ing a distinctive set of various cognitive skills. Reason is an important 
capacity for humans but without further premises it does not make us 
objectively superior to other species. There are various cognitive skills 
where other species defeat humans: the human sense of smell is inferior 
compared to that of dogs, and we can barely see in the dark. This, in 
turn, is no problem for cats or owls. These features simply do not matter 
to us and, similarly, the special human cognitive skills do not matter to 
those species of other animals that do not possess them. 
The cognitive skills of an earthworm are far simpler than those of a 
bottlenose dolphin, and yet both of those species fall under the general 
term of “animals” in contrast to humans, even though the cognitive 
difference between an earthworm and a bottlenose dolphin is larger 
than the one between bottlenose dolphins and humans. An equally 
well-grounded study could in principle be made from the viewpoint of 
a squirrel, for example: What is the cognitive feature that makes squir-
rels what they are? What is it that is squirrelish in squirrels, and what is 
animal in them (the term ‘animal’ should be understood here as refer-




While defining the distinctive features of animal experience and human 
understanding, certain value judgments tend to mix into the findings. 
The capacities that only humans possess are regarded as higher, more 
sophisticated, and in general, just better than the animal ones. This 
subjective presupposition lies already in the terms “higher” and “lower” 
cognitive capacities used by Kant. It is clear that for a human being it is 
better to be equipped with reason than to be without it. It is completely 
a different issue whether it is better to be a human or some other animal. 
The possession of understanding should not serve as a yardstick for a 
hierarchical order of living beings according to their ethical or whatever 
relevance, even though it is often taken as one. These cognitive skills 
do not as such justify our ruling the creation. Instead, they enable us to 
do science, create art, have faith in a higher being that gives purpose to 
our lives, propose scientific theories about nature and ethics etc. What is 
important is that these skills entail moral responsibility of how we use 
them. 
The concept of consciousness will be discussed and defined in Chapter 
2.1.1. along with other closely related concepts such as ‘experience’ 
and ‘perception’. I am not interested in physiological brain processes 
with which cognitive operations or phenomenal feelings might be ac-
companied. The physiological level alone is here not enough to qualify 
as cognitive. By cognitive, I do not refer to the capacity of cognition as 
Kant understands it, as consisting of intuition and concept, unless that 
exactly is the topic, and if that is the case, it will be made clear through 
the context. When I use the term ‘cognitive’ outside of such contexts I 
mean by it the processing of information in the mind. 
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I often refer to rationality, or rational animals. The core feature of ratio-
nality, according to my way of using the term, is the capacity to causal 
and instrumental reasoning. Causal reasoning is the capacity to create an 
association: when a certain thing B has been perceived to follow from or 
to accompany a certain other thing, A, for a sufficient number of times, 
the presence of A will be associated with the representation of B. In 
instrumental reasoning the subject can actively strive for A in order to 
get B. The capacity of this kind of reasoning is different from the under-
standing of these principles. I do not want to stress the role of rationality 
more than this, since being rational does not necessarily entail having 
experience or a mind (see, for example, Khalil 2010 on the rationality of 
plants), which is my topic. Rational behavior can, however, be a sign of 





Descartes, Kant and Hume each have a different understanding con-
cerning the definition of reason and the difference between animal and 
human minds. Prima facie, their views seem to be very different from 
each other, but when we look behind the terms they use we see that the 
amount of differences decrease. They all regard the independent use of 
reason as a unique human capacity whereas animals are always depen-
dent on sensible stimuli.
Often, the discussion concerning Kant’s philosophy of mind has con-
centrated on the higher cognitive capacities and the role of concepts 
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in perception. My focus is instead on the role and the possibilities of 
sensibility. Besides the passive, receptive side of sensibility, I stress the 
role of the reproductive imagination in animal experience as the means 
of making animal experience rich, enabling complex cognitive opera-
tions without this amounting to the use of concepts, which are needed in 
judgments. 
It is exactly this role of concepts that keeps Kant from attributing reason 
to animals and seeing the difference between human and animal minds 
as a difference in degree, as Hume does. By broadening the role of 
reason Hume is able to attribute it to animals but, nevertheless, some 
cognitive operations are possible only for humans, and it is exactly those 
operations that Kant sees as the proper use of reason. As Kant states in 
the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, the real value of reason 
comes from what it is used for. The highest use of reason lies in its 
autonomic use in moral issues. In Kant’s view, this requires taking an 
outsider’s view to one’s own functions of the mind, the capacity to see 









2. The problem of animal experience
2. THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL EXPERIENCE
He has Eyes, but knows not what he sees; knows not what to call any 
thing he looks on, or what Uses any thing he sees are appropriated to 
[…].
      Defoe 1726, 64
In the quotation above, Daniel Defoe describes the state of Peter the 
Wild Boy, a feral child believed to be raised in the woods without hu-
man contact. After he was found near Hamelen in Germany in 1725, he 
became an object of curiosity in the English court. Although Defoe’s 
pamphlet is not a scientific but a literary work, it still serves as a suit-
able case-study to introduce the topic of animal experience. It addresses 
some central issues in the discussion concerning animal minds in early 
modern philosophy, such as cognitive and conceptual capacities of a 
non-verbal being, the state—and even existence—of the soul, the range 
and limits of possible experience of such a creature, and the wide-
ranging effects of not having a language. What can we know of a living 
being that does not verbally communicate? What is the world like to 
him? These are exactly the same questions that we are faced with when 
we examine animal minds from a philosophical perspective. 
In this chapter, I will first define some central concepts and explain the 
nature of the problem of animal experience, with special focus on how 
this problem was approached in early modern philosophy. Then, I will 
briefly present three possible solutions to the problem that continues to 
be the guiding thread throughout this work. One extreme view claims 
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that there is no such thing as animal experience, as experience is seen 
as inseparably tied to language. According to another extreme, animal 
experience is very similar to ours. Between these two extremes, there is 
a variety of moderate views. Another important discussion concerning 
this topic is the question of whether conceptual capacities are necessary 
for perceptual experience, that is, the debate between conceptualism 





2.1. THE PROBLEM 
 
2.1.1. Experience and consciousness: central concepts defined 
Before going deeper into the issue, I want to look closer at the most 
central concepts regarding this work, namely ‘consciousness’, ‘repre-
sentation’, ‘sensation’, ‘perception’ and ‘experience’. Each philosopher 
I discuss here uses these terms in a slightly different manner. In discuss-
ing each view, I use these terms as each of them uses them. Here, I want 
to bring together their views on these concepts and define the way I use 
them in a general context.  
By ‘consciousness’ I mean a capacity or a state of awareness. If the 
awareness concerns merely the state the subject is in that makes it like 
something to her, the consciousness is phenomenal. Phenomenal con-
sciousness is first-order consciousness, direct awareness of something: 
an emotion, a sense perception, a feeling. It can be contrasted with re-
flective consciousness. Consciousness is reflective when it is directed to 
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mental states instead of the objects of the mental states. It is higher-order 
consciousness. Everything phenomenally conscious is a mere stream of 
sensations, whereas reflective consciousness consists of thoughts. Re-
flective consciousness is discursive rather than experiential, even though 
using reflective skills is necessarily experiential: we experience also our 
being reflective. In the discussion concerning animal experience, the fo-
cus is on the phenomenal consciousness. It is not clear whether animals 
have reflective consciousness.3 
‘Phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘reflective consciousness’ are rather 
modern concepts. Descartes, Kant and Hume did not discuss the issue of 
consciousness in these terms. However, the referents of these concepts 
are not modern inventions. What is at stake in the discussion concerning 
Descartes’ view of animals is whether animals have phenomenal con-
sciousness, or whether phenomenal consciousness and reflective con-
sciousness come as a package for being equipped with thinking souls. 
For Kant, sensibility enables phenomenal consciousness that is com-
prised of successive conscious representations. Understanding enables 
reflective access to these representations. In Hume’s theory that ascribes 
reason to animals, the degree of the reflective use of impressions (that 
correspond to what Kant means by  
 
 
3  Besides these senses of consciousness that are relevant to my project, it should be mentioned 
that the senses of consciousness are not restricted to them. Some of the most important ad-
ditional senses of consciousness are access consciousness, creature consciousness and state 
consciousness. Ned Block (1995) uses the term ‘access consciousness’ to refer to second-order 
consciousness which enables access to the contents of phenomenal consciousness. The term 
‘creature consciousness’ refers to wakefulness or sentience. When you faint, you lose creature 
consciousness; and when a physician evaluates your state of consciousness, he is first looking 
for signs of creature consciousness. ‘State consciousness’ can be used as a synonym for phe-
nomenal consciousness or the what-is-it-likeness of a mental state.
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representations) increases while approaching to such use of reason that 
is independent of impressions. 
 
Self-consciousness is a high form of consciousness. It is consciousness 
of one’s own subjectivity as an individual. A self-conscious subject can 
observe her representations as representations. General consciousness 
and experience is possible without self-consciousness but not vice versa. 
In contrast to self-consciousness, there is a simpler form of conscious-
ness, object consciousness as awareness of objects that surround us 
without necessarily amounting to consciousness of one’s being the 
subject of the representations. 
I use the term ‘representation’ in the Kantian sense, as a general concept 
that encompasses all mental contents (see KrV, A 319–20/B 376). A rep-
resentation can be conscious, but does not have to be (on unconscious 
representations, see Chapter 5.2.2.). By ‘sensation’ I mean a subjective, 
neural modification that is caused by a stimulus transmitted by sense 
organs to the brain for possible further processing. For Descartes, sensa-
tions can occur only at the physiological level, in which case they re-
main unconscious. Kant and Hume understand sensations as subjective 
modifications of the mind. Sentience is a capacity that unites physiology 
and experience, the external world and internal mind.  
The term ‘perception’ often comes very close to ‘sensation’. Kant, for 
example, counts sensations under perceptions in his Stufenleiter (KrV A 
320/B 376–7), where intuitions and concepts are mentioned as objec-
tive perceptions in contrast to subjective sensations. Descartes makes 
a distinction between sensations and perceptions: perceptions always 
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involve the mind. For Hume, perceptions are impressions whose object 
is present (T 1.3.2., 29). The essential characteristic of a perception is 
that it involves being conscious of something. 
Let us look at this from a neurological point of view. In brief, the 
problem is, when do neural changes in the brain become experience. 
First, there is the objective reality, say, a green avocado. If this avocado 
happens to be in my visual field, it generates some changes in my eyes, 
optic nerves and in the primary visual cortex, V1. At this first level of 
visual perception, I am not conscious of the avocado—I do not yet no-
tice that I am seeing it. What happens here is the sensation. My seeing of 
the avocado attains qualitative elements if it is further processed in the 
occipital lobe, which here is the second level. This is where it becomes a 
perception. The visual perception can become an object of my conscious 
awareness. Then, I am processing it in the frontal cortex. This is the 
third level of visual perception.4 
It is undeniable that the first level—what happens in V1—is uncon-
scious. It is the neural basis of all visual perceptions. The much debated 
question in the philosophy of consciousness asks when experience steps 
in: in the second level or only in the third level? Ned Block (1995) ar-





4  This is a very simplified model of the neurophysiology of visual perception. Its func-
tion is to illustrate what the debate concerning the relation between experience, phenome-
nality and consciousness is about as I will explain shortly. The neurophysiological details 
do not really matter relative to the topic at hand.
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experienced; and the third level is access consciousness and makes pos-
sible the use of the contents of the phenomenal level.5  
 
Experience is constituted from conscious representations. By ‘experi-
ence’, I mean the flow of such states that are not merely physiological 
but also have a qualitative, mental side that make them feel like some-
thing and that might have a representational content. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, s.v. “experience”), the senses of 
the term relevant in my phrasing of the question are the following: “The 
actual observation of facts or events, considered as a source of knowl-
edge”, “The fact of being consciously the subject of a state or condition, 
or of being consciously affected by an event. Also an instance of this; a 
state or condition viewed subjectively; an event by which one is af-
fected.” By ‘animal experience’ I do not refer to the experiential knowl-
edge or skills developed through personal experience although in some 
contexts I also discuss this issue. 
What is relevant for experience is that it is phenomenally conscious. The 
essential thing in phenomenal consciousness is that it is like something. 
Not having any conscious representations is certainly not like anything. 
Phenomenal consciousness comes close to sentience. They are, however, 
not quite identical. Elisa Aaltola (2012, 10) points out that “[w]hereas 
‘phenomenal consciousness’ refers to the capacity to experience in gen-
eral, ‘sentience’ is frequently deployed specifically in the context of pain 
 
5  The so-called global workspace model claims that the second and the third level together 
constitute consciousness (see, for example, Baars 1988). The higher order representational-
ist theories (HOR) claim that the second level consists of first order representations and is 
unconscious; consciousness appears in the third level as second order representations, such as 
thoughts or perceptions (see, for example, Lurz 2009, 9–10).
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and other basic, often physical, experiences.” If we focus on the kind of 
a mental state—whether it is experienced as positive or negative—we 
are talking about affective states (ibid.). Experience is always subjective. 
In the current discussion it is often described in terms of qualia, or raw 
feelings. They incorporate the what-is-it-likeness of particular, subjec-
tive, conscious experiences. For example, the taste of guacamole is a 
quale, as well as its feeling in the mouth. When I eat guacamole with 
you, it is possible and perhaps even probable that my qualia are different 
from yours. However, we can never really compare our experiences: I 
cannot have your experience and you cannot have mine. 
Perhaps the most clear-cut example of an experience is pain. The Inter-
national Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) defines pain as “[a]
n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual 
or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” The 
questions, whether animals feel pain and whether they suffer from pain, 
is of the utmost importance in animal ethics. According to the treaty 
established by the European Community, animals are recognized as 
sentient creatures. The sentience of animals is the starting point of the 
Protection of Animals Act in the member states of the EC. The central 
issue of the Act is to protect animals from unnecessary suffering and 
pain and to promote certain level of welfare. 
Pain is often expressed in behavior: certain exclamations, grimace and 
a tendency to move away from the source of pain (whether possible or 
not) are often associated with the experience of pain. We can find these 
behavioral signs also in animals. From a skeptical perspective, it is not 
clear whether animals can feel pain, but in general it is assumed that at 
36
2. The problem of animal experience
least vertebrates have this capacity due to their neural and behavioral 
similarities with humans.6 
It is possible to argue against animal sentience that even though animals 
sometimes look like as though they were in pain, in fact they do not 
experience pain. In such a case, we are talking about mere nociception, 
which is a physiological reaction to pain without the feeling of pain. No-
ciception is sufficient to trigger the response. It happens at the instinc-
tual, non-conscious level. Pain is a subjective, phenomenal experience; 
nociception a physiological reaction.
If we assume, as it is reasonable, that (most) animals can feel pain, we 
can continue by asking, what are the other possible objects of animal 
experience. What kind of information processing are they capable of? 
What kinds of emotions, moods or feelings can they have? And what 
about more complex experiences such as the feelings of unfairness, 
shame and envy that are related to social interaction?
Along with phenomenality, the likeness of an experience, another issue 
that is constitutive of experience is the aboutness of the experience. 
Experience as a mere mixture of sensations remains meaningless and 
confused. The sensations are in themselves insufficient for determining 
intentional action. If my experience of an avocado were limited to the 
qualia of the visual perception, it would never come to my mind to use 
the avocado in any way. I would have a sensation only of a spatial, dark  
 
 
6  For further discussion, see Dawkins 1998, 308; Singer 1975, 11–13; Webster 1997, 91; 
on the argument against the capacity of fish to feel pain, see Rose 2002; on the methods 
for studying pain in animals, see Webster 1997, 91; on the capacity of cephalopods and 
decapod crustaceans to feel pain, see Minett 2013, 40–1.
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green area. The qualia are there but, as such, my experience does not 
generate any action. Access consciousness makes it possible to use the 
information provided by sense perceptions. If I can identify the avocado 
as an object (not necessarily as an avocado), this kind of conscious-
ness of the content of the experience makes it possible for me to use my 
experience. I can now, for example, try to find out whether the avocado 
is edible and then enjoy the qualia related to its taste. Now the ques-
tion arises, whether this differentiation requires conceptual capacities or 
whether it is possible without them. 
How is the problem of animal experience different from that of animal 
consciousness? In short, the answer is: not much. All (relevant) experi-
ence is conscious. The reason why I have chosen to talk about animal 
experience and not about animal consciousness is in the kinds of things 
on which I want to concentrate. ‘Consciousness’ refers to a mental 
capacity or state, ‘experience’ to the mental content made possible by 
it. Thus, the focus will be on the quality and content of animal minds 
rather than on their mental capacities; these however, will also be care-
fully examined. To know what the capacities are is not as interesting as 
to know what they make possible, that is, experience. Another reason 
to talk about experience and not consciousness is that in early modern 
philosophy, consciousness was closely connected with rational reflection 
as a counterpart of sentience whereas today we are tempted to regard 
sentience as belonging to consciousness. (Morris 2000, 402–3.)  
The core of the problem of animal experience lies in the representational 
content of animal representations. Are animals conscious of what they 
represent? Some authors, such as Jamiesson (2009), address this prob-
lem by discussing animal thoughts. By ‘thinking’, he refers merely to 
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mental content, which is a proper use of the term ‘thinking’ in every-
day language. The reason why I do not use the term ‘thought’ here is 
the technical use of the term in early modern philosophy as referring 
to a cognitively demanding act of the mind, which is often regarded as 
originating from a separate faculty that many authors want to exclude 
from animals. (See Chapter 3.4.2. on Donald Davidson’s argument for 
language as a criterion for thinking and on Norman Malcolm’s argument 
for two senses of thinking, as a propositional act on the one hand and the 




2.1.2. Ontological and epistemological issues 
Simply put, the problem of animal experience can be expressed in a 
direct question that can be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’: Do 
animals have experience? If the answer is negative, we are interested to 
hear the reasons why. If the answer is affirmative, we are tempted to ask 
another question: What is animal experience like? Is it similar to ours? 
If not, how is it different? Very soon we realize that these questions are 
not that easy to answer. We are faced with methodological difficulties: 
Is there a way to reach even a part of the animal point of view? How can 
we reach it, what aspects of it can we reach, and where are the limits of 
our possible knowledge concerning it? 
The problem of animal experience is in fact a version of the skepti-
cal problem of other minds. Instead of asking whether other people 
have minds, the question is directed to animals. As such, it is no longer 
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merely a theoretical problem that haunts mainly philosophers and other 
people with a distorted sense of reality; instead, it is a reasonable ques-
tion whose answer can be further applied to discussions in animal ethics 
concerning the justification of animal use. Another issue in the philoso-
phy of mind where animals bring the discussion from the theoretical 
spheres to reality is the discussion of zombies. If we can find criteria, 
according to which we are justified in believing that other humans are 
not zombies but are sentient, rational beings, then we have little reason 
to deny this conclusion in the case in which we find the same criteria 
fulfilled in animals. 
 
It feels natural to regard animals as beings that undergo experiences. 
This intuition is based on physiological and behavioral similarities be-
tween humans and animals. We can see that animals have sense organs 
and (neuro)physiology similar to ours. It would make sense to assume 
that they had the same function in animals as they do in us. However, 
this inference is logically not valid. The same organ can have different 
functions in different species (for example, not all animals with wings 
are able to fly); or different organs can have the same function (for 
example, some birds are known to be intelligent even though they do not 
have a neocortex that in humans is associated with intelligence).7 
Animal behavior is similar to ours: they seem to have preferences, their 
behavior appears goal-directed; they seem to learn. Their action often 
seems rational instead of irrational or mechanical. It is, however, also 
possible to give a mechanical explanation for animal behavior, one  
 
 
7  For a more detailed discussion concerning analogical reasoning, see Aaltola 2012, 10–11.
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that does not provide conscious experience. Which explanation, then, 
is correct? A good principle of explanations is to rely on the simplest 
explanation possible. Comparative psychology relies on a version of this 
principle known as Morgan’s canon. According to this, we need not ex-
plain animal behavior through a higher mental capacity if it is possible 
to explain it through a lower one. 
However, it is not always easy to decide which explanation is the 
simplest one. If the chosen explanation relies on instincts, we may have 
to assume a very complex system of instincts. Is this explanation, after 
all, simpler than the one based on conscious reflection? Moreover, it 
should be kept in mind that when we are looking for signs of sentience 
in animal behavior, we might need profound understanding of animal 
behavior. Animal behavior is not similar to human behavior in every re-
spect. Animals may, for example, express pain differently than humans. 
(Aaltola 2012, 11–13.)  
The investigation of animal experience is easy to question by appealing 
to the methodological difficulties of this field of study. We cannot even 
know for certain whether animals are conscious beings, much less attain 
the subjective nature of their experience. Thomas Nagel addressed this 
issue in his famous article, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” (1974), where 
he argued that we can know that being a bat certainly is like something 
even though it is impossible to give an objective account from the third-
person-perspective on what it is like. 
 
Peter Carruthers (1999, 2000) argues that there is not anything it is 
like to be an animal: being an animal does not have any particular feel. 
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Especially most if not all representatives of ethically and politically 
motivated animal philosophy8 take it for granted that animal experience 
is—in relevant respects—similar to human experience, or they do not 
consider the cognitive capacities of animals relevant in animal ethics.9 
Colin Allen (2004, 620–1) claims that these extreme views—which, 
surprisingly, are the most common ones in the discussion concerning 
animal experience—are not fruitful approaches to the problem of animal 
experience, because they both presuppose the uniformity of non-human 
species. What, if anything, is similar in the experience of an earthworm 
and chimpanzee? 
 
According to recent research in cognitive ethology (see for example 
Griffin 2001, 12–13; Dawkins 1998b, 177), the most promising signs of 
animal consciousness are flexible behavior, communication and neuro-
psychological similarities with humans (this line of thought can also be 
found in Descartes’ and Kant’s writings). These features—apart, per-
haps, from the last one—provide a subjective point-of-view that matters 
to the subject and affects its behavior. Keeping the restrictions of our 
capacity of knowledge in mind, we can proceed by asking that even if 
we cannot obtain the whole, absolute truth concerning animal experi-
ence, what we can fairly reliably know about it. On this basis, we can 
further consider the role of our view of animal experience in ethical and 
practical decisions concerning the treatment of animals, such as10 the 
question of when analgesics should be given. 
 
 
8  For instance, Cora Diamond 1978 and Barbara Smuts 2001.
9  For instance, Adams 1990, Donovan, 1990; Francione 2010 and Nussbaum 2006.
10  See for example Decartes’ letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646 
(AT IV, 576).
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2.1.3. The problem of animal experience in early modern philosophy 
The problem of animal experience was a topic of lively discussion in 
early modern philosophy. One motivation for it was theological, and it 
was related to faculty psychology. Animals seem to act in many re-
spects as humans do. Many human actions are based on thinking, that 
is, conscious representations of the world, and subjective states such as 
emotions and wants. Is this the case also with animals? Further, it was 
argued that the thinking substance—soul—was simple, not a composite 
and, as such, it cannot be naturally destroyed by decomposition but it 
must be immortal.  
 
In early modern times, the idea of immortal animal souls was regarded 
as improbable if not even impossible. Therefore, in the extreme version 
of the argument (presented most famously by Descartes), animals do 
not have souls and thus cannot be capable of thinking. In his letter to the 
Marquess of Newcastle on May 4 1647 (AT IV:576), Descartes writes 
that
if animals thought like we do, they would have an immortal soul 
like we do, and it is not probable, because there is no reason to 
believe this in the case of some animals without believing it of 
all, and because many, such as oysters, fungi etc. are too imper-
fect to this being plausible.11
Faculty psychology is an issue that hardly any early modern philosopher 
leaves untouched. Its aim is to classify the faculties of the human mind  
 
 
11  My translation. 
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and to define their tasks. In such an enterprise, the interest easily turns 
to comparative psychology: how are animal mental faculties different 
from human mental faculties? Are they different only in degree, so that 
animals are equipped with the same faculties but with a lesser amount, 
or perhaps in kind, so that humans have all the faculties that animals 




2.2. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
In this chapter, I present possible solutions to the problem of animal 
experience by introducing three possible ways to see the difference 
between human and animal minds. This serves as a theoretical frame-
work for approaching this problem and illuminates the ways it has been 
approached also in early modern philosophy. Each philosopher I will 
discuss here represents a different approach, and this chapter helps to 
see what is special in their views and also introduces the relevant termi-
nology. The focus in in early modern philosophy, but I will look at this 
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The views of animal experience can be divided in three12 groups: 1. 
eliminativistic view, 2. assimilationistic view and 3. moderate or dif-
ferentialistic view. According to the eliminativistic view, there is no 
such thing as animal experience. According to the assimilationistic view, 
animal experience is essentially similar to human experience and the 
differences are only differences in degree. The moderate view includes 
several viewpoints between these two extreme views. Common to all 
the views that fall under the moderate view is that the cognitive differ-
ence between humans and animals is seen as a difference in kind. These 
views can thus also be called differentialistic. Also the eliminativistic 
view is differentialistic but in a quite radical way: in eliminativism, the 
difference is substantial. It does not concern even the kind of the experi-











12  Jamiesson’s (2009, pp. 19–34) corresponding division—based mainly on the views in 
contemporary philosophy—has four groups: eliminativism, wet eliminativism, the brute 
content view and interpretivism. As eliminativists (such as Davidson) deny all kinds 
of animal thinking, wet eliminativists (such as Stich) accept that there is some kind of 
belief-like representational activity going on in animals. According to the brute content 
view (such as Allen), the content of animal representation is, at least in principle, identifi-
able; and according to interpretivism (such as Dennett), our attributions of thoughts to 
animals are, in general, sufficiently correct.
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2.2.1. Eliminativistic view  
 
The eliminativistic view claims that animals have no experience; any 
talk about animal experience is therefore nonsense. The eliminativ-
ists accept only mechanistic or physiological explanations for animal 
behavior. In early modern philosophy, Descartes is often seen as the 
most famous representative of this view. The question of whether there 
is room for animal experience in Descartes’ theory is a topic of lively 
discussion and not everybody agrees that phenomenal sentience of 
animals is incompatible with it. I will discuss Descartes’ argument and 
its various interpretations in detail in Chapter Three. In this chapter, the 
standard interpretation of the Cartesian view serves as an example of the 
eliminativistic view. 
According to Descartes’ substance dualism, the world consists of a 
material and an immaterial substance. Each substance is autonomic, that 
is, subjected to certain kind of laws. Natural laws govern the material 
substance whereas immaterial, thinking substances are capable of auto-
nomic action. In humans, these substances interact: we can decide how 
we move our mechanically functioning body. Animals are merely mate-
rial beings; there is no immaterial substance present in them, and since 
thinking, in Descartes’ view, is the attribute of the immaterial substance, 
animals do not think. According to the eliminativistic standard interpre-
tation of Descartes’ view of animals, animals are machines devoid of 
everything mental: they have no feelings whatsoever. Being an animal is 
not like anything. All animal action can be explained through mechanis-
tic physiology. Animals are seen as machines, and sensorial inputs  
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together with the pre-programmed physiological responses determine all 
their behavior without this amounting to any kind of experience. 
In early modern times, Descartes’ view was criticized from a physico-
theological point of view (for example G.F. Meier 1749, § 69–70, 
117–19; and H.S. Reimarus 1773, § 109, 212–15). According to 
physico-theology, everything in nature is perfect and purposeful and, as 
such, nature is seen as a living proof of the existence of God. Mechani-
cal animals would be useless parts of nature, incapable of enjoying the 
Creation, and therefore the Cartesian doctrine of animals must be mis-
taken. Another, a more recent problem for this view is the complexity of 
the explanations of animal behavior, as already discussed above. It can 
be claimed that the eliminativistic view multiplies the mechanistic and 
instinctual entities beyond necessity by denying conscious experience. 
Descartes acknowledges this line of argument and answers it by appeal-
ing to the intelligent design of the mechanics of animals, mechanics that 
is far beyond our skills. 
In contemporary philosophy, Carruthers (2000) has argued that animals 
probably do not have phenomenal consciousness. Even though the 
world is somehow presented to them, they do not really experience it 
anyhow. Animal experience can perhaps be compared with the experi-
ence of sleepwalking. Carruthers argues that we are tempted to ascribe 
conscious mental states to animals. When we are thinking, for example, 
what it might be like to be a squirrel jumping from one tree to another, 
we are in fact projecting our own conscious thoughts on to the squirrel 
and simulating what we would be experiencing if we happened to have 
access to his mind. According to Carruthers, the squirrel’s experience is, 
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however, in fact probably unconscious and not like anything. This does 
not rule out sense perceptions, only their phenomenality. (Carruthers 
2000, 198–200.) 
What about animal pain, then? Do they not feel pain? According to 
Carruthers (2000, 200–1), they perceive pain as a phenomenally con-
scious feeling, but can still be in the state of pain, which is a first-order 
perceptual state and which does not imply this state having any kind of 
feeling in the same sense as it is possible to be able to see the color, red, 
without this being like anything. Carruthers’ claim is that phenomenal 
consciousness is not a necessary part of the experience of pain. Phenom-
enal consciousness requires higher order representations which make 
perceptual relations to the contents of the representations, in this case, 
pain, possible. “[T]o feel pain is to have a first-order analog representa-
tion of a certain property (paina) distributed through a certain region 
of one’s body; and the experience of feeling pain may or may not have 
any subjective feel or ‘what-is-it-likeness’, either.” (Carruthers 2000, 
200–1.) For the state to have a feeling one needs to be able to recognize 
it (ibid., 14). 
 
The eliminativistic view is based on the idea that phenomenal sentience 
is not necessary to explain animal behavior; and since it is not necessary, 
it is reasonable to assume that it does not exist. This view relies heavily 
on the fact that animals do not have a language. Language is seen as a 
sign of second-order consciousness that is seen as a necessary condition 
for the awareness of perceptions: Without the ability to express what 
you feel you do not really feel anything. In this study, I want to stress 
that feeling and making a judgment concerning the feeling are two dif-
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ferent things, and the latter capacity adds to the experience exactly the 




2.2.2. Assimilationistic view 
 
The assimilationistic view is the opposite view of eliminativism. Ac-
cording to assimilationism, the difference between animal and human 
cognitive capacities is only a difference in degree; or, as Rescorla (2009, 
52) puts it, “linguistic and non-linguistic cognition are fundamentally 
the same.” In early modern philosophy, Hume, Locke and Meier can be 
counted as assimilationists. This seems evident when we look at Hume’s 
bold claim in Treatise (1.3.16, 173) that it is an evident truth that ani-
mals have reason as well as humans.  
The approach of Hume and Meier to animals is more empirical than 
that of Descartes and Kant in that they both stress the importance of 
observing animal behavior. By comparing our observations to our own 
behavior, we can make analogical inferences concerning the reasons for 
animal behavior. We clearly see that animal and human behavior are es-
sentially similar in that we both aim for what we find pleasant and avoid 
what is unpleasant. We know that in doing so, we are guided by con-
scious representations. Thus, we may conclude that animals also have 
conscious representations; otherwise we would have to use different 
standards in explaining the same thing in different species. 
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The assimilationists proceed bottom up, from the most basic cognitive 
traits (that is, sensibility) that humans and animals share with higher 
ones (that is, conceptual and abstract thinking) where the cognitive dif-
ference is to be found. Animals do have conscious experience and they 
learn from experience. The empiricist assimilationists (such as Locke 
and Hume) regard empirical learning as an important proof of animal 
reason. Learning provides memory and a primitive understanding of 
causality. 
A problem for assimilationism is the difficulty of retaining the differ-
ence between humans and animals as a difference in degree. Even if we 
talk of degrees, there is always a line that cannot be crossed. If this line 
is between reason that is blended with sensibility and reason free from 
sensibility, as David Hume sees the difference between humans and 
animals (I will take a closer look in Hume’s argument in Chapter 6), this 
seems like a difference in kind. One might also accuse assimilationists 
of assuming too much from animal cognition (just as the eliminativists 
were faced with the opposite problem, of assuming too little). This view 
takes seriously our tendency to attribute beliefs to animals and aims to 
justify it rather than refute it through theoretical reasoning that requires 
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2.2.3. Moderate view 
According to the moderate view, animals are conscious beings and it 
makes perfect sense to talk about animal experience, but animal experi-
ence is essentially different from human experience in that animals only 
have sensible (or lower) capacities13 and not discursive (or higher) ones 
as humans do. Lower cognitive capacities are responsible for sentience, 
whereas higher cognitive capacities make thinking and self-conscious-
ness possible.  
 
Understanding and reason are higher capacities. Language, as a product 
of higher cognitive capacities, is considered a central factor that dif-
ferentiates between humans and animals. As Rescorla (2009, 52) writes, 
the idea is that “non-linguistic creatures display cognitive activity of a 
fundamentally different kind than human thought.” In contrast to the 
assimilationistic view, which regards the difference between humans and 
animals as gradual, the moderate view regards this difference as a differ-
ence in kind. Thus, it can also be called differentialism. In early modern 
philosophy, the most famous advocates of this view were Leibniz and 
Kant. Here, I will shortly discuss Kant’s view, on which I will concen-
trate in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Kant’s view of animals adds experience and mentality to the elimina-
tivistic interpretation of the Cartesian view. According to Kant, animals 
are beings that have sensible representations. They cannot, however, 
conceptualize these representations, since they do not have the required  
faculties, understanding and reason. Furthermore, animals are not  
 
13  On the division of the cognitive capacities in the lower and higher ones, see Chapter 4.
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conscious of themselves. All this keeps animal action mechanical, that 
is, subject to natural and physiological laws and necessities. Higher cog-
nitive capacities entail freedom and moral responsibility. What this view 
adds to eliminativism is the mind: animals do have mental representa-
tion and there is something it is like to be an animal, but this something 
is very rudimentary in cognitive respect (the intuitive content can, how-
ever, sometimes be richer and more detailed than what is possible for 
humans; comparing, for example, the sense of smell in dogs and in us). 
According to this view, animal experience is a non-conceptual flow of 
sense perceptions, moods and emotions. Unlike humans, animals cannot 
perceive something as something. Due to this non-conceptuality, it is 
difficult if not impossible to know what exactly animals are thinking 
(thinking should be read here as referring to mental content), since we 
would have to use concepts to describe the non-conceptual representa-
tions, and this is why some philosophers are tempted to say that accord-
ing to this view, animals do not think. Even though animals can make 
distinctions at the level of perception, it does not follow that they can 
make conceptual distinctions. 
According to Wild (2006, 8), the interaction between mental faculties in 
humans can be a problem for differentialism. If higher cognitive facul-
ties are completely different in nature from the lower ones, how can they 
interact? Schemata are Kant’s solution to this problem. Another problem 
for differentialism is—just like in eliminativism and assimilationism—
explaining animal behavior. To compensate for the missing higher facul-
ties, the differentialist may have to assume very complex instincts, and 
once again it can be asked whether this is the simplest way. 
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2.3. THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL EXPERIENCE IN CONTEM-
PORARY PHILOSOPHY 
Before moving on, let us take a brief look at the problem of animal ex-
perience from the viewpoint of contemporary philosophy to see how this 
discussion has developed since Kant. Contemporary philosophers are no 
longer concerned with the question of animal souls. Instead, the focus is 
on the question of the relation between language, experience and think-
ing. I introduce two contemporary problems here. The first is theoretical 
and concerns the structure of animal representations; the second is more 
practical in that it depends heavily on studies in the field of cognitive 
ethology and concerns the cognitive capacities of animals: can they have 
knowledge concerning minds? If they can, what does it tell us about 
their cognitive capacities? 
In contemporary animal philosophy, one important discussion concerns 
the language of animal thought. According to Elisabeth Camp (2009), 
there are three ways to understand the structure of (animal) representa-
tions: iconic, propositional and map-like. Iconic representations repre-
sent the environment as an image with no formal structure. Propositional 
representations can be combined very flexibly and, in map-like repre-
sentations, the combinatorial principle is robust and restricts the possible 
representations and the possible relations of the representations (Camp 
2009, 121–2). Camp (2009, 125) suggests that the language of animal 
thought is at best map- or diagram-like. As we will see, the same prob-
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In contemporary animal philosophy and comparative psychology, there 
is discussion about theory of mind (for example, Povinelli and Vonk 
2006, Proust 2006, Tomasello and Call 2006) and metacognition (for 
example, Call 2006, Proust 2006, Shettleworth and Sutton 2006) in 
animals. The core question of this issue is whether animals know that 
other animals also have minds and their own viewpoint of the world. In 
the discussion concerning metacognition, the focus is on the ability to 
understand one’s own mental states as mental states: do animals know 
that they know? These contemporary discussions are fundamentally 
a continuation of the early modern discussions concerning the mental 
faculties of animals. The role of philosophy is to assess the criteria for 
the correct use of the relevant concepts: How is using concepts to be dif-
ferentiated from proceeding from mere sense perceptions? When are we 
justified to ascribe higher cognitive capacities to animals? 
In the contemporary, politically-orientated animal philosophy, the skep-
ticism concerning animal experience is seen as ungrounded sophistry; 
we intuitively know that animals are intelligent beings that have feel-
ings. It is argued that this should be our starting point in dealing with 
the questions of animal ethics (see, for example, Dawkins 1985, 27–8; 
on a detailed exposition of the central doctrines of animal philosophy, 
see Wild 2008 19–24). The issue of animal experience has still not 
been completely solved. Cognitive ethology constantly generates new 
knowledge concerning the cognitive abilities of animals. The job of the 
philosopher is to define the sufficient and necessary conditions for the 
relevant concepts, such as the concept of self-consciousness or reason, 
to ensure that they are appropriately employed. 
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2.4. CONCEPTUALISM AND NONCONCEPTUALISM 
 
The problem of animal experience lies at the heart of the debate between 
conceptualism and nonconceptualism concerning mental contents: are 
concepts a necessary condition for conscious representational mental 
content, that is, conscious experience? What is the relation between 
conceptual capacities and perception? In particular, what is the role of 
perception in conscious experience? I will now briefly introduce the 
conceptualistic and nonconceptualistic views, since answers to these 
questions form the foundation to our perceptions concerning the issue of 
animal minds. In Chapter Five, these themes will be applied to interpret-
ing Kant’s perceptions concerning the role of sensibility in the consti-
tution of experience. Kant sees animals as beings that are capable of 
sensible perception regardless of their incapacity of using concepts, and 
I argue that this is a strong argument for the nonconceptualistic reading 
of Kant. 
The core claim of conceptualism14 is that conceptual capacities deter-
mine all experience; there can be no perceptual discriminations without 
the possibility of conceptually referring to their content, if only through 
a demonstrative concept (see Hanna 2008, 46). Our original encounter 
with the world is already tinged with categorization of perceptions. 
There is no such thing as pure perception that somehow precedes judg-
ment independently from concepts or, if there is, it cannot have any kind 
of representational content. 
 
 
14  For example McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) argue that the role of perceptions 
lies in providing reasons for beliefs and that conceptual contents are necessary for this.
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This implies that animals—assuming that they are non-rational, lack-
ing conceptual capacities—do not have mental contents (see Hanna 
2008, 42; and 2005, 250), meaning that there is no such thing as animal 
experience. 
 
Colin McLear (2011, 3–4) distinguishes between two kinds of concep-
tualism which he calls sensory solipsism and sensory nihilism concern-
ing non-discursive consciousness. Sensory solipsism allows subjective, 
phenomenal consciousness experience of non-discursive minds but only 
the access to objective world. Sensory nihilism allows interaction with 
the environment without it being anything like the subject of which 
Descartes’ mechanistic view is a good example. McLear argues for non-
conceptual cognition, that is, the possibility of objective consciousness 
without conceptual capacities. Hanna (2008, 59) argues for nonconcep-
tual contents by claiming that direct sensimotor subjectivity is possible 
without meta-representational self-consciousness. 
 
John McDowell (1996, 114, 119) claims that animals with no concep-
tual capacities lack self-consciousness, experience of objective reality, 
external experiences and inner experiences. He claims that the idea that 
human experience differs from animal experience only in that humans 
can conceptualize what they perceive rests on the so-called myth of the 
given (originally presented by Sellars 1956/2000), the idea that there is 
a fundamental structure of the world that can be nonconceptually and 
directly perceived (McDowell 1996, 63–5; 114), and, furthermore, the 
perceptions of the same object are essentially similar, independent even 
from the species of the subject (Brewer 1999, 177). 
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According to the nonconceptualistic standpoint,15 the mental content 
provided by perception is nonconceptual, and thus concepts are not 
needed for representing the world. In this view, it is easy to account for 
the experience of non-linguistic creatures such as human infants and 
non-human animals. Non-conceptual thinking is “domain-specific and 
modular” whereas conceptual thinking is “domain-general, systematic 
and productive” (Bermúdez and Cahen 2008/2011). 
There are at least three strong motivations for adhering to the noncon-
ceptualistic view. The most important argument is that non-linguistic 
creatures such as animals and human infants clearly seem to have 
perceptions without the ability to conceptualize them. Closely related 
to this, it would be difficult to account for the fact that it is possible that 
human infants with dormant conceptual capacities learn to conceptualize 
the world around them, without this being a giant leap in the way they 
experience it (see also Hanna 2008, 43). Lastly, it sometimes happens 
that one experiences something that one would like to share with others 
but just cannot find the exact concepts to describe one´s experience.  
 
Not having the concept does not imply not having the experience.
The difference between animal and human minds can be approached 
from two starting points. The first option is the top-down approach, 
which proceeds from the conceptual capacities emphasizing the differ-
ences between the two kinds of minds whereas the bottom-up approach 
proceeds from the basic, shared features and sees them as the relevant 
foundation for conceptual capacities.  
 
15  This view was originally spelled out by Evans 1982 and it was further developed by Pea-
cocke (see, for example, 1992). Also McLear 2011, Laiho 2012, Hanna 2008 and Hurley 2006 
argue for the nonconceptualist stance.
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The top-down approach supports the conceptualistic account whereas 
the bottom-up approach is compatible with nonconceptualism (see also 
Hanna 2008, 43). 
I have not yet encountered any convincing reply from the part of the 
conceptualists to the issue of explaining animal perceptions. They have 
two options: they must either accept that at least some animals have 
concepts, or they must deny the possibility of animal experience. Still, 
the conceptualist has to assume a huge leap between a conceptual intel-
lect and a nonconceptual intellect, and the fact that most human infants 
seem to learn conceptual thinking gradually rather than with a sudden 
leap seems to contradict that view. Brewer (1999, 178–9) acknowledges 
this problem but argues that this alone does not imply that conceptual-
ism is mistaken; instead, he claims, that there is an equal problem for 
the nonconceptualist concerning the interaction between perceptions and 
concepts which are seen as completely different kinds of things. Brewer 
does not, however, meet this challenge and argue for conceptualism 
here. I claim that he is making things more complicated than they are, 
mixing the roles of perception and concepts (see Laiho 2012, 228). 
McDowell (1994) has faced this challenge by developing an account 
of “perceptual sensitivity to features of our environment” instead of 
nonconceptual content as the shared feature between rational and non-
rational beings; but what is shared is more of a tendency, not a content 
or a form. For humans, this sensitivity is essentially conceptual. In this 
way, McDowell (1994, 116) argues, the features of the environment can 
be “problems or opportunities” for animals, even though they do not 
perceive them as such. Defined this way, conceptualism is compatible 
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with object consciousness of animals without this having to amount to 
phenomenal consciousness. Animals can act—or, rather, react—in the 
world, but they are completely determined through their physiological 
structure and environment. Again, this makes the leap to conceptual con-
sciousness enormous. Through concepts, one would not only be credited 
with the capacity to judge but also the contents on which to judge, that 
is, a complete world. The form and content would come in the same 
package. 
I claim that our primary encounter with the world is not conceptual but 
phenomenal. Otherwise it would be impossible to account for experi-
ences that are hard to put into words. We know what we want to de-
scribe, we recognize that the concepts that come to our mind come close 
but do not capture the exact experience we have in mind. Still, that does 
not make it any less of a conscious experience. Conceptualization helps 
to reconnect with the experience by providing a label for the contents of 
the essential characteristic marks of its object. The conceptualists would 
claim that since it is possible to start referring to this content by a con-
cept, it already is of a conceptual character in the demonstrative sense. It 
is “that” perception I mean, and not any other simultaneous perception. 
To be able to individuate it in the first place is already conceptual. But I 
claim that here the conceptualists broaden the concept of a concept too 
far. If I am unable even to articulate the necessary components of the 
given experience, but can still perceive them, I do not see how this is 
supposed to be conceptual. 
Finally, the key issue before going deeper into this debate is to define 
clearly what exactly it means to have a concept (see also Bermúdez and 
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Cahen 2011). Is the capacity for perceptual, singular discernment al-
ready conceptual, or do concepts require more generality? Are concepts 
necessarily linguistic? Where exactly is the border between meaningful 
perceptions and concepts? Does demonstrative pointing count as using 
a concept? Similarly, as in explaining animal behavior, it is important to 
find the right balance between how much and how complicated in-
stinctual responses have to be assumed and where is the right place for 
rational reflection to step in; it is important to find the balance between 






In this chapter, I have defined the most central concepts concerning 
the problem of animal experience and highlighted its ontological and 
epistemological aspects. The epistemological approach should always 
be kept in mind to remind us that the assumptions concerning other 
minds are only assumptions, not hard facts. This problem has often been 
approached from the viewpoint of how animal minds are different from 
human minds. In this chapter, I have introduced three possible ways to 
see this difference. These three ways guide our way through this whole 
study, since each philosopher I discuss here represents a different ap-
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Hardly any early modern philosopher concerned with animal minds dis-
agrees that it is the capacity for abstract conceptual thinking that makes 
humans different in relation to animals. Whether this difference is seen 
as gradual or qualitative, it nevertheless entails significant implications 
on the whole of life: the way of living and experiencing. Reason entails 
the capacity to understand what is meant by morality and freedom of 
choice. Let us go back to Peter the Wild Boy for a while. Defoe (1726, 
24) describes him as “a Ship without a Rudder, nor steer’d or managed, 
or directed by any Pilot; no, hardly by that faithful Pilot called Sense, 
the Guide of Beasts.” This description is directly applicable to animals, 
even according to the assimilationistic view. 
My topic in this study is metaphysical—what kind of experience mere 
sensibility, the faculty Kant ascribes to animals, makes possible. Even 
though the metaphysical question of animal minds and the ethical ques-
tion of the proper treatment of animals are distinct, ethics and meta-
physics are not completely isolated from another, and I want to shortly 
discuss the contribution of the former to the latter. Our views concerning 
what makes us different from animals can be and have been used in the 
discussion concerning our moral duties to animals. 
It is important to notice that loose criteria for treating animals do not 
follow directly from eliminativism; similarly, assimilationism does not 
necessarily entail high moral demands concerning animals, even though 
it is easy to assume such connections between the moral standing of ani-
mals and our conception of animals. The scope and depth of the possible 
experience is not the sole criterion for ascribing moral value to animals. 
I will shortly discuss Kant’s and Hume’s views of animal ethics in rela-
tion to their metaphysics of animal minds.
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3. DESCARTES ON ANIMAL EXPERIENCE
Toys can’t see even black.
 Kerttu, five years.
In this chapter, I will discuss the Cartesian view of animals as mechani-
cally functioning material beings that have no minds. To understand 
Kant’s view of animal experience profoundly, it has to be set in a histori-
cal context. It is a counterargument to Descartes’ mechanistic view of 
animals. This chapter sketches a starting point for Kant to argue against. 
Simply put, Descartes’ doctrine is that animals are material beings that 
do not think. The common understanding of this view is that it justifies 
meaningless torture of animals. If animals do not think or even feel, it is 
unnecessary to treat them humanely (see for example Rogers 1997, 15; 
Dombrowski 2013, 227; Rollin 2013, 256). 
The short description of Descartes’ view of animals does not, however, 
say much to explain animal behavior—not to mention animal sensations. 
Descartes had profound reasons for classifying animals as machines, and 
before proceeding to Kant’s thoughts on the subject, it should be made 
clear what he meant by this and why he thought like this. When we have 
a good understanding of Descartes’ way of explaining animal behavior 
and the implications of his view on the possibility of animal experience, 
it is easier to understand how Kant’s view works as a counterargument 
to it. 
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In the above quotation, my daughter aptly characterizes the state of 
non-experience by using toys as an example. What about animal experi-
ence in the Cartesian view, then? Is it like the toys with no experience, 
not even the experience of complete blackness? Or is there something 
more in the experience of animals, perhaps some kind of experiential 
blackness, with no further qualifications? Or is it, perhaps, very rich in 
the level of sentience, without distortions caused by preconceptions and 
anticipations of the analyzing and selective mind? 
 
According to Descartes’ substance dualism, the world is composed of 
two kinds of substances, unextended spirits and extended bodies. The 
chief difference between humans and animals is their ontological ingre-
dients: animals are composed of mere matter, whereas humans also have 
a thinking soul. The question about animal experience is particularly 
tricky in this view. Descartes counts various cognitive acts as thinking 
which, by definition, is excluded from animals. The case is not as clear, 
however, for sentience: does all sentience count as a species of thinking, 
thereby being excluded from animals; or is there room for experience at 
the physiological level? 
In the following paragraphs, I will first concentrate on the foundations 
of Descartes’ substance dualism; especially on the question of why he 
thought that humans must have souls whereas animals cannot. Then, I 
will explain his doctrine of animal machines and discuss the problem 
of whether this doctrine allows of animal experience. In Section Three, 
I will look closer at Descartes’ notions of sensation and thinking. I will 
classify the interpretations of animal sensations into four groups ac-
cording to what level of experience is granted to non-thinking creatures. 
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Sensations cannot be discussed without any reference to thinking, but 
the focus in the second part of this chapter is on the question of what 
the core element of thoughts is, that is, when sensations count as think-
ing. To conclude, I ask how Descartes justifies all this, given that it is a 
common practice to attribute thoughts to animals. This section will deal 




3.1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DUALISM 
Briefly, the difference between humans and animals in Descartes’ view 
is that humans have a thinking soul and animals do not. Before focusing 
on Descartes’ arguments for his doctrine of animal machines, let us first 
concentrate on the questions of why he thought that humans must have 
an immaterial soul, and why he could not accept that animals have souls. 
The answer for these questions is to be found in the Meditations. 
In the Second Meditation, Descartes realizes that there is one thing that 
is impossible for him to doubt: that he thinks. “But what then am I? A 
thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, af-
firms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory 
perceptions.” (CSM II:19, AT VII:28.) Here, Descartes defines things he 
just knows for certain every time he experiences them, and they all fall 
under the category of thinking. He cannot be as certain of the existence 
of his body (which he, however, finally proves in the Sixth Meditation), 
to which, however, he notices himself being in a close relation.  
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Since the degree of certainty concerning these two substances is differ-
ent and since they can be grasped independently of each other, they are 
distinct substances and the soul must be immaterial: 
[M]y essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. 
It is true that I may have (or, to anticipate, that I certainly have) 
a body which is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on 
the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far 
as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other 
hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an 
extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I 
am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” (CSM 
II:54, AT VII:78).
Here, Descartes takes the non-extendedness—which entails simplic-
ity—of the soul as given. He argues for it later (CSM II:59, AT VII:86). 
The argument that material beings are divisible whereas the immaterial 
soul is indivisible is, according to him, sufficient to prove that mind and 
body are different and independent substances. If a part of the body is 
removed the soul does not diminish. Different acts of the soul are not its 
parts; there is only one mind that does all those things. (Ibid.) 
The possibility of animal thinking is an issue that often comes up in the 
objections to Descartes’ Meditations (see, for instance, CSM II:144, 
AT VII: 204–5; CSM II:189; AT VII: 270–1; CSM II:279, AT VII:414). 
Many authors, such as the early modern philosophers, G.F. Meier and 
H.S. Reimarus and the contemporary philosopher, Stephen Gaukroger, 
suggest that the simplest—or the most plausible—explanation for 
animal behavior is that they have thinking souls, since they seem to be 
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capable of information processing in the sense that they interpret their 
stimuli. 
One reason for refraining from attributing souls to animals is the prin-
ciple of parsimony. There are two principles of action, spiritual and 
material. Descartes is convinced that the latter can explain all actions of 
animals. (CSM II:161–2, AT VII: 231–2.) His arguments for this point 
will be examined in the fourth section of this chapter (epistemological 
issues). Descartes (CSM II:248, AT VII: 358) also points out that we 
can study animal thinking only empirically; we cannot look inside their 
heads to see what they think or feel. We cannot prove with absolute 
certainty that animals think or that they do not, since we see animals 
only from the outside. Descartes’ point is that we do not need thoughts 
to explain animal behavior. 
It is important to keep in mind that Descartes’ focus is not in argu-
ing against animal souls from the theological point of view where the 
idea of immortal animal souls is regarded as absurd. Descartes’ argu-
ment also includes this point (see for example letter to the Marquess of 
Newcastle, 23 November 1646, AT IV, 576), but it is not the reason why 
he refrained from attributing soul and thoughts to animals, which would 
make his argument ad hoc. This argument runs as follows:
1. Animal behavior can be explained either by attributing thoughts 
to animals or mechanically without attributing thoughts.
2. The ability to think is a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
having a soul.
3. The idea of immortal animal souls is absurd.
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4. Therefore, animals do not think and their behavior should be 
explained mechanically.
Here, the conclusion does not follow since absurdity does not necessar-
ily entail falsity. His focus is rather on the question of what we need to 
explain animal behavior:
1. Animal behavior can be explained either by attributing thoughts 
to animals or mechanically without attributing thoughts.
2. The ability to think is a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
having a soul.
3. Animal behavior does not include anything that could not be 
explained mechanically without attributing thoughts.
4. Therefore, given the restrictions of human knowledge, animals 
do not think and their behavior should be explained mechani-
cally.
Descartes’ conclusion is more modest here than in the first argument. He 
admits that we can never really know whether animals undergo experi-
ences and what their possible experiences are like, since the perspective 
of another being is simply not attainable from our subjective, first-per-
son perspective. 
 
Descartes’ theory broadens the scope of mechanical explanation. The 
core of Descartes’ notion of the soul is that thinking depends on it. Life 
is possible without a soul. In his letter to More on February 5th 1649 
(CSM III:366, AT V:278), Descartes writes that “I do not deny life to 
animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of the heart.” 
For Descartes, life is a material principle that enables the maintenance 
of the organism. Also sensation takes place at the material level. Already 
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this point shows how the Cartesian doctrine is an alternative to the Aris-




3.2. DESCARTES’ DOCTRINE OF THE ‘ANIMAL MACHINE’ 
 
Descartes’ view of animals can be condensed to the doctrine of the ‘ani-
mal machine’ [AM]: 
 [AM]: Animals are machines and they have no souls. 
According to Descartes, there is a qualitative difference between ani-
mals and humans: animals do not have thinking souls like humans do.16 
This difference concerns the very essence of beings, not their acci-
dents, since accidental differences are possible within a species (see for 
example Discourse; CSM I:112, AT VI:2–3). The spiritual substance is 
not present in animals. Thus, animals do not think and all their action is 
mechanical. It should be noted that AM applies also to humans as far as 
their bodies are concerned. Descartes is famous for eagerly comparing 
animals with clocks, but he uses the same analogy also with respect to 
human bodies. Like animal behavior, a part of human behavior can also 
be explained mechanically. (Treatise on Man, CSM I:99, AT XI:120; 
Hatfield 1992, 345.) The physiological function of all bodies is based on 
the properties of matter and natural laws. 
16  According to Cottingham (1993, 15), this is the reason why Descartes uses the word bête or 
brutum (beast) to refer to animals and not the word animal, whose root is in the Latin word 
anima, soul. However, in the Aristotelian-scholastic conception of the soul the word animal 
refers to lower animals such as oysters and brutum to higher animals such as dogs. They have 
sensibility in common, but only the latter are capable of autonomic movement. (Wild 2006, 
31–2.)
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According to the AM, animals are machines. Without any particular 
expertise in animal physiology, it is, however, easy to see that there is 
something essentially different in the functioning of, say, elephants and 
cell phones; even besides the obvious fact that elephants are organic 
beings and cell phones are artifacts. Descartes, however, thinks that it 
is in principle possible to construct an animal but not a human. Animals 
differ from human-built machines only in that their structure is more 
complicated. (Discourse, CSM I:139, AT VI:55.) The constructor of ani-
mals must be very skilled. Descartes (letter to More February 5th 1649, 
CSM III:366, AT V:277) regards animals as automata built by nature. 
Cottingham (1978, 551) splits the doctrine of the AM into seven asser-
tions: 
(1) Animals are machines. (2) Animals are automata. (3) Animals 
do not think. (4) Animals have no language. (5) Animals have no 
self-consciousness. (6) Animals have no consciousness. (7) Ani-
mals are totally without feeling.17 
These assertions capture the idea of animal machines. Animals are ma-
chines because they function mechanically; they are automata because 
they move by themselves; they do not think since they are material; they 
have no language since language requires thinking and an immaterial 
substance; they have no self-consciousness because that, again, is not 
possible at the material level; the same goes for consciousness (provided 
that consciousness is understood in the cognitively demanding sense or 
that the doctrine is given an eliminativistic interpretation); and finally, 
they have no feelings as far as they are understood as modes of thinking. 
17  Periods added by me.
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Cottingham (ibid.) claims that Descartes agrees with the first five asser-
tions and is unclear with the sixth but, unlike the standard interpretation 
suggests, there is no reason to accuse him of asserting the seventh one, 
which has been characterized as monstrous (Cottingham 1978, 552). 
For example, in his letter to More on February 5th 1649 (CSM 366, AT 
V:278), Descartes claims that “I do not even deny sensation [to animals], 
in so far as it depends on a bodily organ.” As to Cottingham’s sixth as-
sertion, Carriero (2009, 24; 70–1; 366) and Morris (2000, 404–6) point 
out that the issue of consciousness is not as central for Descartes as 
judgment and rationality are. 
The exact relation between sentience and thinking is a hot issue in Des-
cartes’ notion of animals. Descartes does not deny sensations from ani-
mals, but he does deny thinking from them. So far, this sounds simple. 
The problem is that Descartes counts sense perceptions, or conscious 
sensations as thinking. At the same time, he attributes various emotions 
to animals, such as joy or fear. This seems like a serious contradiction. 
The question is, is there room for any kind of animal experience in Des-
cartes’ view of animals. Reception of sensory information is an essential 
element of sentience. This, however, can be interpreted either only in 
physiological terms, or as having also an experiential aspect.  
Is it possible for animals, as machines ingeniously built by nature, to 
be to some extent aware of their feelings without it being necessary to 
ascribe a thinking soul to them? 
When reading Descartes, I think it is important not to confuse sensations 
with phenomenal consciousness. My suggestion concerning the most 
plausible interpretation is that even though it theoretically is possible to 
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argue that in Descartes’ system sensations are like something, even not 
much, to their subject in the physiological level alone, this makes sense 
only if there is a thinking soul that has access to them. Therefore, inter-
pretations that claim that animals can have phenomenal consciousness 
are incompatible with Descartes’ view. Understood like this, sensations 
are not much more than mechanical reactions. Only when the soul steps 





3.3. SENSATIONS AND THINKING 
 
Cartesian scholars disagree on the correct interpretation of the doctrine 
of AM. The standard interpretation (introduced above) claims that 
Descartes regarded animals as nothing but machines and wanted to deny 
them sentience and even life along with thinking. The standard inter-
pretation flourished already in early modern philosophy. For instance, 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus and Georg Friedrich Meier read Descartes 
according to it. In the last few decades, some authors, such as John 
Cottingham (1978) and Stephen Gaukroger (2002), have questioned the 
standard interpretation by claiming that Descartes’ account allows of 
some kind of animal experience. This interpretation can further be 
divided in two strands. The moderate interpretation, one that Cotting-
ham defends, claims that animals do have experience but it is uncon-
scious. Gaukroger represents the radical interpretation and claims that, 
in Descartes’ view, “[s]entient animals have not only cognitive states but 
affective ones as well” (Gaukroger 2002, 213). 
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The fourth option is to acknowledge the (apparent) inconsistencies in 
Descartes’ writings on animal sensations without preferring either way 
to read them and explaining away the other as a rash statement. There 
are two strategies how to proceed from here. This issue can be recog-
nized as an unsolvable problem in Descartes’ view; or it can be claimed 
that even though Descartes seems to be contradictory here, it is possible 





3.3.1. Sensations: four interpretations 
 
The important thing in reading Descartes’ mechanistic theory on sensa-
tions is that it is directed against the hierarchical Aristotelian model of 
souls. Aristotle divides the soul in three parts all of which have their 
own functions. The vegetative soul is responsible for nutrition and 
growth. It is a necessary and a sufficient condition of life, and is present 
already in plants. The sensitive soul makes sense perceptions possible, 
and the rational soul contemplation. Animals have a sensitive soul, 
humans a rational soul. The lower functions of souls are present also in 
the higher ones. The soul is always a unity, but not all souls are similar. 
(Aristotle, De Anima / On the soul, 414a29–415a14.) 
Descartes claims that it is unnecessary to assume different kinds of souls 
since a rational soul is the only kind of soul needed. The functions of 
lower souls, such as growth and sensation, can be explained mechani-
cally. Descartes’ extension of the scope of mechanical explanation is 
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radical. He claims that mechanics can do a great deal more than previ-
ously thought, namely explain sensation and animal action. (Morris 
2000, 403.) 
 
In his reply to the sixth set of objections (CSM II:294–5, AT VII:436–7), 
Descartes divides sensory response into three grades: 1) “the immediate 
stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects” (sensation), 2) “the 
immediate effects produced in the mind as a result of its being united 
with a bodily organ which is affected this way” (perception), and 3) “the 
judgments about things outside us” (understanding). Only the first grade 
is material; the soul plays an important role in the second and the third 
grade. The second grade captures the interaction of the two substances. 
Animals remain in the first grade, whereas humans have all three grades. 
The problem is whether mindless animals can experience their sensa-
tions. 
This is how Descartes’ theory works in practice: Catherine is walking 
barefoot and steps on a stone. The stone causes pressure on Catherine’s 
sole. This pressure activates tiny, string-like fibers inside the foot, and 
they deliver the message of the incident to the pineal gland (which 
Descartes takes to be the seat of imagination and soul but which, how-
ever, exists also in animals). In the pineal gland, the movement of the 
fibers activates the animal spirits, which Descartes describes as wind- or 
flame-like particles in the blood that are responsible for many functions 
of the body. The animal spirits react to the stimulus by activating the 
appropriate muscles and other parts of the body, in this case the muscles 
of the foot which then lift the foot away from the stone that caused the 
pain. (See Treatise on Man, CSM I:101–2, AT XI: 141–2.) 
73
3. Descartes on animal experience
All this can happen very fast, as a reflex, without Catherine’s rational 
deliberation. There does not have to be any temporal delay between the 
sensory stimulus and the activation of the animal spirits. The tiny fibers 
are like strings with a bell attached to one end: “just as when you pull 
one end of a string, you cause a bell hanging at the other end to ring at 
the same time” (Treatise on Man, CSM I:101, AT XI: 142). If Catherine 
were an animal, this would be all there is for her sensation. Since she, 
however, has a soul, she can become conscious of this sudden pain by 
perceiving it through her soul. Now she can further articulate to herself 
the judgment, “My foot hurts”. This is the third grade of sensation.
Let us now look at three ways to understand animal sensation in Des-
cartes’ system: 
 
(i) Standard interpretation: no experience 
The standard interpretation includes all assertions in Cottingham’s list in 
Chapter 3.1. In Descartes’ mechanistic doctrine, there can be sensations 
that are not experienced, or phenomenally conscious. The sensations of 
animals are just like the pullings-of-a-string described above without 
them being like anything to the animal. The sounds that animals make 
are comparable to the sounds of organs: they are physiologically neces-
sitated, not actively produced by the animal as expressions of some kind 
of an emotion, feeling or intention.  
 
A thermostat and a guided missile react mechanically to changes in the 
environment. A thermostat reacts to changes in the temperature by turn-
ing on when the temperature falls below a certain level and turning off 
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when the temperature exceeds that level. A guided missile uses heat as a 
clue of the location of its target. What seems like a complex, voluntary 
action that requires thinking can in reality be based on much simpler, 
mechanical processes. However, hardly anyone is willing to attribute 
beliefs or even representations to thermostats or missiles. 
How is animal behavior, then, different from the behavior of a guided 
missile? Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1773, § 209, 215), a philosopher 
of the Enlightenment, discusses the differences between animal and 
mechanical action in his treatment of Descartes’ view of animals argu-
ing that a machine moves from one place to another in a straight line, 
whereas an animal can find many routes to the same place. He illustrates 
this through a detailed example of a dog finding the best route to a table 
full of delicacies after having realized that it is not possible to reach it 
through the most direct route by jumping. A guided missile does not 
necessarily move in a straight line, but the important thing is that it 
responds only to one clue of the environment, namely heat. Animals are 
far more flexible, and the variety of possible clues they react to is wider. 
It is, however, easy for Descartes to respond to this criticism by pointing 
to the carefully designed precision mechanics of animals.18  
 
This interpretation captures the common understanding of Descartes’ 
view of animals as a hostile view that justifies cruel treatment of 
animals. It is often associated with the vivisections performed and 
described also by Descartes in his studies of anatomy (see McCance 
2008, 77–82). This was also the common interpretation in early modern 
philosophy. Reimarus (1773, § 109, 211), for example, formulates 
Descartes’ doctrine as follows: “All animal actions could be explained 
18  See Camp’s (2009) division of possible languages of thought in Chapter 2.3. 
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from mere mechanism without the permission to ascribe them a soul, 
life, feeling or representation.”19 
Reimarus looks at Descartes’ writings from a physico-theological point 
of view, where nature is seen as demonstrating God’s perfection. He 
thinks that Descartes’ notion of animals, which depicts animals as soul-
less machines, is an insult to God: ”[T]his view […] robs the world of so 
many thousands of species of living creatures that it renders most of the 
world dead and incapable of all happiness, which defames the perfection 
of the master as well as his work.”20 (ibid. 212; see also § 7, 9.) 
 
(ii) Moderate interpretation: unconscious experience 
Descartes often hints at there being some kind of awareness in animals. 
Therefore, many authors consider the standard interpretation insuffi-
cient. However, Descartes’ writings do not allow of a cognitively  
demanding notion of animal experience since it is not possible without 
a thinking soul; and some authors, such as Cottingham (1978), have 
argued that animal machines do have experience, but it is unconscious. 
Markus Wild (2006, 173) aptly calls this a yes-but-doctrine: “Animals 
do have sensations but they are not conscious of it.”21 Unlike the stan-
dard interpretation, this view allows attributing feelings to animals. 
19  “man könne alle Handlungen der Thiere aus dem bloßen Mechanismo erklären, ohne 
daß man ihnen eine Seele, Leben, Empfindung oder Vorstellung zueignen dürfte.” (My 
translation.)
20  “[Diese Meynung] beraubt . . . die Welt so vieler tausend Arten der Lebendigen, sie 
machete den allergrößten Theil der Natur todt, und aller Glückseligkeit unfähig; welches 
die Vollkommenheit des Werkmeisters sowohl als seines Werkes schmälert.” (My transla-
tion.) It might be helpful to already keep in mind here that the connection between repre-
sentations and the soul is important for Kant. 
21  My translation. (“[Tiere haben] Empfindungen, aber sie haben kein Bewußtsein davon.”)
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According to Cottingham (1978, 555), Descartes counts only such 
sensations as thinking that are accompanied by reflective consciousness, 
that is, the mind’s awareness of its own representations. In animals, 
then, there are sensations but they are unconscious. Pain is perhaps 
the most obvious example of a sensation that is not perceived through 
reason but it is sensed (Meditations, CSM II:56, AT VII:81). In humans, 
body and soul form a whole, which makes it difficult to differentiate 
between bodily and mental events. Humans can consciously form a 
judgment “I am in pain”, while in animals, we can imagine, there just 
wafts an indefinite sensation of pain, and it is not even clear what this 
kind of sensation means for the animal. Does it just serve as a stimulus 
to somehow change the situation to get rid of the sensation, or does it 
include a feeling of distress? 
 
Cottingham bases this interpretation on numerous textual passages in 
the writings of Descartes. Peter Harrison (1992, 224), however, reminds 
us that Descartes made a difference between sensations as feelings and 
sensations as passions, and claims that Cottingham does not take this 
division into account but takes all passions as feelings. Descartes as-
sumed that awareness of passions is possible—but not necessary—only 
for humans:
 
As for the movements of our passions, even though in us they are 
accompanied by thought because we have the faculty of thinking, 
it is nevertheless very clear that they do not depend on thought, 
because they often occur in spite of us (letter to Newcastle, No-
vember 23rd 1646, CSM 3:303, AT IV:573). 
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The passions of animals cannot, of course, be connected to the soul 
since animals have none. There is thus no reason to think that animals 
are sentient beings. Their reactions to their environment are mechanical, 
and they cannot be regarded as subjects of experience.  
 
It should be kept in mind that Cottingham understands consciousness as 
a discursive capacity that makes possible language and judgment. It is, 
however, difficult to understand what exactly the unconscious sensa-
tions would be like, unless they are understood at the physiological level 
without any qualitative element but then this interpretation is not differ-
ent from the standard interpretation in any relevant sense. For a feeling, 
it is crucial that somebody feels something, and without a conscious 
subject, the qualitative element of the feeling disappears.
 
(iii) Radical interpretation: experience 
Some authors think that attributing subjective experience to non-
thinking animals is not incompatible with Descartes’ mechanistic view. 
Gaukroger (2002) constructs this kind of interpretation, even though he 
also acknowledges the lack of clarity in Descartes’ expressions concern-
ing his exact view of the possibility of animal experience. 
 
Gaukroger (2002, 203) compares the principle of animal sentient action 
with the principle of non-sentient action: non-sentient action is based on 
reflexes and governed by a causal mechanism whereas sentience enables 
information processing and interpretation of stimuli. The way animals 
behave suggests that they are not completely determined through a caus-
al mechanism but there is some degree of rational reflection involved. 
Not all clues are given the same weight. 
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From this Gaukroger (ibid., 200) concludes that non-thinking animals 
are aware of their environment. He is even ready to allow cognitive 
states to them, even in the Cartesian context. What the immaterial sub-
stance and the capacity to think add is the unity of these states and the 
capacity to form judgments. (Ibid., 223.) In animals, representations are 
thus “fragmented and dispersed” (ibid.), and their experience is probably 
very different from ours: 
[T]he automaton can have a representational response to a stimu-
lus without that response taking exactly the same form as a hu-
man sensation: what an animal experiences when it perceives 
color as a result of a visual stimulus is not necessarily the same as 
what we experience when we perceive color under these circum-
stances. (Gaukroger 2002, 201–2)
Gaukroger suggests here—much like Nagel in his famous article on bats 
(1974)—that even though we cannot know what animal experience is 
like and even though it probably is not justified to attribute animals the 
same kind of experiences that we have, we can nevertheless suppose that 
it is like something. 
 
Gaukroger uses Descartes’ doctrine of the pineal gland as an argument 
for his interpretation. In the Cartesian physiology, representations are 
formed on the pineal gland at the material level. The pineal gland is like 
a neural TV screen that projects the information that has been delivered 
through the sense organs. In humans, these representations are then 
available for the mind to consciously look at and judge on. Nevertheless, 
it is quite correct to say that also animal machines do have representa-
tions. It is, however, another issue whether animals are aware of the 
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content of representations. It might as well be that there runs a flux of 
representations in the pineal glands of animals without them having any 
idea—or experience—of that, the function of the representations just 
being the generation of relevant physiological reactions. According to 
Gaukroger (2002, 201), however, this would make no sense. Memory, 
which Descartes ascribes also to animals, is also based on the pineal 
gland. 22 Remembered representations are formed again in the gland. 
Gaukroger’s move from corporeal representations to awareness seems 
rather bold. Moreover, it makes Descartes an identity theorist: if animals 
do not have minds but do have brain states of which they are aware (that 
is, the representations on the pineal gland), then animal experience, 
which does not amount to conceptual capacities which provide a soul,  
equals brain states. The Cartesian identity theory functions at the level 
of sense perceptions. Conceptual thinking is not a brain state but an 
action of the immaterial substance. In his letter to Newcastle on Novem-
ber 23rd 1646 (CSM III:304, AT IV:576), Descartes himself hints at this 
direction: 
 
The most that one can say is that though the animals do not perform 
any action which shows us that they think, still, since the organs of 
their bodies are not very different from ours, it may be conjectured 
that there is attached to these organs some thought such as we expe-




22  On the mechanistic explanation of memory, see Treatise on Man (CSM 106–7, AT 
XI:177–8).
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The Cartesian identity theory is, however, short of textual support—in 
fact Descartes provides textual support against this view in the replies to 
the objections to his Meditations:  
If […] they [the opponents of dualism] take the view that the 
formation of thoughts is due to the combined activity of parts of 
the brain, they should realize that this view is not based on any 
positive argument, but has simply arisen from the fact that, in the 
first place, they have never had the experience of being without 
a body and that, in the second place, they have frequently been 
obstructed by the body in their operations. (CSM II:95–6, AT 
VII:133.) 
Rather than being an interpretation of the Cartesian account, this 
enterprise would be more feasible as a mechanistic view arising from 
Cartesian background.23 The tenets of the standard or the moderate 
interpretation could, however, argue that even if there were a series of 
representations on the pineal gland of animals, experience would not 
follow. Instead, these representations affect animal behavior by activat-
ing relevant animal spirits in a specified way. 
 
(iv) The open interpretation: mechanism + contradictory views on 
the possibility of experience 
As far as the notion of phenomenal consciousness is applicable to Des-
cartes’ philosophy, Descartes’ writings reflect some kind of uncertainty  
 
 
23  The possibility of identity theory is raised in the objections to Meditations, but Des-
cartes firmly rejects it.
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concerning the phenomenal consciousness of animals. On the one hand, 
he seems to say that animals do not experience anything. For example, 
in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (CSM I:42, AT X:415), he 
writes that “we refuse to allow that [animals] have any awareness of 
things”, and in his letter to Mersenne on 11 June 1640 (CSM III:148, AT 
III:85), he claims that animals cannot feel pain:  
I do not explain the feeling of pain without reference to the soul. 
For in my view pain exists only in the understanding. What I do 
explain are all the external movements which accompany this 
feeling in us; in animals it is these movements alone which occur, 
and not pain in the strict sense.
On the other hand, he often hints at animal feelings. In the Passions of 
the Soul (CSM 1:348, AT XI:370), he seems to attribute sensations to 
animals: “When a dog sees a partridge, it is naturally disposed to run 
towards it; and when it hears a gun fired, the noise naturally impels it 
to run away.” This passage can, of course, be understood as referring to 
seeing and hearing as merely neurological occurrences without reference 
to any kind of visual or auditory experience. It is more difficult to see 
what emotions or feelings would be without them being experienced. 
Let us look at the following passage from Descartes’ letter to Newcastle 
(AT IV, 574): “All the things which dogs, horses and monkeys are taught 
to perform are only expressions of their fear, their hope or their joy; and 
consequently can be performed without any thought” (my italics). What 
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In the third set of replies to objections of Meditations (CSM II:128, AT 
VII:182–3), Descartes makes an interesting comparison that might help 
us to solve this. Just as it is different just to see a lion than seeing it and 
being afraid of it, “seeing a man run is different from silently affirming 
to oneself that one sees him”. This seems to hint at the possibility of 
phenomenal consciousness of non-thinking animals: animals could have 
experiential sensations without any kind of capacity to analyze their 
contents. The “seeing a man run” is something that just might happen 
when looking around without having to amount to a conscious percep-
tion, while “silently affirming to oneself that one sees him” requires 
paying attention to what is seen. The first case can be just a mechanical 
sensation amounting only to certain physiological reactions, while the 
second case is also conscious. 
 
Some authors try to explain away passages that conflict with their 
interpretation of the subject. As Vili Lähteenmäki (2009, 19) points out, 
Cottingham and Gaukroger depend on selected passages in Descartes’ 
writings to support their interpretations. However, they both also men-
tion that animal experience in the Cartesian framework is a problem, 
which perhaps cannot be satisfactorily solved, even though they both 
construct coherent interpretation of Descartes’ view of animal sentience 
(Cottingham 1978, 557–9; Gaukroger 2000, 201). Some authors (such 
as Wild, Lähteenmäki and Carriero) confess that there are unsolved and 
perhaps unsolvable difficulties and contradictions in Descartes’ writings. 
Wild (2006, 175) argues that Descartes did not want to deny animals 
feelings but to avoid being metaphysically inconsistent, he had to. There 
are, then, two different issues concerning Descartes’ notion of animals: 
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first, the theoretical notion of animals in the framework of Cartesian 
dualism, and secondly, Descartes’ own idea of animals as beings that 
experience and feel. According to this view, animals remain a huge 
problem for Descartes’ metaphysics. The way animals seem to be simply 
does not fit into the metaphysical framework.24 
Lähteenmäki (2009) argues that in Descartes’ account phenomenal ex-
perience of material animals would be possible (in the sense of conceiv-
ability) without thinking—this is the case with infants, for example—but 
Descartes nevertheless refrains from attributing phenomenal conscious-
ness to animals since it would amount to ascribing modes of thought to 
them. In other words, Descartes’ focus is not in the claim that animals 
do not have experience; but rather that it is not necessary to attribute 
experience to animals. 
John Carriero (2009) does not offer a clear answer to the question of 
animal experience in Descartes’ view, and therefore also his interpreta-
tion is suitable under this heading. He points out that Descartes talks of 
“a purely mechanistic sensing” of animals and “a cognitive sensing” in 
humans, but that Descartes is unclear concerning the content of mecha-







24  On this so-called common sense strategy for defending animal sentience and con-
sciousness, see Allen 2004, 621–25.
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Catherine Morris (2000, 403–6) argues that our current concepts of 
consciousness make it difficult to really understand Descartes’ doctrine 
of AM. She points out that Descartes wanted to keep thinking and sen-
tience strictly separated, and since humans have both faculties, sensation 
 in us is substantially different from sensation in animals, but this does 
not mean that animals, who do not think, would not have sensations 
or feelings. What Descartes wanted to deny animals is thinking and 
consciousness in the meaning of rationality and capacity of judgment 
and free will, not feelings. It is an essential part of human nature that the 
body and the soul are closely linked with each other. It is difficult—if 
not impossible—to imagine what a feeling would be like without mak-
ing a judgment concerning it but, nevertheless, it is conceptually pos-
sible for the qualia to exist without a judging soul. 
In all of these four interpretations it is important to distinguish between 
mechanical reaction, sentience, consciousness and thinking on the one 
hand; and between passion, sensation and sense perception on the other. 
Mechanical reactions and passions are possible at the unconscious level. 
It is consciousness that makes sensations meaningful to the subject. 
Consciousness enables the capacity to choose how to react to them, or 
how to use the information provided by them, and most authors argue 
that it is consciousness that makes experience possible. 
The (i) standard interpretation allows of talking only of passions and 
sensations as mechanical reactions. The (ii) moderate interpretation 
understands sentience as something a little more than a mere mechanical 
reaction, but not yet amounting to consciousness. The (iii) radical inter-
pretation sees no problem in sensations being phenomenally conscious 
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in animals, but this consciousness does not amount to self-consciousness 
or thinking. The (iv) open interpretation says that Descartes’ doctrine of 
animals is incoherent. 
 
According to the doctrine of AM, Descartes means by animal sentience 
mechanical reactions to sensible stimuli. For humans, it is possible to 
be aware of such reactions. Today, the ability of animals to feel pain 
and to suffer is commonly acknowledged (see, for example, Allen 2004; 
detailed literature revue on the subject in Aaltola 2012, 12–20), and it 
serves as a starting point, for instance, for the Protection of Animals Act. 
However, it is supposed to be valid primarily for mammals since the 
nervous system of invertebrates and fish is remarkably different from 
ours. 
The ability of fish to feel pain has, in particular, invoked a great deal of 
discussion. James D. Rose (2002 and 2014) argues against the percep-
tion of pain in fish. Rose argues that although fishes react to painful 
stimuli, they do not feel pain since they do not have a neocortex, which 
in humans is associated with conscious experience. In fishes, he claims, 
we can talk only about nociception, that is, a mechanical reaction which 
does not provide conscious experience of pain.25 There is, however, also 
research (for example Sneddon 2003 and 2006) that hints to the direc-
tion that Rose is mistaken and in fact fishes do feel pain. 
25  In humans, nociceptical reactions can occur in medical operations performed under local 
anaesthesia (Rose 2002, 14). The question of pain perception in fishes is still unsettled. For the 
arguments for the capacity of fish to feel pain, see Sneddon 2006, and on the whole controver-
sy, see Allen 2013 It is, however, impossible to achieve absolute certainty concerning subjec-
tive experience of animals through neurological means (Cf. Peter Sandøe, B. Forkman and S.B. 
Christiansen 2004, 121–126.) For a more detailed discussion on the subject, see Chapter 2 (the 
problem of animal experience).
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There is a great deal of similarity in the views of Rose and Descartes 
on the consciousness of animals (in Rose’s case, fishes). Descartes’ 
argument is, however, more radical since he refrains from attributing 
consciousness even to animals that have a nervous system similar ours. 
However, analogical reasoning is not always reliable in comparative 
psychology. A certain nervous structure that in humans is associated 
with a certain cognitive function is not a necessary condition for such a 
function. For example, birds do not have a neocortex which in humans 
(and other mammals) is responsible for many cognitive processes, such 
as the processing of sensorial information, reasoning and language; 
many birds, nevertheless, are capable of complex cognitive action.26  
The Cartesian view of animals leads easily to complex mechanical ex-
planations of animal behavior. It certainly is possible to give a mechani-
cal explanation for such phenomena such as hunger or pain,27 but it is 
hard to see how a mere mechanism without any kind of awareness can 
bring about actions such as preying that requires a constant focus on 
the prey in an ever-changing environment. Would it be possible to talk 
about some kind of bodily consciousness with regard to animals? Could 
phenomenal consciousness be possible without a soul? I think that it is 
exactly this that Cottingham (1978, 558) wants to say in observing 
that the sensations (such as pain or anger) that Descartes attributed to 
animals require some kind of consciousness, if not self-consciousness, 
which requires second order consciousness of one’s own representations 
and of one’s being the subject of one’s representations. If this is the case, 
then Cottingham’s view comes very close to that of Gaukroger. 
 
26  For a general summary on this subject, see Aaltola 2012, 11; on differences in brain 
structures, see Rogers 1997, 95 –129; as an example of cognitive skills in birds, see Pep-
perberg 2006 on problem solving in parrots.
27  See, for example Principles of Philosophy, CSM I:281, AT VIII:318.
87
3. Descartes on animal experience
3.3.2. Thinking 
 
Morris (2000, 401–2) aptly explicates the twofold goals of Descartes’ 
doctrine of AM: The first goal is to argue that we need only one kind of 
soul, namely rational souls, and we can well do without attributing them 
to animals (see for example letter to More on February 5th 1649, CSM 
3:365, AT V:276). His second goal is to refute arguments on animal 
thinking, presented for example by Montaigne and G.F. Meier, who ar-
gue that animals do think but their thinking is essentially different from 
the conceptual, human thinking (see, for example, letter to Newcastle, 
November 23rd 1646, CSM 3:302, 303; AT IV:573, 575). 
Descartes claims that there is only one kind of thinking. Thinking is 
an action that can be explained only through an immaterial substance. 
Thinking is the attribute, or the principal property of the immaterial sub-
stance whereas extension characterizes the corporeal substance (Prin-
ciples of Philosophy, CSM I:210, AT VIIIa:25). Matter cannot think. 
Thus, thinking makes humans different from animals. In this section, I 
will look at what Descartes understood by thinking. 
 
In the Principles of Philosophy (CSM I:195, AT VIIIa:7), Descartes 
explains that he means by thought “everything which we are aware of as 
happening within us, insofar as we have awareness of it.” He continues 
by saying that thinking includes “understanding, willing and imagining” 
and also “sensory awareness” (ibid.). In the Third Meditation (CSM 
II:25–6, AT VII:37), he divides thoughts into ideas that are, “as it were 
the images of things”, and attitudes to ideas such as volitions, emo-
tions and judgments. Awareness seems to be a central characteristic of 
thoughts. How is this awareness, then, to be understood?  
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Can phenomenal consciousness count as such awareness? If we admit 
this, we would be able to refute the radical interpretation, since the 
attribution of phenomenal consciousness to animals would amount to 
attributing thinking to them, which is precisely what Descartes denies. 
Norman Malcolm (1973, 11) suggests that the presence of a proposition-
al content is a necessary condition for thoughts in Descartes’ view. 
 
The key to understanding Descartes’ apparent contradictions concern-
ing sensations as such and sensations as thinking, according to Malcolm 
(1973, 11–13), lies in the propositional content of thoughts. He claims 
that conscious sensations have a propositional content and should 
therefore be counted as thoughts. This means that the subject can form 
a judgment concerning the propositional content of the sensation. Pain 
itself is not propositional, but the judgment “I am in pain” is. According 
to this view, animals do not think and do not have propositional states 
of mind, but they can still have experiential sensations. As a theory of 
sensations, this view would count as a radical interpretation, according 
to which experience is compatible with mechanism. 
 
Malcolm’s argument focuses, however, on the fact that Descartes’ view 
contradicts the everyday practice of attributing thoughts to animals. He 
claims that Descartes does not take the difference between the expres-
sions “S thinks that p” and “S has the thought that p” into account and 
thus understands all thinking in the latter, cognitively more demanding, 
sense. Malcolm claims that it is justified to talk about animal thinking in 
the former sense, which does not require attributing a propositional con-
tent. A person walking on a slippery street certainly thinks that the street 
is slippery—as far as she has noticed the street being slippery—without 
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expressing this thought in any way, that is, without the thought having 
a propositional content. This unconscious, or unexpressed thought still 
affects the way she walks. 
Malcolm presents an example which has provoked a great deal of dis-
cussion: A dog chases a cat. The cat flees up into an oak tree and then 
jumps to a maple tree without the dog noticing. The dog stays barking in 
front of the oak tree. Now, it seems justified to say that the dog thinks—
and has a false belief—that the cat is still in the oak tree. However, 
according to Descartes, this is by no means permissible, since animals 
cannot have any kind of propositional mental states. (Malcolm 1978, 
13–16.) But the inability to express one’s thought does not mean that 
there is neither thinking nor sentience. Malcolm’s argument is intended 
to show that Descartes’ conclusion that animals cannot have thoughts 
because they do not express them, does not follow. 
 
Malcolm’s description of animal thinking justifies explaining animal 
behavior through thinking. It is also a theory of animal experience. Mal-
colm, however, commits exactly the mistake Descartes argues against in 
refuting the Aristotelian notion of the hierarchical system of souls: Mal-
colm assumes two kinds of thinking. To count as a serious interpretation 
of Descartes doctrine of thinking, Malcolm should admit that what is 
commonly understood as animal thinking is in fact a kind of sensation. 
Malcolm’s view that a thought is different from its verbal expression has 
also been questioned by Donald Davidson (2001 [1982], 95–105). Since 
Davidson’s view concentrates on language, I will postpone its discussion 
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The Second Meditation (CSM II:20–2, AT VII: 30–3) illuminates the 
function of thinking in contrast to sensation. There, Descartes investi-
gates a piece of wax. Its properties change according to the temperature. 
A cold piece of wax is solid, it makes a sound when it is tapped, it tastes 
mildly like honey and has a mild scent of flowers, whereas heated wax is 
tasteless, scentless and liquid and makes no sound when tapped. Des-
cartes concludes that the wax must be perceived in the understanding, 
not through the senses, since otherwise it would not be possible to grasp 
the different sense perceptions as relating to the same substance. There 
are, according to Descartes, two modes of perception. Sense perception 
relates to superficial properties; the faculty of judgment relates to the 
substance or being and is clear and distinct:  
[F]or what distinctness was there in my earlier perception [of the 
piece of wax]? Was there anything in it which an animal could 
not possess? But when I distinguish the wax from its outward 
forms—take the clothes off, as it were, and consider it naked—
then although my judgment may still contain errors, at least my 
perception now requires a human mind. (Italics added.)
The perception of something as something, regardless of its appearance, 
requires a thinking soul that can have insight into the very being of the 
objects of perception. Interestingly, this passage leaves open the pos-
sibility of there being a phenomenal consciousness in animals, as a mere 
consciousness of something, without this something being identified at 
all as anything. 
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3.4. EPISTEMIC ISSUES 
Descartes’ claims concerning animal minds are clearly at odds with the 
common sense view of animals as beings that feel and act consciously. 
Therefore, Descartes must have had good reasons to defend his meta-
physical doctrine against this view. In this section I ask whether it is 
possible for Descartes to get empirical support for his doctrine. How 
can he justify the claim that animals that so much resemble humans in 
their behavior are in fact non-thinking beings that hardly have anything 
that could be characterized as experience? Flexibility of behavior is one 




3.4.1. The flexibility of behavior 
 
Animal behavior often seems very clever. Furthermore, animals resem-
ble humans physiologically. This is why we tend to think that animals 
sense and think like we do and that their behavior is based on will and 
reasoning. It is difficult for Descartes as a strict dualist to draw any kind 
of conclusions concerning consciousness by looking at animal physi-
ology. As far as he can assume that thinking has anything to do with 
brains, he has no physiological grounds for denying animals the capac-
ity to think (letter to Newcastle, November 23rd 1646, CSM III:304, AT 
IV:576; letter to More, February 5th 1649, CSM III:365, AT V:277). He 
even regards the argument of physiological analogy as the best one for 
animal thoughts:  
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I see no argument for animals having thoughts except this one: 
since they have eyes, ears, tongues and other sense-organs like us, 
it seems likely that they have sensation like us; and since thought 
is included in our mode of sensation, similar thought seems to 
be attributable to them. (Letter to More, February 5th 1649, CSM 
III:365, AT V:277) 
Descartes (ibid.), however, concludes that it is more probable that ani-
mals are mechanical than that they have incorporeal, thinking, immortal 
souls. He refers to animal sensations a little more confidently, but only 
as far as thinking is not involved (ibid., CSM III 365–6, AT V:276–8). 
 
Even though he does not have any physiological support for his denial 
of animal thinking, he claims that we do not need a soul to explain ani-
mal behavior:  
I came to realize, however, that there are two different principles 
causing our movements. The first is purely mechanical and corpo-
real, and depends solely on the force of the spirits and the struc-
ture of our organs, and can be called a corporeal soul. The other, 
an incorporeal principle, is the mind or that soul which I have 
defined as a thinking substance. (CSM III:365, AT V:276)
Descartes then concludes that all movements of animals could “origi-
nate from the corporeal and mechanical principle” (ibid.). The material 
substance is completely different from the immaterial substance and is 
governed by different laws. The changes in both substances must there-
fore also be explained differently: mechanical explanations are valid in 
the context of material substance whereas psychological explanations 
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through wants and deliberation in the context apply to the immaterial 
substance. Thinking is a function of the immaterial substance which 
animals do not have, and therefore all animal behavior is to be explained 
mechanically. 
 
There are two things that are characteristic of mechanistic behavior: 
infallibility and inflexibility. Animals have a complex nervous system 
which makes complex behavior possible. Descartes argues, however, 
that since animals do not think, they are infallible as far as their physiol-
ogy is intact. Making errors, in the proper meaning, requires the capacity 
to think. Let us see why this is so. 
 
Humans make errors because our faculty of true judgment is limited 
and because we do not use our unlimited free will correctly: “If […] I 
simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not perceive 
the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am 
behaving correctly and avoiding error. But if in such cases I either affirm 
or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly.” (Meditations, CSM 
II:41, AT VII:59–60.) Errors arise because something is judged to be 
true or untrue without sufficient understanding of the subject. By mak-
ing judgments, perceptions are either affirmed or denied, we need will 
to do that. The concepts of truth and falsity are not applicable to percep-
tions. Perceptions are more or less clear. If we make judgments based on 
unclear perceptions, we are likely to make errors. 
 
To take a contemporary example, driving a car is quite automatic 
(provided that the driver is experienced enough), but it certainly is not 
advisable to decide suddenly to switch off this autopilot and let think-
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ing guide the driving. It would immediately make driving difficult and 
slow since the cognitive processes involved in conscious thinking are 
rather slow. Descartes (letter to Newcastle, November 23rd 1646, CSM 
III:303; AT IV:573) uses sleepwalking as an example of non-thinking,  
perfect action in humans: “It is said that those who walk in their sleep 
sometimes swim across streams in which they would drown if they were 
awake.” The truth of this claim is uncertain, as Descartes himself ad-
mits, but the point here is that thinking does not always make the action 
better. 
 
Since thinking does not interfere animal action, their action is perfect as 
far as they function properly. Descartes (ibid., CSM III:304; AT IV:575) 
takes this as a proof of their mechanical ability. Similarly, a clock, he 
continues, “tells the time better than our judgment does” (ibid.). Des-
cartes claims, for instance, that honeybees are not even able to make 
imperfect beehives, provided that there is nothing that disturbs the bees’ 
physiology (La formation du foetus, AT XI:518–20; letter to Newcastle, 
November 23rd 1646, CSM III:304, AT IV:575). In the most difficult 
cases, where explaining animal behavior merely mechanically becomes 
too complex, Descartes claims God’s ingenuity as the programmer of 
animals (Discourse, CSM I:139, AT VI:56). The flip side of infallibility 
is inflexibility. Animals can perform tasks only in a fixed way, whereas 
reason makes possible a creative accommodation of action in new situ-
ations. (Discourse, CSM I:140, AT VI:56–7). Bees do not invent new 
ways to build beehives. 
 
In current animal research, flexibility of behavior is still regarded as a 
sign of rationality. Usually, animal behavior is located between two ex-
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tremes: the Cartesian mechanical behavior that is strictly tied to the con-
text and a conceptual generalization that is independent of the context. 
The flexibility of the action varies according to the species as well as to 
the context. Furthermore, it makes more sense to talk of “islands” of ani-
mal rationality, that is, rationality in certain contexts that are important 
to the species, rather than universal rationality, which also broadens the 






Language is the most important argument for Descartes’ doctrine of AM. 
Descartes (letter to More February 5th 1649; CSM III:366, AT V: 278) 
even sees language “as a real specific difference between humans and 
animals.” Language is a way for the immaterial substance to express it-
self: thoughts can be expressed through language. Animals, however, do 
not have language: “[I]t has never been observed that any brute animal 
has attained the perfection of using real speech, that is to say, of indi-
cating by word or sign something relating to thought and not to natural 
impulse” (ibid.); and “there has never been known an animal so perfect 
as to use a sign to make other animals understand something which bore 
no relation to its passions” (letter to Newcastle, November 23rd 1646, 
CSM III:303; AT IV:575). 
 
28  We can of course ask, what, if anything, rationality has to do with experience, what I 
am primarily interested in in this study (see Khalil 2010 on ascribing rationality to organ-
isms without any neural structures, such as plants). For my purposes, it is sufficient to say 
that while rationality in itself does not imply experience, rational animal behavior is more 
likely to be conscious than fixed and inflexible behavior patterns.
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Since animals do not express any thoughts, it is probable that they 
do not think. Animal sounds are caused mechanically; animals can-
not choose whether to utter something or remain silent. They can be 
compared with squeaks of hinges. They do not count as expressions of 
thinking but can be explained as utterances of passions. Not having the 
appropriate organs for talking is not a valid counterargument against 
Descartes since parrots, for example, do have the ability to talk but they 
still do not express thinking, they only imitate.29  
 
Now, if there were an artificial animal so skillfully constructed that its 
outer appearance and behavior would be an exact copy of a real animal, 
we would not be able to tell whether this animal was real or not since 
animals show no sign of there being any kind of thinking in them. If, 
again, this machine were a copy of a human being, we would very soon 
find that out by checking whether it was capable of flexible behavior 
and creative, meaningful and appropriate use of language. (Discourse, 
CSM 1:140; AT VI:56.) This follows from the materiality of animals: the 
principle of action is the same in artificial machines and animals (Dis-
course, CSM I:139 AT VI:55). It is, however, impossible to construct a 
human. The immaterial mind is an essential part of humans. It cannot be 
composed, and language and flexible behavior cannot be mechanically 
generated. 
29  This is Descartes’ understanding of the subject. He discusses talking parrots in Dis-
course on the Method (CSM I:140; AT VI:57) and in a letter to the Marquess of Newcas-
tle (November 23rd 1646, CSM 3:303, AT IV:574). Irene Pepperberg’s studies on the cog-
nitive capacities of parrots suggest that parrots are, in fact, able to express their thoughts 
in language (see for example Pepperberg 2006). Recent studies in cognitive ethology 
have showed linguistic capacities at least in great apes (on Washoe, the chimpanzee and 
sign language, see Gardner, Gardner and Van Cantwort [1989]; on Kanzi, the bonobo and 
lexigrams, see Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker and Taylor [1998]; and on dolphins, see, for 
example, Herman [2006]).
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Descartes sees language as a sign of thinking. As Catherine Morris 
(2000, 412) underlines, Descartes’ argument is not that it is absolutely 
not possible that animals think. Instead, claims Morris, Descartes argues 
for a weaker claim, namely, that it is morally certain that they do not 
think. Moral certainty means being beyond reasonable doubt. Not 
expressing one’s thoughts does not definitely mean not having thoughts, 
but since animals never express their thoughts, it is reasonable to con-
clude that they do not have any. She claims that the apparent inconsis-
tencies disappear once we understand that “it is Descartes’ view that it 
is ‘morally certain’ but not ‘absolutely certain’, that non-human animals 
lack rational souls” (ibid.); and thus “[i]t remains absolutely possible 
that animals have thoughts but do not express them; but it is nonetheless 
morally impossible” (ibid., 413). 
 
In contemporary philosophy, the relation between thinking and language 
is still a vivid topic. For example, Donald Davidson (1982) argues that 
language is required for having any thoughts. This is not the same as 
Descartes’ argument: Descartes thought that thinking is a necessary con-
dition for language, and Davidson’s claim is that language is a necessary 
condition for propositional attitudes, even beliefs that do not become 
verbally expressed, and that propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, 
desires and intentions) are necessary for all kinds of thinking. 
 
Propositional attitudes are holistic: one singular belief is always depen-
dent on other supporting beliefs. Furthermore, having a belief requires 
having the concept of a belief and the concept of objective, intersubjec-
tive truth: to have a concept of a belief is understanding that beliefs have 
a truth value; they might turn out to be true or false. (Davidson 1982.) 
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Davidson does not say that animals do not think. He only says that the 
concept of intersubjective, objective truth and a holistic web of beliefs 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for thinking. As far as we do not 
communicate with animals through shared concepts, we cannot know 
whether they think or not. 
 
Davidson’s holism has often been criticized as being too demand-
ing. Hans-Johann Glock (2000, 2007) suggests moderate holism as an 
alternative. The network of beliefs does not have to be as extensive as 
Davidson suggests but some kind of network is still necessary in order 
to exclude the possibility of a being that only has one single belief. He 
thinks that the dog’s belief of the cat in the oak tree could easily be 
possible without supporting beliefs concerning the properties of trees in 
general. 
 
Along with Glock, Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1992, 11–12) point 
out that strict holism leads to severe difficulties in the dialogue between 
scientific theories based on different empirical beliefs. They compare 
ancient and modern astronomy as an example: from the point of view of 
modern astronomy, it is impossible even to determine what the ancient 
astronomers referred to when talking about stars since their beliefs con-
cerning stars did not include facts central to modern astronomy such as 
their remote location and their relation to black holes or planets. 
 
Davidson does not have the metaphysical burden to take a stance on the 
question of whether animals think or not, as Descartes did. What David-
son denies is thoughts as propositional attitudes, not sensations. Having 
mental representations does not amount to thinking in his view. If we 
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somehow had access to an animal’s mind, we could give a linguistic de-
scription of the mental content but in this case it would be us thinking on 
the basis of the representations of the animal. We would not know what 




3.5. CONCLUSION: HOW SHOULD DESCARTES’ DOCTRINE 
OF ANIMAL MACHINES BE UNDERSTOOD? 
 
As this chapter has shown, the spectrum of interpretations concerning 
animal sentience in the Cartesian framework is wide. Animals can be 
understood as robots, or the possibilities of sentience as a physiologi-
cal reaction can be broadened to include phenomenal experience. A 
further option is to admit that animal sentience was a stumbling block 
for Descartes, and he did not succeed in integrating it smoothly into his 
metaphysics. To conclude this chapter, I will present my view of what 
Descartes’ theory of sensations enables regarding animal experience, 
ending up to the conclusion that he did not succeed to construct a coher-
ent model of animal experience. 
 
Despite the controversies in Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines, at 
least two things are obvious: first, animals do not think; and secondly, 
they do have sensations. Language is a means to express thoughts, and 
beings that use language also think. Thinking also enables creativity in 
the sense of the capacity to generalize from a familiar context to a new 
one. Animals do not use language, so Descartes has no reason to assume 
that they would be capable of the generalizations that language,  
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concepts and judgments require. Animals are capable of sensations at 
the mechanical level. External stimuli cause different internal reactions 
in animals that make them behave in a certain way. The question is 
whether these sensations feel like anything to the animal. 
Even though thinking includes various mental acts from sense percep-
tions and feelings to wants and affirmations (see Meditations, CSM 
II:37; AT VII:37), a certain kind of awareness is common to them all. 
Additionally, they all relate to the capacity of judgment. Judgment 
consists of the subject of thinking (pain in my foot, for instance) and 
the propositional attitude toward it (affirmation and probably the desire 
for it to cease) (ibid.). What is it, then, that thinking adds to mechanical 
sensations? 
 
A helpful textual passage is Descartes’ division of sense perception into 
three grades presented here in Chapter 3.3.1. To understand the role 
of thinking in sensations we need to focus on the difference between 
sensation (grade 1) and perception (grade 2). The relation of percep-
tion to judgment is clear: as I perceive that there is a pain in my back, I 
make a judgment concerning it. This judgment can be just an affirmative 
notice: “Oh, my back hurts.” In this case, perception and judgment are 
simultaneous. If the pain is not sudden and I am concentrating deeply on 
philosophical meditations, it might well be that I do not first even notice 
it. In this case, the sensation is not conscious. 
 
If I am immersed in listening to music while driving a car, I still sense 
the environment and react to it. The visual properties of the environment 
are there for me, even though I do not describe their contents to myself 
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or even seem to pay much attention to them. It is, however, possible for 
me to do that whenever I choose. Much of my driving takes place at the 
physiological level (grade 1), my body reacting to external stimuli. 
Perception is a conscious act. It is the first grade where consciousness 
steps in. It does not, however, have to be the grade where qualia step 
in. The qualia can be present already at the level of the physiological 
sensation, as they are in the example of driving a car. Descartes even 
claims that he does not want to deny sensation to animals “in so far as 
it depends on the bodily organ” (AT V:278; CSM III:366). What makes 
my unconscious sensations different from the sensations of nonthinking 
animals is that since I am a thinking being, I can become aware of them. 
In animals they always remain unconscious and mechanical. 
It could be argued that already this unconscious stage is phenomenally 
conscious, just like the environment I am driving a car in is phenom-
enally conscious for me even it is not the object of my conscious atten-
tion. However, the question of phenomenal consciousness or the like-
ness of the experience did not arise for Descartes, since for them to be 
something to their subject requires awareness, which is possible only for 
thinking subjects. Even though it would perhaps be possible to construct 
some kind of an identity theory of experiencing sensations, it would 
multiply the objects beyond necessity: unconscious qualia without even 
the possibility of becoming conscious seems to be quite an empty con-





3. Descartes on animal experience
As I have mentioned throughout this chapter, Descartes’ doctrine of ani-
mal machines is not a biological doctrine of the constitution of animals. 
It is primarily an answer to the question of what we need to suppose 
in order to explain animal behavior. We can well do without ascribing 
to them the capacity to think, which entails consciousness, freedom 
of choice and morality. We need to ascribe to them only physiological 
states. But the problem to which Descartes does not give a sufficient 









4. Kant´s view of the constitution of experience
4. KANT’S VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EXPERIENCE 
 
One of the big questions that puzzled Kant was how it is possible that 
the content of our experience corresponds to the content of our judg-
ments. How is it possible that different things affect our minds in a 
different way; and, specifically, how is it possible that we can ascribe 
meanings to different effects, notice that some effects are similar and 
some not, and refer to objects through concepts? To solve these prob-
lems, Kant developed a detailed theory of the function of the mind with 
a focus on the faculties of sensation, understanding and reason. Kant’s 
framework is the doctrine of transcendental idealism, according to 
which the only access to the external, noumenal world is through the 
framework of our own minds; we cannot access it directly as it is. 
 
In this chapter, I will focus on Kant’s view of the faculties of the mind. 
What mental faculties are there and what do they do? How do they con-
tribute to experience? This chapter sketches the theoretical background 
for the next chapter, which concentrates in a specific area in this field, 
namely animal experience. To be able to profoundly understand the role 
of the lower mental faculty that Kant ascribes to animals, it is useful to 
relate it to human experience: what is similar, what is different? 
 
To begin, let us see what Kant means by experience. ‘Experience’ can 
refer to the product of the passive capacity of perceptions in general; or 
it can have a narrower meaning as a constitution of connected percep-
tions. In the latter meaning, the activity of the experiencing mind is 
crucial. Usually Kant speaks of experience in the latter sense, where un-
derstanding is a necessary part of it. For example, in Prolegomena (§ 34, 
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Ak.4:316), he describes experience “as the product of the understanding 
from materials of sensibility.” Both elements are necessary for experi-
ence, so that experience can also be defined as a judgment that expresses 
an empirical cognition (BF, Ak. 18:318). Experience in this sense cannot 
be ascribed to animals. I am interested in experience as an awareness of 
perceptions. 
Mere thinking, or pure consciousness, does not count as an experience; 
it is rather the framework of the temporal experience that is not itself 
temporal (BF, Ak. 18:319). Thinking can, however, be experienced as a 
determination of the mind. The object of the experience, in this case, is 
the thinking, not the object of thinking (which, of course, determines the 
content of the thinking in question). This latter case is inner experience, 
whereas experience of objects is outer experience. 
Kant (for example in MM, Ak. 29:880–1) divides the faculties of the hu-
man mind into three parts: the cognitive faculty, the faculty of pleasure 
and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Each faculty has a higher and 










Table 1. The faculties of the human mind
 
Lower faculty Higher faculty
The cognitive faculty Sensibility Understanding and reason
The faculty of pleasure 
and displeasure




Faculty of desire Based on intellectual 
motives
Based on sensible 
stimuli
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The higher faculties are characterized by the activity of the mind and its 
independence from sensible stimuli; the lower faculties by the passivity 
of the mind and its dependence on sensibility. Another, complementary 
division that might be useful is the division of the faculties according 
to the sources of the cognition they generate. These faculties are sense, 
imagination and apperception. Kant (KrV A 94/B 127) describes them 
as “three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which 
contain the conditions of the possibility of experience, and cannot them-
selves be derived from any other faculty of the mind.” The first division 
is useful in explaining action, the second in explaining the integrity of 
experience. 
 
In this chapter, I will look at Kant’s conception of the faculties of the 
mind to find out how each faculty contributes to experience. I will begin 
by looking at the reasons why Kant thought that it was necessary for 
living creatures to have minds. Then, I will focus on the functions of 
the cognitive faculty. Even though Kant thinks that animals do not have 
higher cognitive faculties, it is important to know how they function, 
since it tells us how animal consciousness differs from ours. In Chapter 
4.4., I will explain how experience starts to form when sensoral inputs 
become perceptions through the functions of the inner sense and repro-
ductive imagination. 
 
Chapter 4.5. goes even deeper into Kant’s theory of experience by dis-
cussing the threefold synthesis which contributes to the increasingly dis-
cursive understanding of experience. Before concluding, I will shortly 
deal with the faculties of pleasure and displeasure and of desire, which 
are important with respect to the issue of animal ethics and welfare.  
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The topics of this chapter are wide-ranging and controversial, and each 
of them could be an independent topic of a doctoral dissertation. My aim 
here is to define what I take to be the best way to understand them so 





4.1. THE FOUNDATION OF EXPERIENCE: THE SOUL AS THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LIFE 
 
In his discussion concerning the principle of life, Kant’s focus is on 
animal souls, human souls and spirits. Plants are of no interest to him. 
Animal souls are dependent on their connection to the body, whereas 
spirits exist independently with no connection to the body. The human 
soul is connected to the body but is not dependent on it, as the capacity 
to think is an action of the mind. (L1 Ak. 28:274.) The human soul is the 
most versatile kind of soul: it has the faculty of sensation provided by 
the body, as well as the capacity to independent thinking provided by the 
soul. 
Kant argues that Descartes’ doctrine of the AM is not plausible, since 
matter cannot generate life. Life necessarily requires an immaterial 
principle, a soul. Kant argues that life must be inherent in something 
immaterial, since it is of a different nature than matter, whose function 
is to occupy a determined area of spatial dimension. Life is an “inner 
capacity to determine [oneself] voluntarily” (Träume Ak 2:238n, italics 
removed). Beings equipped with an “own power of will [that] is capable 
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of spontaneously determining and modifying itself” are living. In the 
Critique of Practical Reason (Ak. 5:9n), Kant writes that “life is the fac-
ulty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire.” 
Spontaneity, activity, subjectivity and will are the most central features 
of a living being. They cannot be properties of matter. Matter can be 
moved only by external forces. Merely material beings cannot have any 
intentions. 
This immaterial principle of life that enables spontaneous action cannot 
itself be perceived, but we can easily see whether it is inherent in mate-
rial substances: 
Animals are not mere machines or matter, but they have souls; for 
everything in the whole of nature is either inanimate or animate. 
All matter [...] is inanimate. [...] When, e.g., we perceive a mote 
on a paper, then we look to see whether it moves. If it does not 
move of itself, then we hold it to be inanimate matter [...]. But as 
soon as a matter moves, we look to see whether it moved itself 
voluntarily. If we perceive that in the mote, we say that it is ani-
mate, it is an animal. An animal is thus an animated matter, for 
life is the faculty for determining oneself from an inner principle 
according to the power of choice. Thus, if a matter moves, then it 
follows that there is in it such a separate principle of self-activity. 
But only a being that has cognition is capable of this principle of 
thinking and willing. Matter can move only by means of such a 
principle. But such a principle of matter is the soul of the matter. 
(L1, Ak. 28:274–5.) 
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In this passage, Kant sets two criteria for a living being: it must have an 
inner principle of movement and representations. The principle of the 
movement of matter is inertia. According to the principle of inertia, ma-
terial bodies can move only if they are affected by something external.  
Living beings are not completely governed by external forces but are, at 
least to some extent, able to make own decisions concerning their own 
movements. 
Descartes’ idea was that the movement of an animal is reducible to the 
movements of its parts. Why does Kant so eagerly want to deny this 
thought? Kant was, after all, as little fond of immaterial principles in sci-
ence as Descartes was, but in some circumstances Kant considered them 
necessary. One instance is explaining animal behavior. (Träume A 33–4; 
Naragon 1990, 15, 18–19.) 
Here, a Cartesian could ask how can we know that the origin of the 
movement is really in an immaterial principle and not reducible to 
material movements. We cannot directly show that animals have repre-
sentations, and we have no reason to assume animal minds since their 
behavior does not show any signs that would indicate the mental origin. 
Kant would probably answer this by an argument of analogy which he 
presents, for instance, in his Critique of the Power of Judgment (Ak. 
5:464n.): 
Thus, in comparing the artistic actions of animals with those of 
human beings, we conceive of the ground of the former, which 
we do not know, through the ground of similar effects in humans 
(reason), which we do know, and thus as an analogue of reason 
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[...] Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in 
the animals (the ground for which we cannot immediately per-
ceive) to that of humans (of which we are immediately aware) we 
can quite properly infer in accordance with the analogy that the 
animals also act in accordance with representations (and are not, 
as Descartes would have it, machines), and that in spite of their 
specific difference, they are still of the same genus as human be-
ings (as living beings).30
Also in Volckmann’s lecture notes (Ak. 29:449), Kant argues against the 
Cartesian view of animals: 
We call an animal alive because it has a faculty to alter its own 
state as a consequence of its representations. Someone who main-
tained that in animals the principle of life has no power of repre-
sentation, but rather that they act only according to general laws 
of matter, was Descartes, and afterwards also Malebranche, but 
to think of animals as machines is impossible, because then one 
would deviate from all analogy with nature, and the proposition 
that a human being is itself a machine, is utter foolishness, for we 
are conscious of our own representations, and all natural science 
rests on the proposition: that matter can have no representations.
Since we know that we are able to change our behavior according to 
our representations, and since we perceive similar goal-directedness in 
animal behavior, we can conclude that they also act according to  
 
30  It is worth mentioning that Spinoza expressed the same thought in 3P2 in the Ethics: 
“The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the 
Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).”
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representations. Representations are always mental and therefore require 
a soul in which they are inherent, so machines cannot have representa-
tions. The faculty of representation is the basis of internally determined 
movement. Without representations, movements would be without a 
conscious goal.  
 
Even though Kant thinks that it is necessary that animals have souls, he 
is careful with inferences concerning the nature of animal souls. We can 
directly perceive only animal behavior. Inferences concerning the invis-
ible grounds of animal behavior are possible only indirectly, through 
their visible consequences (behavior). In this way, we can never attain 
the same degree of certainty concerning animal minds as concerning our 
own minds, to which we have access through immediate experience. 
However, the idea that life cannot be explained through the properties of 
matter is more relevant to the issue of animal souls than this epistemic 
question. Descartes thinks that the movement of animals is not sufficient 
for ascribing souls and thinking to them, and that sensations are possible 
without a soul. For Kant, sensations have a representative function and 
they are not possible at the material level. 
Sensible representations form the basis for all animal life and action 
by serving as necessitating stimuli. Representations awaken feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure and are thus connected to the will. This is the 
essence of life itself:  
The faculty of desire is the faculty to be, by means of one’s repre-
sentations, the cause of the objects of these representations. The 
faculty of a being to act in accordance with its representations is 
called life. (GMS Ak. 6:211.)
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4.2. THE  LOWER  COGNITIVE  FACULTY: SENSIBILITY 
 
To be able to experience the external world and our own bodily states 
at all, the first requirement is the faculty of becoming affected through 
them. This passive capacity is sensibility. We can have perceptions only 
through senses. Kant (KrV A 19/B 33) defines sensibility as “[t]he ca-
pacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which 
we are affected by objects” or the faculty of intuition (K1, Ak. 28:240). 
Intuitions are singular representations (JL §1, 91; KrV A 42/B 59).  
Empirical intuition receives its matter from sensations that are caused by 
objects that affect the capacity of representation (KrV A 19–20/B 34).  
Our intuition is always sensible and it always has an object that affects 
us in a certain way (KrV A 19/B 33; A 51/B 75). Time and space are the 
forms of our intuition, and in themselves pure intuitions; they contain 
nothing empirical. This means that we perceive everything necessarily 
spatially or temporarily, but things outside our perceptions are not neces-
sarily in themselves spatial or temporal. Every human being has spatial  
and temporal intuition, but it is theoretically possible that there would be 
other kinds of intuitions.31 
31  In his letter to Markus Herz written in February 1772 (Ak. 10:130), Kant presents an 
alternative kind of cognition. The cognition of the intellectus archetypi, God, is active 
and intuitive: the intuition of the archetypical intellect creates the objects. God has im-
mediate cognition a priori of beings he has created. Our way of cognition is passive and 
discursive, that is echtypical: beings in themselves are independent from us but they af-
fect us, and, thus, we can have sensible cognition a posteriori of them. (ibid.; KrV A 68/B 
93.) The intuition of the intellectus archetypi of a certain object is a cause of the existence 
of this object in a way responding to the intuition of the intellect, whereas the intuition of 
the intellectus echtypi of the same object provides the existence of the object in question. 
The cognition of the intellectus echtypi is dependent of certain forms of perception (that 
is, the forms of intuition and the categories). The reason for this division is Kant’s desire 
to illustrate that it is frivolous to presume that our representations would correspond to 
their objects, and that it is important to study the limits and possibilities of our intuition.
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Time and space are not properties of things in themselves, but they 
pertain to our way of perception. Our thoughts and feelings appear to us 
in a temporal order, whereas external objects are perceived temporally 
in space. Spatial perception is possible in a split second. The perception 
of time is possible only when we notice a change in the representation. 
This requires a certain unity of the experience and, in particular, of the 
subject. The perception of change, and temporal perception in general, is 
possible only if the representation r1 at the moment t1 and the changed 
representation r2 at the moment t2 are in the consciousness of the same 
subject and the subject is conscious of this. 
Kant divides the senses into an outer sense that is directed to spatial 
objects, and an inner sense that is directed to temporal representations. 
The outer sense is a link to the external world. Through it, we can have 
impressions (such as sounds, smells and tastes) of the external objects. 
In humans, the outer sense consists of five organic senses (vision, 
hearing, feeling, smell and taste) and a vital sense, which concerns the 
overall state of the organism (such as irritation or joy). The amount and 
the accuracy of the organic senses is species specific. Also the degree 
of objectivity of different senses varies: feeling, vision and hearing are 
more objective than taste. (MM, Ak. 29:882.) There is more individual 
variance in taste perceptions than in visual perceptions.  
Besides the outer senses, there is also an inner sense. Its object is the 
mind or the soul. Using introspection is using the inner sense. Visual 
perceptions are received through the outer sense but it is possible to 
think about a visual perception as an inner representation, that is, as an 
object of the inner sense. Representation as a modification of the mind 
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can be an object of the inner sense, but the act of representing an exter-
nal object is using the outer sense, since the represented object is exter-
nal. When I look at the tea mug on my table, the mug is an object of the 
outer sense. When I focus my attention on the way I perceive the mug or 
the emotions it evokes in me, I use the inner sense. Outer senses deliver 
the matter for the inner sense: particular sensations are not objects of the 
outer senses but of the inner sense (L1, Ak. 28:271). 
At the sensible level, there are not only representations of objects but 
also pleasure, suffering, desire and certain kinds of memory and antici-
pation. When we add the capacity to experience some representations 
as pleasant and others as unpleasant we get the foundation for action 
based on stimuli and motives. This alone is insufficient for goal-directed 
action. This only makes possible the tendency to linger with pleasant 
things and to get rid of unpleasant things. To be able to plan one’s own 
action according to them (for example, to refrain from eating avocados 
if their taste has previously been terrible; or to go look for them if they 
are judged as a delicacy) one has to have memory and the capacity to 
associate and anticipate; that is, the capacity to bring or keep in mind a 
former representation that is not currently the object of sensation. 
This capacity is the imitated cognition of the senses, which can be un-
derstood as a second order sensibility, is a formative power of the mind 
that does not require immediate contact with the object. This imitative 
power, or formative faculty (facultas fingendi), belongs to the faculty 
of sensibility (L1, Ak. 28:230, 28:235). The formative faculty is the 
basis for memory and association. It makes reproduction of the former 
perceptions possible. It can be further classified in subcategories, such as 
illustrative, imitative and anticipatory powers. (L1, Ak. 28:230–1.) 
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I use the faculty of illustration when I complete an incomplete picture 
of an object in my mind. When, for example, I look at the front of a 
building, I cannot see the back of it. I do not take my perception of the 
building as a complete perception. Even though I do not see the whole 
building at once, I have no doubt that the building also has a back side. 
I picture its other side in my mind by using the faculty of illustration. 
I use the faculty of imitation, or reproductive imagination, when I call 
this representation of the building to my mind, even though I am not 
currently looking at a real building. In the voluntary use, this faculty is 
memory. The faculty of anticipation is at work when we plan things we 
are going to do. For example, if I am going to repaint the façade of a 
building, I can imagine the result beforehand by using this faculty, and 
use this mental picture as a model. (MM 28:585.) 
To put all these pieces together: Through sensibility, we can become 
affected through temporal or spatial representations. We can have sense 
perceptions of outer objects and our inner states. Connected to the fac-
ulty of pleasure and the faculty of desire, sensible representations serve 
as motivations to action. However, empirical learning through associa-
tion requires second order sensibility, the capacity to remember and 
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4.3. THE HIGHER COGNITIVE FACULTY: UNDERSTANDING 
AND REASON 
 
The higher cognitive faculty consists of understanding and reason. Their 
function is to analyze and synthesize the matter provided by sensible 
intuitions and to make it discursive through concepts, judgments and 
inferences. Together with sensibility, understanding generates cogni-
tions; hence the name “cognitive faculty”. The task of the higher cogni-
tive faculty is thinking, that is, putting representations together in one 
consciousness. In Prolegomena (§ 22, Ak. 4:304), Kant writes that  
“[t]he business of the senses is to intuit; that of the understanding, to 
think. To think, however, is to unite representations in a consciousness.” 
 
Kant (MM, Ak. 29:888–9) divides thinking into three kinds: 1) thinking 
through concepts in the understanding, 2) thinking through composi-
tion of concepts in the power of judgment, and 3) thinking through 
inferences in the reason. All these aspects of thinking are important in 
inference: Understanding represents the universal by forming a rule 
(which can be, for example, the definition of a human being). The power 
of judgment represents the particulars that the universal defined by the 
understanding contains; in other words, it judges, which object goes 
under which rule (for example, “Jacques-Yves Cousteau is a human be-
ing”). Reason derives the particular from the universal according to the 
principle, that what is true of the universal is also true of the particular 
subsumed under the rule (for example, “All human beings are mortal, 
Jacques-Yves Cousteau is a human being, therefore Jacques-Yves Cous-
teau is mortal.”). (MM, Ak. 29:889–90.) 
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Intuition is a necessary part of cognition. We can know something about 
objects only through an intuition. Intuitions can be used as criteria for 
determining, what is correct and what is not. Cognition is based on an 
intuition that provides a link to its object. This object is thought in the 
understanding through concepts.32 Moreover, the unity of apperception 
is needed for cognition. ‘Cognition’ is an elementary concept in Kant’s 
doctrine of experience (as a meaningful unity). We can cognize only 
objects of possible experience. What is outside of experience is uncog-
nizable. It is, however, possible to think about an object, whose pos-
sibility cannot be proven through experience or reason. In this case, we 
have a representation of this object but no cognition. (KrV B XXVIn.) 
The objects of cognition are given through intuition. Arbitrary specula-
tion generates only representations, not cognitions, but it can itself be an 
object of intuition (and cognition). 
 
Kant defines concept as “consciousness that the [same] is contained in 
one representation as in another, or that in multiple representations one 
and the same features are contained” (MM, Ak. 29:888), as “a represen-
tation as it is made into a rule” (Dohna, Ak. 28:672) and as “a universal 
[...] or reflected representation” (JL, Ak. 9:91). The logical form of 
concepts is generality (MM, Ak. 29:889). Understanding is an active 
capacity to think of the objects of intuition. Concepts are rules or forms, 
whose content is afforded by intuitions.
32  This view that presents intuition and concept as necessary components of a cognition 
can be challenged by referring to Kant’s division of representation, the so called Stufen-
leiter (KrV A 320/B 377), where he says that a cognition is either an intuition or a 
concept. This view of cognition is prominent in the Critique of Pure Reason; elsewhere 
Kant also speaks of cognizing through intuitions (JL, Ak 9:33) or through concepts (for 
instance, JL Ak. 9:64–5). Cognition through intuition will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5, Kant on animal experience. (For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Laiho 
2012, 115–21.)
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The generation of concepts begins when we notice that there is suffi-
ciently something similar in several representations. The generation of 
concepts consists of three phases: 1. comparison of representations, 2. 
reflection concerning the traits they have in common and 3. abstraction 
of the traits in which they differ. (JL, Ak 9:94.) This act generates a rule 
for thinking of the given object. Kant illustrates this through the concept 
of a tree. The process starts when we compare for instance a pine tree, 
a birch and an oak tree with each other and notice that they are differ-
ent, but through closer reflection we see that they have something in 
common: they all have a trunk, leaves and branches. When, finally, all 
the different traits are abstracted from this, we get the concept of a tree, 
that is, a rule, through which we think about trees in general. (JL, Ak. 9: 
94–5n.) 
 
Our representations are subjected to the forms of intuition, time and 
space as well as the forms of understanding. Pure understanding is inde-
pendent of sensibility. Categories, the concepts of the pure understand-
ing, are the means through which we think about the objects of experi-
ence: once we have a manifold of intuition, the understanding analyzes 
it by applying categories to it.33 In Kant’s words, 
[t]he same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the 
very same actions through which it brings the logical form of 
a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also 
brings a transcendental content into its representations by means 
of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general,  
 
 
33  The table of categories is presented in KrV A 80/B 106.
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on account of which they are called pure concepts of the under-
standing that pertain to objects a priori […] (KrV A 79/B 104).
When I observe an avocado, my understanding can perform the follow-
ing operations: I can put the avocado on the scales to learn its weight, 
which is a totality of several (particular) grams (unity). I can see that it 
the skin is dark green (reality), it is not red (negation) and it is a non-
animal34 (limitation). I also see that a lighter green color is inherent in 
the substance of the avocado and I know that the fruit grows on a tree 
(causality) and that it is edible and healthy (community). Finally, the 
avocado exists (existence), it is impossible that it would grow feath-
ers (impossibility), and its particular size and shape are just contingent 
properties (contingency). 
Now we can ask how pure concepts of the understanding can apply to 
appearances, which are of a completely different nature. Kant’s answer 
to this is schemata. Briefly put, the task of schemata is to connect pure 
concepts of the understanding to the sensible objects. Kant (KrV A 140/
B179) describes a schema as “representation of a method for represent-
ing (A 141/B 180); “a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with 
regard to pure shapes in space” (ibid.); “the phenomenon, or the sensible 
concept of the object, in agreement with the category” (A 146/B 185). 




34  If I say that an avocado is not an animal, the act that my understanding is doing is 
negation. But if I say that the avocado is a non-animal, I am affirming that it does not be-
long to the class of animals, which does not in itself yet tell us much about avocados, just 
limits the concept, the sphere of the non-animality still being infinite. (See KrV A 72–3/B 
97–8.)
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 homogeneous with categories (by being pure) as well as appearances 
(by being sensible) (KrV A 138/B 177).  
 
Appearances—or intuitions, individual images—are always variable and 
imperfect; and concepts are rules to think them. Schemata tell how to 
apply these rules. Let us look at Kant’s (KrV A 141/B 180) example of 
the schema of a triangle: The concept of a triangle contains the neces-
sary conditions for triangles. It is the rule to think about triangles in 
general and to discern them from other geometrical figures. However, to 
have the concept of a triangle I need to know the method of producing 
triangles. That method is the schema: it connects the concept of a tri-
angle to its concrete instances. The schema itself is not entirely concep-
tual and not entirely sensible. 
In the similar fashion, schemata work for empirical concepts. Kant 
(ibid.) also gives an example of the concept of a dog. First, there is the 
concept of a dog as “a rule in accordance with which my imagination 
can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being 
restricted to any particular shape that experience offers me or any pos-
sible image that I can exhibit in concreto.” The job of the schema is this 
specification. We do not have to pay any conscious attention to how we 
do it, and I do not even think that we could do that. The application of 
schemata happens automatically and unconsciously.  
The essential difference between schemata and concepts is that to use 
schemata one does not need to be aware that one is acting according 
to a rule that one has set oneself. The essence of the understanding is 
the capacity to set rules, and these rules are concepts. For example, the 
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concept of a tree is a rule that tells the criteria for objects to which this 
concept can be applied. The concept of a tree does not, however, have 
any perceptible properties. I cannot draw a picture of my concept of a 
tree; the concept does not look particularly like anything. Nevertheless, 
I am able to recognize trees when I see them. This recognition is made 
possible through schemata. 
Reason “is the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal” 
(KrV A 646/B 674) or “the faculty of principles” (KrV A 299/B 356, 
emphasis removed). External objects are the object of the sensible 
intuition, and sensible intuition is the object of understanding. Similarly, 
understanding is the object of reason. Understanding generates concepts 
by unifying the manifold of the objects; reason organizes concepts by 
unifying the functions of the understanding. Reason operates through 
syllogisms. (KrV A 304/B 361). In its logical use, reason applies the 
rules of syllogisms to judgments, and since it aims at the greatest gen-
erality possible, the conclusion is also generalizable. In this way, reason 
seeks “to bring the greatest manifold of cognition of the understanding 
to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions), and thereby 
to effect the highest unity of that manifold” (KrV A 305/B 361). 
Reason also has a pure use where it operates only with abstract con-
ditions by proceeding in the series of conditions until the idea of the 
unconditioned, of which we do not have a corresponding intuition. It 
is just an idea of reason that does not refer to anything objectively real. 
Just as categories are products of the pure understanding, transcendental 
ideas are not concepts of objects but creations of the reason itself. (KrV 
A 643–4/B 671–2.) There are three classes of ideas: 1) “the absolute 
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[...] unity of the thinking subject”, 2) “the absolute unity of the series 
of conditions of appearance” and 3) “the absolute unity of the condition 
of all objects of thought in general” (KrV A 334–5/B 391–2, emphasis 
removed). The ideas of reason are perfect and unlimited, whereas the 
objects of intuition are always tied to a limited perspective. 
To sum up, the higher cognitive faculty is responsible for thinking; 
that is, uniting representations in a consciousness. The higher cogni-
tive faculty operates with concepts. United with an intuition, a concept 
generates cognitions. Schemata serve as the link between intuitions and 
concepts. The pure forms of the understanding define everything we 
conceptualize. Reason is responsible for organizing concepts, and in its 
pure use it generates transcendental ideas that we never can validly af-




4.4. FROM RECEPTIVITY TO THE PERCEPTION OF SPATIO-
TEMPORAL OBJECTS 
 
If all we had in mind were the representations provided by the pres-
ent moment, our experience would be very restricted. We would not be 
able to act, only to react. For experience to be meaningful, we need the 
capacity to reproduce representations. Imagination is a sensible capac-
ity that is attributed also to animals, and its contribution to experience 
is huge. In this chapter, I will explain what exactly this contribution to 
experience consists of. This equips us with important building blocks of 
animal experience that will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Imagination is a sensible capacity that is responsible for reproduction. 
Kant defines it as “the faculty for representing an object without its pres-
ence in intuition” (KrV B 151). Kant’s imagination is not to be equated 
with fancy as the capacity to think about make-believe issues and to 
invent novel things. Instead, imagination is a necessary part of sensible 
experience. It makes the necessary components of learning and inten-
tionality possible: memory and anticipation. Time is a necessary element 
in imagination: reproduction is not possible in a split second. For me to 
be able to reproduce a representation, I need the capacity to keep that 
representation in my mind from one moment of time to another, that 
is, I need memory. Imagination is a sensible faculty since it deals with 
sensible representations (ibid.). 
 
Is not sensibility as receptivity enough for experience? For Kant, the 
answer is no. Senses provide only input from the world or one’s body 
(as feelings or sensations), and they do not need to be conscious for the 
subject to be able to act on them. A machine that is sensitive to some 
features of the environment fulfils this criterion; and hardly anyone 
wants to claim that machines were experiencing something. This is also 
how the Cartesian animals function, according to the standard interpreta-
tion. In this case, the act of chasing a ball could be presented like this: 
 
The subject S has this representation over and over again in the fol-
lowing way (the t’s are different moments of time and the s’s different 
spatial locations): 
t1: the ball is in s1, I go and chase it
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t2: the ball is in s2, I go and chase it
t3: the ball is in s3, I go and chase it
S does not need to have any memory of the past and no idea of the 
future. She is not able to plan the act of chasing the ball, nor even make 
the decision to chase it. The representation of the ball affects her senses 
so that it forces her to chase it. S just reacts to the current stimuli with-
out the representational baggage of the past or expectations of the future. 
In this case it hardly makes any sense to talk of S’s experience. S could 
be a machine that is programmed to respond to one environmental clue. 
I claim that this is not Kant’s idea of animal experience. 
 
I argue that the Kantian animals are capable of action that is not a mere 
mindless reaction to stimuli but that has empirical integrity. Let us see 
how this affects the example of chasing a ball. Unlike in the former 
case, where the situation was always new for S, the capacity for tempo-
ral perception makes also her object consciousness capable of temporal 
extension. She does not need to make the decision of chasing the ball 
each and every moment; it is enough that she makes it only once. She 
remembers where the ball was a moment ago, and can anticipate the 
direction in which the ball is going to move. In this case, she has the 
ability to temporal perception but not necessarily any idea of herself as a 
subject. 
 
In this latter case, the mental capacities that S has, besides outer sense, 
are inner sense and a sensible imagination. Let us first concentrate on 
the inner sense. The objects of the outer intuition are spatial appear-
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ances, things we perceive in space. Now, these appearances, or mental 
states, can be further observed in the mind through the inner sense. 
Kant describes inner sense as the capacity “by means of which the mind 
intuits itself, or its inner state” (KrV A 22–3/B37). Inner sense can be 
understood as awareness of the content of one’s mind. In other words, 
inner sense makes the objects of outer intuition subjective objects; feel-
ings, emotions, volitions and other representations of one’s state are also 
included among them. (See also Allison 1983, 261.) 
 
Kant also describes inner sense as “a determinate form, under which 
the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that 
belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time” 
(KrV A 22–3/B37). This means that we perceive things as temporal 
when we are using the inner sense (through the outer sense, we perceive 
things as spatial). For S to perceive the movement of the ball she is 
chasing, she has to be able to keep in mind the past locations of the ball 
and to notice that the location changes. If there is absolutely no change 
in our representations, there are no temporal relations on the basis of 
which we could have a sense of time. We lose the sense of time when we 
are unconscious or asleep. 
 
What I have been describing here can also be put in terms of syntheses. 
Kant’s problem in the A-deduction is how it is possible that our a priori 
concepts apply to objects of experience, and how we can relate to them 
and make objective judgments concerning them. His solution is that this 
happens through three syntheses: the synthesis of apprehension in intu-
ition, synthesis of reproduction in a representation of imagination, and 
synthesis of recognition in a concept. The act of collecting or uniting is 
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common to all of them. The first two syntheses occur together; the third 
one requires the first two (KrV A 102). In the latter case of perceiving 
the ball, the first two syntheses are at work. 
 
The first synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, collects 
the elements of perception together and unites them. Kant describes it as 
follows: 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however 
would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish 
the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as 
contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything 
other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to 
come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), 
it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this 
manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, 
since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which sure provides a 
manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as con-
tained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a 
synthesis. (KrV A 99)
In the empirical use, this synthesis runs through the manifold of our rep-
resentation contained in each moment, being some kind of a preparatory 
analysis or inventory of it without yet identifying its content. My visual 
field is very restricted. I need time to be able to represent for example 
Turku Cathedral: I might first look at its lower part, then at its roof and 
finally at its tower. Also these parts can be further divided into simpler 
elements. Finally I collect all these representations together. This prelim-
inary inventory of perception is the synthesis of apprehension.  
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The same act of collecting happens when S concentrates on chasing the 
ball. 
 
Since the first synthesis requires time, it would not be possible without 
the capacity of keeping past representations in the mind. In other words, 
it goes together with the second synthesis, the synthesis of reproduction. 
This synthesis takes place at the level of imagination. It seeks consisten-
cies among the variable representations and makes association possible. 
In Kant’s words, 
[I]n accordance with [the empirical law of reproduction] repre-
sentations that have often followed or accompanied one another 
are finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a con-
nection in accordance with which, even without the presence of 
the object, one of these representations brings about a transition 
of the mind to the other in accordance with a constant rule. (KrV 
A 100)
Appearances are also subject to this rule. For example, if avocados kept 
constantly changing their form and color, I would not be able to associ-
ate certain shades of green color with its flesh; or if the referent of the 
word ‘avocado’ changed, I would not know what kind of objects would 
be evoked by this word. Here, the imagination reproduces representa-
tions that have been received earlier through the senses. 
When I cut ripe avocados in half, I have noticed, in successive intu-
itions, that inside the avocado, there is yellow-green flesh surrounding a 
large, brown seed. Due to my reproductive imagination, I always antici-
pate this when I cut an avocado in half. I cannot, in one intuition, repre-
127
4. Kant´s view of the constitution of experience
sent the same avocado as whole and as cut in half. For me to associate 
the representation of the flesh of the avocado with the representation of 
the avocado as a whole, I need to keep the representations of the avo-
cado in my mind from moment to moment as I cut it in half. Otherwise I 




4.5. FROM PERCEPTIONS TO JUDGMENTS  
 
Now we know how sensorial inputs are transformed into spatio-temporal 
perceptions. What still needs to be explained is how these perceptions 
can be expressed in judgments. There is also the question, what this 
mind or the subject is where all the collecting or uniting of the synthe-
ses happens. To be able to keep something in the mind for a later use, a 
fundamental experience of subjectivity is required. At the sensible level, 
inner sense is responsible for this subjective identity. For judgments to 
be possible, the unifying aspect of the syntheses culminates in the third 
synthesis and personal identity as transcendental apperception arises. 
For the part of experience, this opens up new depths of subjectivity as 
issues of moral responsibilities and personal development arise. 
 
The observation of one’s mental states through the inner sense can be 
quite complex. For example, I may notice that the fatigue and apathy I 
felt a moment ago have turned into joyful zest after drinking a cup of 
refreshing tea with a friend while participating in an a lively discus-
sion. This kind of self-reflection is not possible only through a capacity 
of external and internal sensibility. What it further requires is self-
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consciousness as the idea of unity of my experiences and my conscious-
ness; that is, a representation of the “I”. Kant calls this “transcendental 
apperception”. 
This consciousness of being the subject of one’s representations is not 
necessarily required in simpler uses of the inner sense. For example, if a 
dog is waiting for his master to give him a command to fetch a ball, he 
can do this quite well without having any idea of himself as a subject. 
This can also be described as an instance of apperception, but only 
of empirical apperception, which is a synonym for inner sense: “[t]he 
consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our 
state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can 
provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, 
and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception” (KrV 
A 107)35 
Let us now look at the concept of apperception. For my purposes it is 
sufficient to give a general outline of the transcendental apperception 
since its function for my topic is just to demonstrate the kind of con-
sciousness animals do not have, according to Kant. The relevant parts of 
the earlier example of me noticing my mood change can be represented  
 
35  Since apperception is very close to the inner sense, it is easy to confuse these con-
cepts. Even Kant does not use the term ‘inner sense’ consistently. In his pre-critical writ-
ings (for example L1, Ak. 28:276), he relates it closely to transcendental apperception 
and denies it from animals; whereas in his critical philosophy he uses it in a cognitively 
less demanding sense, as a part of sensibility. In Critique of Pure Reason (B 153), Kant 
clearly explicates how his use of these two terms is different from their traditional use: 
“It is customary to treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception (which we 
carefully distinguish).” In this sense, as consciousness of mental states, there are no prob-
lems related to transcendental apperception in attributing inner sense also to animals (see 
for example KrV A 107).
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as follows (the drinking of the tea and the conversation with my friend 
takes place between R2 and R3):  
(R1) I am tired.
(R2) I do not feel like doing anything.
(R3) I feel inspired.
(R4) I feel happy. 
During this set of representations I go through a change. Now, this 
change from apathy to inspiration is huge, I am hardly the same person 
when I am inspired and happy as when I was tired and low on energy. 
Still, there is something that has remained constant through all change, 
and that is my self; not only myself as a physical being but as a mind, 
as an experiencing subject. This ‘I’ is quite abstract: I cannot perceive it 
though the senses; still it accompanies every thought and every mood I 
go through. It is expressed in the sentence “I think”. Kant describes it as 
“that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation I 
think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all con-
sciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further 
representation” (KrV B 132). Thoughts without transcendental apper-
ception are nothing to me; I cannot think of them as my own thoughts. 
Without apperception, R1, R2, R3 and R4 would be separate representa-
tions that do not form a whole for anybody. They would not be inherent 
in one consciousness. 
The transcendental apperception is also needed in forming judgments. It 
gathers the parts of a judgment together thereby making it possible. The 
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judgment “An avocado is green” is possible only if the subject “avo-
cado”, the copula “is” and the predicate “green” are being thought in the 
same consciousness. If one subject is thinking about an avocado, another 
about the relation between subject and predicate and the third one about 
greenness, these scattered thoughts do not form a unified judgment. 
We would not be able to think about the greenness and the avocado in 
different relations to each other, and would not be able to form complex 
thoughts. The sentence “I think” expresses the transcendental appercep-
tion, and it has to be possible to attach it to all representations for them 
to be my thoughts. This means that to form a judgment I must recognize 
my representations as my own thoughts. Otherwise they would be scat-
tered, disconnected from each other, and I would act blindly, driven by 
them. 
The consciousness of representations arises when we move from the 
realm of the outer sense to the inner sense. Self-consciousness emerges 
when we move further to the transcendental apperception, as we be-
come aware of the uniform subjectivity of our representations; that is, 
when we realize that they all are my thoughts; they all are accompanied 
with the quantifier “I think.” For Kant, apperception is more than mere 
awareness of representations (which is the sense that Leibniz, among 
others, used the term). It is the foundation for the experience of subjec-
tivity. There can be object consciousness without apperception but not 
without inner sense. The leap from sensibility to apperception is a leap 
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The conceptual identification of objects comes into play at the third 
synthesis, the synthesis of recognition. As Kant puts it, “[w]ithout con-
sciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought 
a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would 
be in vain” (KrV A 103). This recognition, or identification, of the 
object of thought occurs through concepts, which are rules of the unity 
and identity of objects. This is where transcendental apperception steps 
in. It is the root of all unity and permanence. It is the “pure, original, 
unchanging consciousness” and is the condition for all experience. (KrV 
A 107). 
On the subjective side, we have the transcendental apperception that 
makes concepts—and thereby cognition of objects—possible. It is the 
foundation that collects the manifoldness of representations together and 
gives them identity by uniting them in one consciousness. On the objec-
tive side, there is the transcendental object: 
Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immedi-
ately, and that in them which is immediately related to the object 
is called intuition. However, these appearances are not things in 
themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn 
have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by 
us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., tran-
scendental object = X. (KrV A 108–9) 
This transcendental object provides the relation to objects and enables 
them to have objective reality and unity, even though the ways they are 
represented are temporal and not uniform. 
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In the B-deduction, Kant emphasizes the role of the I think (Das Ich 
denke) in the transcendental apperception:  
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not 
be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representa-
tion would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing 
for me.
Intuitions, therefore, are not yet anything to me in this sense if they are 
not accompanied by transcendental apperception. The moral of these 
two elements of the third synthesis is that for temporal experience to be 
possible, we need twofold unity: the unity of the consciousness and the 
unity of the object. 
 
The three syntheses explain how we proceed from singular perceptions 
to an idea of relations between objects and finally to conceptual cogni-
tion and the idea of a transcendental subject and a transcendental object. 
For my purpose it is important to notice that only the third synthesis 
requires higher cognitive faculties. Thus, the role of sensibility in expe-
rience is dominating. Understanding enables only cognition and judg-
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4.6. THE FACULTIES OF PLEASURE AND DISPLEASURE AND 
OF DESIRE 
As the cognitive faculty determines what kinds of representations we 
can have, the faculties of pleasure and displeasure (from now on: faculty 
of pleasure) and of desire determine our orientation and goals. They can 
be seen as the principles of action of an individual. Our desires define 
what we strive toward, and that is something that we find pleasurable 
or rewarding. These two faculties are closely linked to each other and 
to the cognitive faculty. The cognitive faculty provides representations 
for us; the faculty of pleasure serves in determining the objects of the 
faculty of desire through discerning what is desirable or avoidable. 
The concept of agreement appears in Kant’s various definitions of plea-
sure. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, pleasure is described as 
“[t]he consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to 
the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that state” (KU 5:220) and 
as “[a] state of the mind in which a representation is in agreement with 
itself, as a ground, either merely for preserving this state itself […], or 
for producing its object” (KU 20:230–1). In the Critique of Practical 
Reason (Ak. 5:9n), Kant describes it as 
the representation of agreement of an object or of an action with 
the subjective conditions of life, that is, with the faculty of the 
causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its ob-
ject (or with respect to the determination of the powers of the 
subject to action in order to produce the object). (Emphasis re-
moved)
134
4. Kant´s view of the constitution of experience
The agreement with the subject is the feeling that “this suits me.” We 
wish to maintain, acquire or produce things or states that agree with us. 
Pleasure has many forms depending on the cognitive faculty on which 
it operates. It can be animal, human or spiritual. The characteristics of 












Pleasure can be subjective or objective. It is subjective when its object 
agrees with the subject, and objective when the object agrees with a 
universal judgment. The taste of avocados is agreeable for me but my 
son does not like it. Our subjective constitutions are different in this 
case. When he grows old enough to discuss moral questions, I am sure 
that we will agree that it is a better choice to buy fair trade avocados, 
even though we still might disagree on the taste. The good necessarily 
pleases everybody, which is not the case with beauty, which conforms 
to the laws of sensibility (L1, Ak. 28:248). The distinction between 
the agreeable and the disagreeable is possible without understanding. 
Recognizing beauty provides both understanding and sensibility, and it 
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is possible only for rational beings that also have sensibility; that is, for 
humans. We do not see the good through senses; we perceive it through 
the understanding. (L2, 28:586.) 
 
Pleasure, in all its forms, is the goal of the faculty of desire: we desire 
what we find agreeable, beautiful or good, and we avoid the opposite. 
By the faculty of desire, Kant (KpV, Ak. 5:9n) means the “faculty to be 
by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of 
these representations” (emphasis removed).36 When I want guacamole, 
I have the representation of guacamole in my mind. This might lead 
me to acquire the ingredients to realize my representation. Striving to 
realize the object of representation is an essential element of desire. If 
there is no kind of striving included, there is not really a desire but only 
a wish or an idle desire, whose object is not within the subject’s control 
(such as the desire to see a comet) (L1, Ak. 28:254; MM, Ak. 29:895). 
The power of free choice (freie Willkühr) is an active power to choose 
whether to act or not to obtain a certain goal (L1, Ak. 28:254; L2, Ak. 
28:587). Each choice has always an impelling cause. If this cause is sen-
sible and subjective, it is called a stimulus or impulse; if it is intellectual 
and objective, it is called a motive. (L1, Ak. 28:254–5, MM, Ak. 29:895; 








36  Kant discusses this definition further in his Critique of Judgment (5:177–8 n).
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The faculty of desire can be divided into three kinds just like the faculty 
of pleasure (Table 3):  
Freedom distinguishes human power of choice from animal power of 
choice: animal action is determined through sensible stimuli, human 
power of choice is free despite some exceptions (such as little children 
and some mental patients). (L1, Ak. 28:255.) In its lower form, the rel-
evant judgment has the form, “this is nice”, and it is always determined 
by the current contextual circumstances. In its higher form, the relevant 
judgment has the universal form, “this is good”. 
Hunger is a good example to demonstrate how these levels of the faculty 
of desire work. The lower animal desire for food leads to eating—pro-
vided that proper food is available—with no real possibility of choice. 
The subjective state of hunger makes proper food appear as agreeable 
and desirable. In this case, there is no freedom of choice. Now, if I am 
hungry and there is a chocolate bar and a carrot available, I might find 
it more tempting to choose the chocolate bar. If I do the decision based 
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on my sensible wants, I choose it. If I take a moment to reflect on what 
would be a wise choice, I choose the carrot, since it is healthier. The 
contribution of reason is the capacity to assess the motives one is acting 




4.7. CONCLUSION: THE INGREDIENTS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
Let us now put all the above pieces together. To be alive; to be able to 
determine one’s own movements, what is needed is a mind or a soul 
equipped with sensibility as the subject of representations. Mere sin-
gular sensible intuitions of objects only enable unconscious reactions 
to stimuli. The ingredient that makes it possible to speak of experience 
in the first place is the capacity to reproduce representations and to 
retain past representations in the mind, that is, imagination. So far we 
are operating with sense perceptions; and together with the capacity of 
association provided by imagination, they constitute phenomenally con-
scious experience even without the conceptual interference of the higher 
cognitive capacities. 
If the subject realizes that her representations appear in her conscious-
ness, which remains the same through all the change of the representa-
tions, she has transcendental apperception. This is no longer a sensible 
capacity, and lifts the consciousness to a new level, to consciousness of 
the self. Also concepts and judgments now become possible. The subject 
has the idea of an object in general; it remains constant throughout all 
changes. Now, it is possible for her to move from the level of the singu-
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lar representations to the level of general representations; and to concep-
tually connect representations in one’s consciousness to form judgments 
concerning the relations of things. Her understanding operates according 
to its pure forms, the categories; and for them to be applicable to sensi-
ble objects which are of a completely different nature she uses schemata 
that guide her in their correct application. 
Only a being that has understanding and reason can have personal ends 
in life that serve as motivation of action and thus enable conscious 
choice. The essence of these ends is happiness and a good life; they are 
about what it is to be a good human being and to lead a good life. It is 
not about sensible pleasure but deeper contentment. 
In Critique of Pure Reason (A 805/B 833), Kant condenses the interests 
of reason in three questions: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 
3. What may I hope?” Kant’s answer to the first two questions is, “Do 
that through which you will become worthy to be happy” (KrV A 808/B 
837). The way to happiness is through morality (A 814/B 842).37 Having 
ends for the personal development in life affects the way in which things 
are experienced; or rather, how experiences are valued. A sensible plea-
sure can be largely reduced if the subject acknowledges that it results 
from selfish motives that speak for the low moral nature of the subject 
in that it manifests that her reason and will are weaker than her animal 





37  Kant’s view of morality will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.3.
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These high moral ends are something that certainly are lacking in ani-
mals—in Kant’s view, at least—but what is the real contribution of these 
higher faculties to experience? That is, what can experience be without 
understanding and reason, in the realm of mere sensibility? And what is 
the moral worth or, in general, the moral consequences of such experi-
ence? These questions will be discussed in the next two chapters to 
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5. KANT ON ANIMAL EXPERIENCE 
 
After laying out the building blocks of experience in the previous chap-
ter, we know the context in which Kant is operating when he discusses 
animal minds. In this chapter, my aim is to see what kind of experience 
emerges when blocks that require higher cognitive capacity are omitted. 
I will concentrate on the question, what kind of experience is possible 
if we omit conceptual capacities and self-consciousness. To conclude, 
I will discuss the differences between the Cartesian and the Kantian 
view of animals. Why was it so important for Kant to attribute a soul to 
animals? 
Three things concerning Kant’s approach to animal minds should be 
clear before we start. First, animals only have the lower cognitive capac-
ity, sensibility; and not the higher ones, understanding and reason. Sec-
ondly, it follows from this that the difference between animal and human 
minds is a difference in kind, but of a different type than in Descartes’ 
view. Descartes regards the difference between humans and animals as a 
substantial difference: humans are constituted of two substances, matter 
and spirit, whereas animals are material beings with no spirits. In Kant’s 
theory, animals certainly have minds, but their minds are different from 
human minds; and they remain like that no matter how much they would 
develop their skills. Generating a completely new kind of faculty cannot 
happen just by developing the existing skills. (L1, Ak. 28:276; L2, Ak. 
28:594; Dohna, Ak. 28:690.) 
Thirdly, Kant’s problem of animal minds is hypothetical. We cannot 
have a cognition concerning animal minds since we cannot have an 
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intuition of it. We cannot directly access animal experience; we can only 
construct theories of what it possibly is like given what we know about 
animal behavior and physiology. Kant is convinced that the lower men-
tal capacities he ascribes to animals are sufficient to explain all animal 
behavior (MM, Ak. 29:906). 
 
Kant is not interested in arguing for the objective reality of his view.38 
Kant’s interest in animal minds is to be seen as a part of his project of 
the thorough analysis of the human mind, which culminates in his three 
Critiques. The main function of animals in Kant’s philosophy is to serve 
as examples of beings restricted to sensibility, through which the func-
tions of all three faculties of the (human) mind can be illuminated. The 
Kantian philosophy of animals is rather a philosophy of animality in 
humans, even though Kant also claims that sensibility is all we need to 
explain animal behavior. 
 
A good introduction to Kant’s view of animal experience is a quotation 
from his letter to Markus Herz on May 26th 1789 (Ak. XI:52). There, 
Kant writes about what it might be like to be an animal: 
I would not even be able to know that I have sense data; conse-
quently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely  
nothing. They could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry 
on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected  
 
38  Whether Kant’s view on the cognitive capacities of animal minds is objectively correct 
or not is not relevant. Kant’s claims apply to beings that have sensibility but not under-
standing or reason and, as far as Kant knows, animals can be conceived as such beings. 
However, the accumulating scientific knowledge concerning animal experience can make 
a difference in Kant’s animal ethics: if it can be reliably shown that some nonhuman 
species have higher mental capacities, it follows that they should be treated as ends in 
themselves.
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according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an 
influence on my feeling and desire, without my being aware of 
them (assuming that I am even conscious of each individual rep-
resentation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation 
of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their appercep-
tion). This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing 
thereby, not even what my own condition is.
Here, Kant mentions the following features of animal mentality: 1) there 
are no conceptual representations; 2) the only principle of connection is 
association; 3) representations have affective force; and 4) there is no 
self-consciousness. A further issue that he does not discuss here but that 
follows from all this is that animals have no free will, which has remark-
able consequences on moral issues that are the topic of Chapter 6.5. The 
first three features are related to the imagination. In the following, I will 
look at these issues from two points of view: first, through the opera-
tions of the sensible imagination; and secondly, laying focus on different 
senses of consciousness. 
The common way to interpret Kant’s view of animals renders it similar 
to the standard interpretation of the Cartesian view of animals as mecha-
nistic beings with no relevant experience (see, for example Naragon and 
Kemp Smith) whereas some authors (such as Hanna and Laiho) argue 
that there is more to animal experience in the Kantian context than mere 
automatic, unconscious reactions to stimuli. My interpretation belongs 
to this latter category. I want to show that the non-conceptual experience 
of animals can, in many respects, be very close to our way of experienc-
ing things. 
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In particular, my focus will be on the fictive faculty of animals to see, 
what kind of representation they can have when sensibility is combined 
with the fictive faculty. The fictive faculty of animals has not been 
discussed much so far, and most of the discussion concerning animals 
in Kant’s philosophy has concentrated either in the restrictions of their 
minds or their moral status, leaving aside the possibilities of animal 
representations. Being restricted to sensibility does not mean relying 
completely on the mercy of flowing sensations, but also enables the 
reproduction and anticipation of representations, which is no longer so 




5.1. THE ANALOGUE OF REASON: FROM RECEPTIVITY TO 
COMBINATION 
 
Kant often (for example, in MV Ak. 28:450, L2 Ak.28:594, Dohna Ak. 
28:690,39 KU Ak.5:464n) refers to the analogue of reason in animals. By 
this, he means the principle of action in animals that is based on sen-
sibility but which could well also be explained through reason. In this 
chapter, I will focus on the function of this analogue of reason—that is, 
the sensible principles of association by means of which animals can 
remember, anticipate and learn—and its contribution to experience in 
contrast to reason. In Kant’s terms, the focus will be on the faculty of 
imagination in animals. 
39  The passages from Kant’s lectures of metaphysics are based on Baumgarten’s Meta-
physics, and do not as such necessarily reflect Kant’s own view. However, Kant seems to 
have adopted the idea of animals as analogues of reason to his own thinking since he also 
uses it in his critical philosophy.
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I will start by looking at Kant’s argument against the higher cognitive 
faculties in animals, and will do this by showing how Kant refutes Mei-
er’s argument for them. Even though Kant’s definition of animal minds 
as equipped only with sensibility is only hypothetical, he had good  
grounds for it. In the second subchapter, the focus is on a nonconceptual 
combination of representations, and the difference between a combina-




5.1.1. Receptivity: sensible representations 
 
Animal minds are dependent on the body and restricted to sensibility. 
This means that they are able to perceive their environment through 
their senses and act in it according to representations, but they are un-
able to reflect them as objects of the inner sense, to differentiate between 
the contribution of their own minds and the information provided by the 
environment, to deliberate on the relations between the objects of their 
perceptions—not to mention mathematical or metaphysical problems 
that are independent of everything empirical. In other words, animals are 
not aware that the representational content of their minds is representa-
tional. 
Human minds are connected only to the body, and they are equipped 
also with higher cognitive faculties which make the soul autonomous 
by being the means to detach from the limitations of the body, to which 
sensibility is inseparably attached (L1, Ak. 28:274, MM, Ak. 29:878). 
Sensibility links the mind to the body. It is the capacity to become 
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affected through the sense organs. As rational animals, humans are 
capable of conceptual and abstract thinking independent from empirical 
intuitions. Such thinking is free, and Kant thinks that it raises humans 
above animals, making us autonomous agents (MS, Ak. 6:355). 
An example of the difference between a non-conceptual intuition and 
discursive intuition is in Jäsche Logik (Ak. 9:33): 
If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose 
use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his 
representation the very same object as someone else who is ac-
quainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. 
But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is differ-
ent in the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is 
intuition and concept at the same time. 
The important thing is that the capacity of perception is separate from 
the capacity of understanding but not from consciousness: both non-con-
ceptual and conceptualized perceptions can be conscious. Understanding 
only adds the classification of the perceived object, the ability to form 
the judgment “That is a house.” 
To set the stage for Kant to argue against, let us look at an argument for 
conceptual capacities in animals, presented by Georg Friedrich Meier 
(1718–1777) in his Seelen der Thiere.40  
 
40  Meier was Baumgarten’s pupil and successor at the University of Halle. He mainly 
worked with aesthetics and hermeneutics. Metaphysics and theology are main themes 
in his works but he also discussed other topics such as literature and animal psychology. 
(Roback 1970, 321; Makkreel 2006, 522–3.)
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This is the argument Kant argues against in False Subtlety. Meier’s 
argument runs like this: Since a cow (which Meier, to add force to his 
argument, considers a particularly stupid animal) looks at the new door 
of her stall with astonishment, she must be able to discern it from the 
old one. Had the cow only confused sensations, she would not be able to 
see the difference between the two doors. To notice the difference, the 
cognition must be distinct.41 According to Meier, this means that the cow 
has understanding, which is the faculty that generates distinct represen-
tations. (Meier 1749, § 32, 69.) 
Meier argues that animals can have the first two degrees of the under-
standing (which has altogether four degrees, the last two operating at the 
abstract level). The first degree of the understanding makes the contents 
of the mind distinct so that they can be distinguished from one another; 
and enables cognizing singular things among the stream of sense-data. 
Singular judgments become possible in the second degree of the under-
standing, which provides that there is at least one distinct representation 
in the mind. (Meier 1749, § 32–3, 69–70.) At this level, it is possible to  
 
41  According to Meier’s theory of representation, a representation is either clear or un-
clear. By a clear representation Meier simply means a conscious representation. (Meier 
1749, § 31, 66–7) Clear representations are always thoughts, and thoughts are always 
conscious. (Meier 1752b, § 154, 182–3). A clear representation is either distinct or con-
fused. A representation is distinct when it can be distinguished from other representations, 
otherwise the representation is confused. (Meier 1749, § 31, 66–7.) A confused cognition 
is a cognition of a whole but not of its parts (for example, a cognition of a person who is 
far away so that we cannot discern her face) whereas distinct cognition includes also the 
parts (for example, a cognition of a person who is near us so that we can clearly see her 
face) (Meier 1752b, § 28, 28–9, § 168, 215). For Meier (1952a, § 13, 4), a representation is 
conscious “as far as we distinguish it and its object from other representations and things” 
(“ In so ferne wir sie und ihren Gegenstand von andern Vorstellungen und Sachen unter-
scheiden ”. My translation). Meier compares consciousness with a light that helps us to 
distinguish between things.
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form the judgment that can be expressed in the sentence “this avocado 
is green”, whereby the subject and the predicate of the judgment are 
particular, not yet universal concepts. The word ‘avocado’ refers to the 
particular avocado (which does not have to be cognized as an instance of 
the class of avocados), and ‘green’ refers (in this case) to the particular 
color of the avocado. 
 
In summary, Meier’s argument for understanding in animals goes like 
this: 
1. If S can tell the difference between A and B, S has distinct rep-
resentations.
2. If S has distinct representations, S has understanding.
3. Animals can tell the difference between A and B.
4. Therefore, animals have understanding.
Kant argues that the proposition 2 is false, and therefore the conclusion 
does not follow. Kant’s argument in False Subtlety (Ak. 2:59) suits well 
to refute Meier’s argument for the conceptual capacities of animals: 
This argument runs like this: an ox’s representation of its stall 
includes the clear representation of its characteristic mark of hav-
ing a door; therefore, the ox has a distinct concept of its stall. It is 
easy to prevent the confusion here. The distinctness of a concept 
does not consist in the fact that that which is a characteristic mark 
of the thing is clearly represented, but rather in the fact that it 
is recognized as a characteristic mark of the thing. The door is 
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something which does, it is true, belong to the stall and can serve 
as a characteristic mark of it. But only the being who forms the 
judgment: this door belongs to this stable has a distinct concept 
of the building, and that is certainly beyond the powers of ani-
mals.
A representation is clear if all of its characteristic marks are to be 
distinguished. If not, the representation is obscure. When I look at the 
Andromeda Galaxy, I also represent an individual star belonging to the 
galaxy—let us call it Twinkle—since it is impossible to represent the 
galaxy without representing its components. However, I am not able to 
discern individual stars from the galaxy, no matter how hard I try. My 
representation of Twinkle is obscure; I represent it without knowing that 
represent it. (I can, however instrumentally get a clear representation of 
Twinkle, if I look at it through the Hubble Space Telescope.) Similarly, 
the ox surely can clearly see the door of its stall, and thereby have a 
clear representation of it. This all takes place at the sensible level and 
does not amount to judgment concerning the content of the representa-
tion, which would require understanding even though these representa-
tions are necessary conditions for such a judgment. 
 
Kant and Meier do not disagree about what happens in the mind of the 
animal, or what the experience of the animal is. They disagree about 
what it is to have understanding and concepts and to be able to judge. 
For Meier, abstract reasoning is not necessarily needed for concepts; 
for Kant it is. What Meier sees as a judgment formed by the cow in the 
understanding, is for Kant only discernment through association at the 
sensible level. In concepts and judgments (which are combinations of 
concepts), abstract reasoning is always needed, sensibility alone will not 
do. 
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To sum up, Kant’s argument against conceptual capacities in animals 
goes like this: 
1. If S can compare, reflect and abstract, S has the capacity to 
form concepts.
2. If S has the capacity to form concepts, S has understanding.
3. Animals cannot compare, reflect and abstract.
4. Animals do not have understanding.
The fact that the ox reacts to novel things and thus has distinct represen-
tations does not imply the capacity of judgments, that is, the ability of 
comparison, reflection and abstraction. It rather speaks for acute senses 
and the ability of association, which rest on the capacity of imagination. 




5.1.2. Combination: imagination 
Let us consider Meier’s example of the cow staring at the new door of 
her stable. The ability of the cow to notice that the door is new (which 
she shows by being surprised) requires something more than mere 
receptivity. If all the cow had were mere picture-like representations, 
whose influence would vanish as soon as their objects ceased to be the 
center of attention, she would not be able to notice the change (see the 
example of chasing the ball, Case one, in Chapter 4.4.). 
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For making the effect of objects count more than a “blind mechanism” 
(as Descartes sees it), combination of representations is needed. The 
cow has combined a certain kind of door with the representation of her 
stable. This happens through association and requires memory. Accord-
ing to Kant, the faculty of imagination is responsible for all combina-
tion of representations in animals. In animals, imagination serves as the 
analogy of reason in that its function is in many respects similar to the 
conceptual combination that humans as rational animals are capable of. 
 
The capacity to associate is a function of the faculty of imagination, 
which Kant attributes to animals: “Animals have senses and repro-
ductive imagination […]. With imagination we can think yet a fictive 
faculty […], of anticipation […] and reproduction […]. The faculty of 
consciousness cannot be attributed to animals” (L2, Ak. 28:594). This 
passage suggests that imagination is a distinct mental process from 
sensibility as receptivity, without still amounting to consciousness.42 In a 
more thorough passage in Volckmann’s lecture notes (MV, Ak. 28:449–
50) Kant opens up this issue further: 
We can also think a reproduction […], anticipation […], without 
the least self-consciousness, but such a being could not prescribe 
rules for itself, for the possibility of a rule requires making con-
sciousness of oneself the object of one’s intuition, one must be 
conscious of what different beings agree on; if many beings ex-
hibit a large degree of the effects which can arise in human beings 
through reason, for, if they are lacking consciousness, then they  
 
42  Since this lecture is from his precritical period, I take Kant here as denying only self-
consciousness from animals, not consciousness of perceptions.
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are also missing understanding and reason, and sensibility alone 
reigns. With animals one calls this an analogue of reason […] and 
there is an instinct of sensibility whereby they need no reason,  
but rather which an external being placed in them for acting, or 
for working according to instinct; the analogue of reason […] is 
the summation of all lower powers. 
Kant says here that a lower cognitive faculty can produce behavior 
similar to that resulting from the use of reason. It operates instinct-like, 
with no need for conscious deliberation, and this is where the crucial dif-
ference between imagination and reason lies in. Conscious deliberation 
of one’s undertakings enables action according to rules and prescrib-
ing rules to oneself. This, in turn, is the precondition for all conceptual 
thinking and all morality.43 
 
The core function of the sensible imagination is the synthesis of repro-
duction. It seeks consistencies among the variable representations and 
makes association possible, as seen in the earlier example of the squir-
rel. Imagination reproduces representations that have been received 
through the senses.44 Animals do not, however, have the third synthesis, 
the synthesis of recognition in a concept. Even though Kant (KrV A 103) 
says that this synthesis is necessary for the representations to be some-
thing for the subject, this rules out only consciousness of a meaning, not 
consciousness of objects.
43  On Kant’s view on ethics, see Chapter 6.5.
44  For a detailed exposition of the function of the imagination, see Chapter 4.5.1.
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According to Kant, animals connect representations only through as-
sociation. It is the basis for their ability to learn. When a squirrel tastes 
an acorn for the first time and notices that it is delicious, he associates 
the gustatory pleasure of eating an acorn with the appearance of acorns. 
The next time he sees acorns he probably hurries to them without hesita-
tion. He, however, does not make a judgment “this acorn is delicious”, 
whereby he would understand that the delicious taste is inherent in the 
substance of acorns. Here, the first and the second syntheses are at work. 
The synthesis of apprehension collects the sensible manifoldness of the 
act of eating an acorn into one experience. The synthesis of reproduc-
tion makes the squirrel remember how the acorn affected him a moment 
earlier, thus bringing more unity to his experience; and the memory of 
his pleasant encounter with an acorn makes him hurry to them in future.  
 
An alternative view of this is to attribute reason to animals. This is 
what Meier does. He explains the cow’s ability to notice the change by 
attributing reason to her. According to Meier (1752, § 31, 31), animals 
can have the first of the two degrees of reason, which he understands 
as the power of cognition, that makes it possible to distinctly perceive 
(causal) connections between things. Animals can thus have the capacity 
to recognize the connection between singular beings (Meier 1749, § 37, 
73). Animal reason does not amount to recognizing connections between 
universals. It is not yet possible to form general, universal judgments. 
 
Kant argues that this capacity of the cow to notice the change does not 
amount to the ability to form the conceptual judgment, “the door of 
stable is new”, even though it is required for forming the judgment. 
To become a judgment, the cow would have to know about doors and 
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stables and their functions in general, not just in the particular case of 
her stable. Understanding makes judgments possible. In judgments, con-
cepts are combined with each other. From the forms of judgments, Kant 
derives categories, the pure concepts of the understanding, according to 
which the understanding analyzes the material provided by  
sensibility, as explained in Chapter 4. All these features that are very 
important for the human mind are lacking in animals, and they become 
possible through the third synthesis, the synthesis of recognition in a 
concept. 
 
In his lectures of metaphysics (L1, Ak. 28:276), Kant describes the dif-
ference between animal and human consciousness as follows: 
[Animals] will have no general cognition through reflection, no 
identity of the representations, also no connections of the repre-
sentations according to subject and predicate, according to ground 
and consequence, according to the whole and according to the 
parts; for those are all consequences of the consciousness which 
animals lack.
Animal cognition is always particular and subjective and, as such, insuf-
ficient for general, conceptual combination according to the forms of the 
understanding. A squirrel can represent an acorn, but he cannot represent 
it as an acorn. 
 
The lack of understanding and thus the lack of the possibility of con-
ceptual combination means that animals do not have the capacity to set 
rules for themselves, which is required in conceptual cognition. They 
cannot compare a tree with other trees to find the central characteristics 
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that all trees have in common thereby creating a rule or a concept for 
thinking about trees. They cannot think that this birch that grows beside 
the field and that juniper that grows on the seashore have one thing in 
common, namely that they both are trees. This is a useless capacity 
to animals, even though it is of utmost importance to humans, whose 
interaction is based on linguistic communication. This, of course, entails 
also that animals cannot have language, since language operates with 
concepts. 
 
Furthermore, the squirrel cannot consciously decide whether she eats the 
acorns available or not; that is determined by such things as how hungry 
she is; or whether there are more urgent tasks at hand, such as fleeing 
from a predator. Representations can serve only as necessitating stimuli 
for animals. Only humans have the ability of conceptual combination. 
Conceptual thinking broadens the subjective perspective to a universal 
level and enables action from motives, reflected reasons for action. Ani-
mals act on the basis of impulses of the form “now I want X”, without 
conceptualizing them as such, whereas humans are able to act on the 
basis of the motive “even though I now want X, I still had better do Y.” 
However, the capacity of action from reflected motives does not defi-
nitely imply such action. It always requires intellectual effort, and often 
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Another example of imagination doing in animals what concepts can do 
in humans is this passage from False Subtlety (Ak. 2:60): 
The dog differentiates the roast from the loaf, and it does so be-
cause the way in which it is affected by the roast is different from 
the way in which it is affected by the loaf (for different things 
cause different sensations); and the sensations caused by the 
roast are a ground of desire in the dog that differs from the desire 
caused by the loaf, according to the natural connection which ex-
ists between its drives and its representations.
Here, the dog is clearly capable of making some kind of comparison 
based on the effect of the representations to the faculties of desire and 
pleasure motivates the dog to this comparison (see also Newton 2012, 
7–8), through which he is able to differentiate the two kinds of meat. 
 
Let us assume that the sensible qualities of the roast—in particular its 
taste, smell and feel—have caused more pleasure in the dog than those 
of the loaf. Now that the dog sees the two kinds of meat at the same 
time, he automatically associates them with their previous gustatory 
qualities, and probably decides to eat the roast first. Since the dog is 
incapable of the third synthesis, synthesis of recognition in a concept, 
the pieces of meat remain singular to him. He does not in any way think 
to himself in terms of the particular roast belonging to the category of 
roasts in general as rational humans would be able to do, even though 
this does not necessarily show in any way in his behavior. This is what it 
is to have the analogy of reason.
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5.2. ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The previous chapter focused on the questions, what kind of representa-
tions animals are capable of and how they can combine them. In this 
chapter, I will bring this to the level of experience: how do animals 
experience their representations? An important feature that affects ani-
mal experience and that can even be used to question it is that they do 
not have self-consciousness, which is a distinguishing feature of human 
mentality. First, I will discuss how the lack of self-consciousness affects 
experience. On this basis we can answer to the question, what merely 




5.2.1. No self-consciousness 
 
There are passages (such as L1, Ak. 28:27) where Kant clearly claims 
that animals are not conscious and they do not necessarily even have 
experience; and some scholars (such as Kemp Smith 1992) take this to 
mean that Kant denies animal experience even as phenomenal con-
sciousness or object consciousness. Kant’s notion of self-consciousness 
is cognitively quite demanding. In this chapter, I argue that it is neces-
sary in judgments, but experience is possible also without it. 
By the term ‘consciousness’ Kant does not refer to phenomenal con-
sciousness. That Kant denies consciousness and, with it, the conscious 
experience of animals, does not necessarily mean denying animal  
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perceptions and animal experience. Instead, what he denies is self-
consciousness, or transcendental apperception. We are operating here 
with different senses of consciousness, such as consciousness of objects, 
consciousness of representations, consciousness of meaning and self-
consciousness. Kant would ascribe at best the first two to animals. 
 
The fundamental difference between rational and non-rational animals is 
a difference between judgment and perception: 
If one succeeds in understanding what the mysterious power is 
which makes judging possible, one will have solved the problem 
[about the essential difference between rational and non-rational 
animals]. My present opinion tends to the view that this power or 
capacity is nothing other than the faculty of inner sense, that is to 
say, the faculty of making one’s own representations the objects 
of one’s thought. (FS, Ak. 2:60)
The essence of the understanding consists in the capacity to take one’s 
representations as objects of thought. In other words, understanding is a 
second-order consciousness of objects whereas sensibility is first-order 
consciousness of objects. This enables self-consciousness, the capacity 
to understand that one is the subject in which the representations inhere. 
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Also in his lecture of metaphysics (MM, Ak. 29:906), Kant expresses 
the same idea:  
[W]e assume that animals can endure to eternity and that their 
powers can steadily grow, and yet not attain to understanding, 
because first an essential piece must then be added to their sen-
sibility, through which alone understanding becomes possible, 
namely, apperception. 
Transcendental apperception is the kind of consciousness that separates 
rational animals from the non-rational ones. This is also Kant’s argu-
ment against the assimilationistic view, according to which animals have 
all the same cognitive capacities as humans do but to a lesser degree. 
The lack of self-consciousness makes animal experience a flow of con-
stantly changing singular representations that, at most, leave behind only 
a faint trace so that the next time a similar representation occurs, it is 
flavored with a faint hint of familiarity, instead of being a unity com-
posed of various representations, which become possible only through 
apperception. 
 
The capacity of self-consciousness affects action and makes concep-
tual thinking possible. I have discussed the role of the transcendental 
apperception in thinking in Chapter 4.3., so I will now concentrate on 
its role in action. Self-consciousness affects action by providing the pos-
sibility to choose what one does and why. There is a difference between 
performing a task consciously and “just-performing” it. For example, 
usually when I go home I unthinkingly put the keys where they belong 
by hanging them on a hook in the hall. Sometimes I put them—equally 
unconsciously—somewhere else. In that case, I will be in trouble when 
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I next leave home: if the keys are not hanging on their hook, I have 
no idea where I have put them. In those moments I wish I had acted 
consciously when I put them away, since then I would probably know 
where they are. 
Consciousness of what one is doing does not, however, necessarily make 
the performance any better. “Just-performing” the task at hand is often 
faster and the possibility of mistakes is lower. Consciousness adds a 
cognitive process to it making it a bit more complicated. As I discussed 
in the Chapter 3.4.1., in many cases being on autopilot, so to speak, is 
a better option than acting consciously. This is the case, for example, 
when playing an instrument or driving a car. If I drove a car by directing 
my movements through careful, rational reflection, my driving would 
become less smooth than it is when I do not pay so much conscious at-
tention to the cognitive processes responsible for my movements. 
 
Similarly, a skilled piano player does not need to pay too much atten-
tion to his playing; it happens quite automatically. If this piano player 
decided to reflect carefully on how she in fact is moving her fingers 
while playing, the smoothness of the playing would be lost. This is an 
expression of the classical centipede dilemma: if a centipede would have 
to consciously decide which foot to move first, it probably would not be 
able to move at all. 
 
Animal action is autonomic “just-performing” without conceptual un-
derstanding. To act with consciousness, a pig looking at a muddy puddle 
and a rabbit fleeing from a bird of prey would have to understand that 
they are acting according to a rule. The pig would have to be able to si-
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lently make the judgment for himself that might be something like this: 
“What an attractive muddy puddle there is over there! I’ll go and roll in 
it. It is really good for my skin!” The rabbit would be able to form the 
thought that could be expressed as follows: “That large bird in the sky 
looks threatening. I’d better hide as soon as possible.” 
 
Mere capacity of perception, mere ability to experience things in a cer-
tain way and the ability to act on this basis is not consciousness, as Kant 
sees it. Consciousness is understanding what one does, on what grounds 
and for what purpose. These factors—the content and the purpose of 
the action and the reasons for it— are often present in the experience of 
animals but animals are not conscious of them in the sense that they are 
able to silently spell them out for themselves. 
 
A self-conscious being understands that she is a subject that acts, an 
active subject. Without it, all representations are nothing but subjective 
modifications of the mind that serve as impulses which determine all ac-
tion. In that case, the subject is unable to make autonomous choices. The 
strongest impulse wins. Animals cannot, in a manner of speaking, rise 
above their representations and consider what possible consequences 
each choice entails. What does all this mean, then? How does it matter, 
especially if, as I said before, unconscious, automatic action is often 
more accurate than conscious action? 
 
The most significant consequence is that beings without self-conscious-
ness are unable to set rules for themselves. Action according to a rule is 
possible: we can train animals to follow simple rules, and animal com-
munities also have their strict social rules. These are not, however, rules 
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that animals themselves have consciously set. Training animals to follow 
rules is explicable through association; and the social rules that apply in 
animal communities are determined through natural mechanisms and the 
principle “the strongest one wins” rather than through rational reflection. 
 
To be able to set rules for oneself requires the ability of reaching from 
subjectivity and particularity toward objectivity and universality. Kant 
sees concepts as rules, and everyone whose concepts are based on the 
same rules can communicate with one another at a general level. If I 
refer to the same object through the word ‘avocado’ as you do, we can 
have a meaningful conversation of avocados. For this to be possible, we 
need to use the same syntactical and grammatical rules. The more an 
action is based on reason, the more it is based on rules. It might at first 
sound paradoxical, but the more an action follows a rule, the freer it is. 
Reason entails the possibility of free will. 
 
In the same way, the more sensible stimuli determine action, the less 
free it is. For Kant, moral action is the highest form of rational action. 
Morality is possible only for a subject that has free will. Will is closely 
linked to rules, and together they constitute the core of Kant’s moral 
philosophy, the categorical imperative, which commands one to act ac-
cording a maxim which you can will to become a general law. It is a uni-
versal rule, form or test for all of our moral actions. Just like concepts, 
maxims are also rules that can be applied to objects or situations that 
fulfil the given criteria. In the case of morality, freedom entails responsi-
bility which, in turn, clearly requires self-consciousness. Animals do not 
have free will, and they are outside morality. 
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To put all these elements together, animals that are not self-conscious 
do not have power of choice concerning their action. They act according 
to the strongest stimulus. This is not to say that the possibility of choice 
would be irrelevant for animals. They are completely capable of making 
the best available choices concerning their action, and the possibility 
of making choices is a most important factor concerning the contempo-
rary issues of animal welfare. A cow feels better if she has the choice 
of deciding on what kind of floor she lies down (Manninen et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, her choices, as important as they are for her welfare, are 
not free. She is determined to make only such choices that are the best 
for her in that situation. She does not take others into account, unless 
there is some immediate benefit for her in that. Human action is mostly 
exactly like this, except that I have the feeling that we make more bad 
choices than animals do but, due to our self-consciousness, we are in 
the position also of making moral choices from which we do not gain a 




5.2.2. The cognitive status of animal representations 
 
Now that we know which kind of mental abilities and consciousness 
animals lack, and what kind of consequences that has, we can finally 
concentrate on the kind of consciousness that they can have in the Kan-
tian framework. This will give us the means to answer the core question 
of this whole study, which kind of experience is possible for animals in 
Kant’s theory; or, what is the contribution of sensibility to experience. 
The starting point is that Kant regards animals as beings that have repre-
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sentations. How are animal representations to be understood if animals 
lack the kind of consciousness that we do? Do they have unconscious 
representations and, if that is the case, what does it mean to have uncon-
scious representations? 
In this chapter, I will introduce two ways to understand the cognitive 
status of animal representations in Kant’s philosophy. The first inter-
pretation stresses the importance of the higher cognitive capacities. 
Animal experience is seen as an unconscious but nevertheless a mental 
process According to the second interpretation, animals are conscious 
of their representations even though they are not self-conscious and 
cannot conceptually articulate the content of their representations. As an 
example of the first interpretation I will present Kemp Smith’s view; and 
Naragon’s counterargument to Kemp Smith expresses the essence of the 
second view.  
 
I will argue that this latter view is more correct; but I will also point out 
that the differences between these two interpretations are not necessarily 
as wide as they might seem at first. The biggest difference between them 
is not as much about what animal experience is like as it is about how 
the terms are used. In this particular context, the term that is perhaps the 
most perplexing is the notion of consciousness. Even Kant himself uses 
the term in different senses according to the context, and Kemp Smith’s 
understanding of consciousness is very narrowly outlined, which reflects 
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Let us first look at the theory behind these interpretations. It is a ques-
tion about the definition of the term ‘consciousness’.Through sensibil-
ity, we are able to perceive objects. This is object consciousness. If we 
assume that it is like something, it can be called phenomenal conscious-
ness. If we can look at these representational contents from a distance, 
so to speak, that is, if we can think of what they are about and express 
that, perhaps also make judgments concerning them, we are conscious in 
a different sense. Then, we have reflective consciousness. This requires 
inner sense and transcendental apperception. 
 
Again, we must be careful of what we mean by inner sense. To be able 
of being conscious that the representation r1 at the moment t1 and the 
changed representation r2 at the moment t2 are in the consciousness 
of the same subject is a demanding requirement, and in his pre-critical 
lectures of philosophy, Kant has even claimed that animals do not have 
inner sense.45 I do not, however, believe that Kant would have wanted 
to claim that animals were unable of temporal perception, which would 
follow if ‘inner sense’ was read here in the meaning Kant used it in his 
critical period. In the pre-critical period, ‘inner sense’ comes close to ap-
perception (see also McLear 2011, 9); where as in the critical period, it 
is more clearly attached to sensibility and temporal perception. Keeping 
a representation in mind and noticing it change is possible without the 
conceptual power of thinking, through sensible imagination. 
 
Kemp Smith (1992, xli) argues that animals in Kant’s philosophy are not 
conscious. Kemp Smith has a strict understanding of ‘consciousness’ as 
 
45  See, for example, L1, Ak. 28:276: “animals will have all representations of the outer 
senses; they will forgo only those representations which rest on the inner sense.”
165
5. Kant on animal experience
having a judgmental character; and this requires self-consciousness. This 
makes it possible for Kant to make such divisions as appearance–reality, 
real–ideal and judgment–conditions of judgment. (Ibid., xlii.) Animals 
are not able to think about the transcendental conditions or propositional 
contents of experience; and thus they are not capable of having self-
consciousness. They just take their experience as given and their action 
is completely determined by that. 
Of course, representations do have a meaning to animals in the sense 
that each representation determines animal action in a different way. The 
representation of a predator causes a rabbit to flee, and the representa-
tion of birch buds makes her eat. The rabbit, however, does not concep-
tualize the predator as a threat, herself as fleeing, or the buds as a meal, 
even though her action can be explained as though she did. She does not 
have the required consciousness of a meaning, which also allows the use 
of symbols and thereby language. Kemp Smith’s view is that this does 
not count as consciousness. 
Naragon (1991), on the other hand, claims that Kant does not always 
mean self-consciousness when he uses the term ‘consciousness’, but 
sometimes only consciousness of representations. He claims, and I agree 
with him, that animals are conscious in the latter sense. He argues that 
even though animals are not conscious of (symbolic) meaning, they still 
can have consciousness of representations and of objects even though 
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Consciousness understood as a consciousness of a meaning, as Kemp 
Smith sees it, requires self-consciousness, which animals do not have: 
“If animals are devoid of all awareness of meaning, they must also 
be denied anything analogous to what we must signify by the term 
consciousness” (Kemp Smith 1992, xlviii, xlix). Naragon (1990, 6n.) 
considers Kemp Smith’s interpretation of animals as beings with only 
unconscious representations implausible. Even though Kant (Anthropo-
logie §5; BA 18) approves of the idea of unconscious (obscure) repre-
sentations and even claims that most of human representations are  
unconscious, Naragon (1990, 10) assumes that Kant’s idea is that only 
conscious beings can have this kind of unconscious representation. 
 
Kemp Smith grants, however, that even though animal experience is 
not conscious, it is nevertheless a mental process. Animal experience 
consists of sensations and feelings that are a part of the causal series of 
natural events, but this does not yet mean that they were conscious of 
this series. (Ibid., xlix.) For him, phenomenal consciousness does not 
qualify as consciousness. Kemp Smith sets high criteria for conscious-
ness: it requires ability to differentiate between representations and their 
objects and the ‘I’ that accompanies all representations. Naragon admits 
that Kantian animals are unconscious in this sense but not in the sense 
of consciousness of representations. He points out that Kant’s use of the 
term Bewußtsein is inconsistent, referring sometimes to consciousness 
of representations, sometimes to inner sense (understood as appercep-
tion, not as a capacity for temporal perception) and that Kant denies 
only the latter from animals (Naragon 1991, 7, 11).46 
 
46  See, for example L1 28:276: “Animals are accordingly different from human souls not 
in degree but rather in species; for however much animal souls increase in their sensible 
faculties, consciousness of their self, inner sense, still cannot be attained thereby.”
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I would add here that Kant denies an inner sense from animals only in 
the cognitively more demanding sense, as apperception, not as a means 
of perceiving objects. 
 
In Critique of Pure Reason (A 320/B 376–7), Kant presents a division 
of representations (known as the Stufenleiter) starting from the uncon-
scious ones and proceeding to the more complex ones. Let us have a 
look at the two first kinds of conscious representations and see if that 
might help us to understand Kant’s view of animal representations: 
 
 Conscious representation (perceptio)
1) “A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of 
its state”; that is, a sensation (sensatio)
2) An objective perception; that is, a cognition (cognitio)47
a) a singular cognition that relates immediately to the ob-
ject; that is, an intuition (intuitus)
b) a cognition that can relate to several objects by means of 




47  The claim that Kant seems to present here‒that a cognition is either a intuition or a 
concept‒contradicts his definition of cognition as constituted from both intuition and con-
cept. Is it, then, justified to say that animals that certainly have intuitions also have cogni-
tions? One possibility is that Kant wants to stress here the two inseparable components 
of a cognition; another possibility is, that Kant, perhaps by mistake, uses the term ‘cogni-
tion’ in two different senses, to refer to a cognition on the one hand in a wide sense, on 
another in a narrow and more familiar sense. In this context, however, there is no reason 
to go deeper into this problem field.
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Kant does not mention here, where animal representations belong in 
this division. It is certain that animals have sensations: when we look at 
the above quotation from his letter to Markus Herz at the beginning of 
Chapter 5, we can see that his view is that animals do have conscious 
representations, but only as sensations. 
 
In his lectures of metaphysics (MM, Ak. 29:794), Kant defines percep-
tion as “consciousness of sensation”, and continues by describing this 
kind of perceptual consciousness as follows: “[f]rom pure sensations  
one cannot make any concepts or communicate them to others, for it is  
the manner in which one finds oneself with something”. You just cannot 
find yourself with anything in any manner if you do not experience it. 
And again, this ‘finding oneself’ should not be seen as a reflective act, 
since Kant talks here only of the role of sensibility. This quotation sup-
ports the idea of the existence of non-conceptual consciousness, which 
is brilliantly exemplified in animals, even though part of human cogni-
tion also is non-conceptual. 
 
Now let us return to the issue of the lack of self-consciousness in animal 
representations. Kantian animals do not have a transcendental appercep-
tion that is expressed in the sentence “I think”, the sense of subjectivity 
attached to all the conscious representations of rational beings. Animals 
have only non-conceptual representations, and cannot be characterized 
as thoughts in this sense. In the place of the “I think” of the appercep-
tion animals have “there is” of the stream of sensible representations. In 
other words, instead of self-consciousness, animals only have subjective 
object consciousness; that is, a first-order consciousness of their current 
state they are in, including all sense perceptions, emotions, physiological 
states and so on. 
169
5. Kant on animal experience
According to Kant’s view, animals have their own, unique point of view, 
but they are not aware of it as a subjective point of view. They do not 
have an idea of independent, objective reality and their own subjectivity. 
Animal consciousness is merely experiential in the sense that animals 
are incapable of reflecting representational contents. When a dog has 
a representation of a bone, the representation includes various compo-
nents, such as representations of its hardness, color and taste. The dog 
does not, however, understand that another dog might perceive the taste 
of the bone in another way. He is unable to tell which part of his rep-
resentation of the bone has its origin in his own mind and which in the 
bone itself. 
 
To sum up, the content of animal minds consists of successive percep-
tions whose contents and relations are not conceptualized at all: proper-
ties are not discerned from their bearers, and parts are not understood as 
belonging to a whole. This means that the dog cannot analyze its experi-
ence through universal concepts which require the use of the forms of 
the understanding. Nevertheless he is able to keep past representations 
in mind, that is, to reproduce them. 
 
In animals, this capacity is passive: the dog does not consciously choose 
whether he wants to bring something to his mind or not; rather, it is an 
automatic mechanism of the mind determined by the way the repre-
sentation in question affects the faculty of desire. This is made pos-
sible through imagination. The experiences of pleasure and displeasure 
determine the faculty of desire and action in non-rational animals as 
well as in rational humans. Our capacity to take an objective look at our 
representations and assess the effects of our actions gives us the freedom 
of choice and endows us with moral responsibility. 
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5.3. CONCEPTUAL AND NONCONCEPTUAL INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF KANT 
 
One question that the interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of experience 
deal with is whether conceptual capacities should be seen as a neces-
sary condition for consciousness and proper experience. This dispute 
between conceptualism and nonconceptualism is closely related to the 
question of animal experience. If concepts are not needed for percep-
tions to have content, we can well ascribe rich, conscious experience 
to non-rational animals. A pig that has certain sensations in her skin 
and has a visual perception of a muddy puddle goes to roll in it and can 
enjoy doing that. 
 
Again, if concepts are considered necessary for experience, that is, if 
there cannot be any perceptual discriminations without the possibility 
of conceptually referring to their content, if only through a demonstra-
tive concept, Kant’s view of animals implies that their perceptions really 
do not have content (see Hanna 2008, 46). The itchy sensation together 
with the visual perception determine the pig to go to the muddy puddle. 
Rolling there relieves the sensations that had determined the pig to do 
something to change her condition, without her being in any sense an 
active subject here, and even without this being like anything for her. 
 
One of the most famous slogans in the Critique of Pure Reason is Kant’s 
declaration that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind” (A51/B76). If this passage is isolated from its con-
text, which introduces the roles of these two functions of the mind in the 
specific action of generating objective cognition, it seems that it strongly 
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suggests that concepts are necessary for experience. This conceptualistic 
interpretation would imply that there can be no such thing as animal ex-
perience if animals are regarded as non-rational beings. Furthermore, it 
denies the possibility of perceptual content: intuitions gain content only 
through concepts.48 
 
Laiho’s (2012, 228) formulation of the nonconceptualistic argument 
embodies its core: “Perception is possible without thinking. Concepts 
are necessary only for thinking and judging. Therefore, concepts are 
not necessary for perception.” If we look at the context of Kant’s claim 
about the complementary role of intuitions and concepts, we can see 
clearly that Kant is not making a claim concerning their roles in general, 
but only regarding the constitution of objectively valid judgments (see 
Hanna 2014).  
 
We can also look at the following quotations from the Critique of Pure 
Reason to become convinced that the conceptualistic interpretation 
of Kant is less accurate than the nonconceptualistic one: “Objects can 
indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions 
of the understanding” (A 89/B 122); and even if the understanding was 
unable to put appearances under its forms, “[a]ppearances would none-
theless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires 






48  See for instance McDowell 1994 and Sellars 1968.
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So far, we have seen that Kant allows perceptions for animals. Already 
this speaks for itself for the nonconceptualistic interpretation (see also 
Laiho 230). Let us look, for example, at Kant’s division of cognition in 
Jäsche Logik (Ak. 9:64–5):49
The first degree of cognition is: to represent something;
The second: to represent something with consciousness, or to 
perceive (percipere);
The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to repre-
sent something in comparison with other things, both as to same-
ness and as to difference;
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, 
i.e., to cognize it (cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with ob-
jects too, but they do not cognize them. 
The fifth: to understand something (intelligere), i.e., to cognize 
something through the understanding by means of concepts, or to 
conceive. 50 (My emphasis; original emphasis removed.) 
49  Jäsche Logik comprises notes made by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche from Kant’s lectures 
based on G.F. Meier’s Auszug aus dem Vernunftlehre. Kant, however, was not very faith-
ful in following Meier’s book; he also presented his own comments. The above division 
of cognition is Kant’s own interpretation and elucidation of Meier’s ideas so we can as-
sume that he is not simply repeating Meier’s ideas but presenting his own views based on 
them.
50  Kant’s list has three further degrees but they are irrelevant to my subject.
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In the highlighted passage, Kant says that animal representations are 
not mere subjective modifications of the mind but provide awareness of 
objects (see also McLear 2011, 5). What Kant denies from animals is 
conscious cognition, not conscious representations. Kant also says here 
that animals are capable of discerning things according to the similari-
ties and differences.51 Animals cannot, however, conceptually express 
what it is that they are acquainted with. Perception is “consciousness of 
sensation”, and Kant describes it as follows: “[f]rom pure sensations one 
cannot make any concepts or communicate them to others, for it is the 
manner in which one finds oneself with something” (MM, Ak. 29:794). 
The role of the perception is to feel and to become affected; the role of 






In this chapter, I have looked for the constitutive elements of animal 
cognition, proceeding from singular sense perceptions to the mental op-
erations that are needed for their combination. I have argued that repro-
ductive imagination makes the combination possible by being the source 
of memory and anticipation that is necessary for learning and action that 
is to count more than mere reaction to immediate stimuli. I have also 
discussed animal consciousness. There is a certain kind of conscious-
ness, namely self-consciousness or transcendental apperception that 
Kant ascribes only to rational creatures. It is the second-order capacity 
to have one’s representations as the object of thought. It is necessary for  
 
51  This is also an instance of imagination and schemata at work in animals!
174
5. Kant on animal experience
conceptual thinking, freedom of choice and morality. But only that much 
is excluded from animals; not consciousness of perceptions. Therefore, 
my conclusion is that the conceptualistic interpretation of Kant rests on 
false assumptions of the role of intuitions. 
 
Let us look at this in the light of the kinds of consciousness defined in 
the Chapter 2.1.1., where I introduced a threefold model of the neuro-
psychology of visual perception. At the first stage, visual stimuli cause 
neural changes in the visual cortex but this is completely unconscious. 
At the second level, the input is processed in the occipital lobe where it 
gets its particular feel. Finally, at the third level, the input can become an 
object of conscious awareness when it is processed in the frontal cortex.  
 
I claim that Kant’s theory allows animal experience being like some-
thing for the animal, that is, phenomenal consciousness. However, 
animals do not have access to their representations as representations 
but can still process them a bit further through the reproductive imagina-
tion. Animals are conscious of objects but not of their representations. 
They can, to some extent, use their representations in directing their 
action, but this is always linked to the associated pleasure or displea-
sure. This awareness of objects is always tinged with the current state 
of the animal, but the animal cannot perceive this since this state melts 
together with the perception of the external object. A rabbit can scarcely 
represent a bird of prey without the strong negative emotion with which 
it is associated.  
 
To sum up, animals do not make judgments and they do not have tran-
scendental apperception; they are not self-conscious. Even though they 
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do perceive the objective world from their own, subjective viewpoint, 
they do not have an idea of objective reality and the subjective nature of 
their experience. Animals are incapable of reflecting the content of their 
representations. The content of animal minds consists of successive per-
ceptions whose relations are not conceptualized at all: properties are not 
discerned from their bearers, and parts are not understood as belonging 
to a whole. Instead of self-consciousness, animals have only subjective 
object-consciousness of the current state they are in, including all sense 




5.5. DISCUSSION: KANT VS. DESCARTES  
To conclude, I would like to discuss the question of how exactly Kant’s 
view of animal experience is different from Descartes’ view. This is 
important because it helps us see the real contribution of Kant ascribing 
minds to animals while he still retains the cognitive difference between 
humans and animals as a difference in kind. I will discuss two issues 
here, representations and experience, and mechanism. First, I will look 
at Descartes’ view in Kant’s terms, after which I will bring Kant closer 
to the Cartesian view. 
 
The context in which Kant studies animals is somewhat different from 
Descartes’ starting point. For Descartes, animals are examples of the 
mechanical action of the material substance, whereas for Kant their 
role is to illuminate the functions and possibilities of sensibility. This 
highlights the difference in the way in which Kant and Descartes see the 
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cognitive difference between humans and animals: for Descartes, it is 
a difference in the ontological constitution; for Kant, the difference lies 
in the quality and quantity of the mental faculties. This difference might 
appear as a huge one, given that Kant explicitly refutes it. However, 
when we look at how they conceived animal experience, the difference 
is not anymore necessarily huge. As we have seen, the Cartesian mecha-
nism does not have to be read as implying that animals have absolutely 
no experience; and Kant’s ascribing of minds to animals need not imply 
that the representations which animals have are cognitively complex. 
 
Prima facie it seems as though the difference between the views of 
Descartes and Kant on animals is simply that Cartesian animals have 
no experience since they do not have minds; whereas the Kantian 
animals have. But as we have seen, the issue is not as simple as that. 
The Cartesian view excludes all experience from animals only in its 
standard interpretation. If we read Descartes according to the radical or 
open interpretation (described in Chapter 3.3.1.), that is, if we accept 
that mechanics can account for cognitive states and affective states, the 
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5.5.1. Animal machines and representations 
 
Let us first look at Descartes’ way of dividing sense perception into 
three parts and see how it relates to Kant’s division of representations 
laying special attention to the question whether there are differences in 
where animals are situated. According to Descartes (Meditationes AT 
VII:436–37/II:310), sense perception consists of three parts. First, the 
external objects affect the senses (sensation). This causes inner, physi-
ological movements, whereby the soul becomes affected (perception). 
Finally, it is possible to form a judgment concerning the sensation 
(understanding). 
 
In Descartes’ theory, animals remain at the first, physiological level of 
sensations. Kant’s view of animals differs essentially from that of Des-
cartes in that Kant thinks animals have soul and representations. Kant’s 
division of representations, proceeding from unconscious representa-
tions, is in this respect completely beyond the abilities of Cartesian 
animals. According to Kant’s view, animals reach the second level in 
Descartes’ division, since representation is not only a mechanical reac-
tion but a mental state, a perception. Animals do not, however, reach the 
third level, since they have no capacity to judge. 
 
So far this looks quite simple. Kant’s main point against the doctrine 
of AM is that to be able to move according to representations, animals 
must have minds as the substance for the representations to be inherent. 
If animals do not have minds, as Descartes claims, they cannot have any 
kind of perceptions. In this way, Kant’s view of Descartes leads to the 
standard interpretation. If we read Descartes according to the open or 
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radical interpretation, we can proceed further to diminish the difference 
concerning the kind of animal experience between the two views. 
 
The role of the mind in Descartes’ theory is similar to the role of higher 
cognitive capacities in Kant’s theory: to allow the understanding of 
one’s representations as thoughts and to take diverse propositional at-
titudes toward these thoughts. From the Kantian perspective, the chief 
mistake in Descartes’ view is that Descartes does not ascribe minds to 
animals, which he should do because the Cartesian animals clearly have 




5.5.2. Kantian mechanism  
 
Even though Kant regards animals as conscious beings (at least to a cer-
tain extent), he still wants to emphasize the mechanism of animals (and 
also the mechanism of the animal side in humans), just as Descartes did. 
What raises humans above the mechanical laws is the possibility to free 
thinking that is independent of sensibility. Animals are necessitated to 
act according to the strongest impulse; humas can choose. For instance, 
in his Metaphysik der Sitten (Ak. 6:355) Kant emphasizes that we 
should never abandon reason and morals, since otherwise we are subject 
to “the same mechanism of nature as all the other species of animals.” 
How does determinism go together with the phenomenal conscious-
ness of animals? Kant did not have to accept the Cartesian doctrine of 
animals subject to merely mechanistic laws even though he denied the 
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autonomic, rational action from them. One alternative remained, namely 
Leibnizian spiritual determinism:
[A]ll necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural 
law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature, although 
it is not meant by this that the things which are subject to it must 
be really material machines. Here one looks only to the neces-
sity of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in 
accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this 
development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the 
machinery is driven by matter, or with Leibniz spirituale, when 
it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will 
were none other than the latter […], then it would at bottom be 
nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once 
it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself. (KpV, 
Ak.5:97.)
Spiritual determinism made it possible for Kant to put determinism and 
animal mentality together (Naragon 1990, 19). Leibniz (2005, § 52) also 
regarded human soul as a spiritual automaton in which everything is pre-
determined and free will is only an illusion. According to Kant’s view, 
this applied only to animals, whose action is completely determined by 
their physiology and representations. In other words, animals do not act 
in the sense of autonomic, free action; they only react. 
 
Naragon (1990, 21) finds the central difference between the views of 
Descartes and Kant is the way of explaining natural events. In Des-
cartes’ view, natural events can only be explained mechanically whereas 
Kant thought that humans need teleological explanations because of 
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the complexity of natural phenomena. Despite this, teleological causal-
ity is an accomplishment of reason and thus ideal mechanical causality 
being real. (KU § 65, 284–5.) In other words, natural events always 
have causes in the preceding events, but human reason has a tendency to 
seek purposes for them, partly because deterministic explanation is very 
complex and does not serve reason as well as teleological explanation. 
In this way, the sphere of teleological explanation is wider for Kant than 
it is for Descartes, who accepted non-mechanical explanations only for a 
tiny part of human action, namely those actions that are based on think-
ing (Naragon 1990, 21). 
 
Plants grow and decompose according to biological laws. Animals 
additionally have representations and the capacity to move according 
to them, but their movement is to be seen only as reactions to preced-
ing representations or physical stimuli. To be able to understand animal 
action, humans can give teleological explanations for animal behavior. 
Only rational humans can act according to ends that are not necessar-
ily determined. I can strive to improve my personality, for example, by 
consciously deciding to become more compassionate and less self-cen-
tered. This might involve controlling my natural reactions and using my 
willpower choosing to act in a different way. 
 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (§ 65, Ak. 5: 374), Kant 
discusses one essential difference between living beings and mechani-
cal objects (such as watches) to demonstrate why the Cartesian analogy 
between bodies and machines does not work. That difference is that liv-
ing beings have internal activity, or a formative power (bildende Kraft). 
In this context, it is a power to have intentions; a power to intentional 
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action; a power to direct one’s action according to ends.52 The motive 
power in mechanical things is external: the parts affect the movements 
of other parts. Unlike  living beings, they cannot generate new parts or 
even new things, replacing missing parts or repairing themselves. Of 
course, the external powers also affect living beings, but living beings 
are not completely at their mercy.  
 
Explanation of life is something that “can be conceived without contra-
diction but cannot be comprehended” (KU § 64, 286). Living beings—
plants, animals and humans—are under natural laws on the one hand 
but, on the other, can also be the causes of their own actions. Naragon 
(1990, 22) condenses Kant’s attitude towards Descartes’ doctrine of ani-
mal machines as follows: “[B]rutes can be thought of as machines and 
according to the universal causality of the phenomenal world they are 
machines, but they cannot be comprehended or understood as machines, 
and consequently, as a scientific (as opposed to a metaphysical) doctrine, 
Descartes’ hypothesis is worthless.” If we are interested in knowing 
why a dog is pacing impatiently by the front door, we are not satisfied 
with answers that focus on the physiological mechanisms that have lead 
the dog there but are seeking to know what has motivated the dog to do 





52  Ina Goy (2012 and 2014) has discussed Kant’s notion of formative power in detail. For 
the purposes of my thesis it is sufficient to note that in his critical philosophy, Kant uses 
the term in the biological sense (in contrast to his epistemological use of it in his pre-
critical philosophy) and means by it, to quote Goy (2012, p. 32), “a natural force that is 
responsible […] for establishing and sustaining the organized teleological order or form 
of organized beings.”
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6. HUME AND THE EXPERIENCE OF RATIONAL ANIMALS 
 
Both Descartes and Kant maintain that there is a difference in kind 
between animal and human minds, which makes discursive thinking 
through general concepts a unique skill for humans. Animals have only 
sensibility, and it is controversial whether that alone is sufficient for 
conscious experience. Before Darwin’s theory of evolution, it was easier 
to argue for the difference in kind between humans and animals than it is 
today. Today, we have to account for the generic origin of both physical 
and mental traits between species, which was not considered a necessity 
before Darwin. However, many authors before Darwin also defended the 
view that the difference between human and animal cognitive capaci-
ties is only a difference in degree. One argument for this view was the 
physico-theological principle, natura non facit saltus, that says that 
nature does not make jumps but all change is gradual. The move from 
sensibility to discursivity would be a sudden jump, and therefore reason 
must come in degrees.53 
As stated in Chapter 2, nonconceptualism, assimilationism and the 
bottom-up approach to the issue of the difference between human and 
animal minds often go hand in hand. I see Kant as a nonconceptualistic 
differentialist whose view can be approached either top-down or bottom-
up, depending on the focus. Now, the question of this chapter is, how 
does the replacement of differentialism by assimilationism affect the 
view concerning animal minds and animal experience? What are the key 
differences between the two views? Do they lead to different kinds of 
views concerning the human-animal relationship and the ethical guide-
lines of our treatment of animals? 
53  This argument has been presented, for instance, by G.F. Meier (1749, § 60, 107–8).
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David Hume is known for his skepticism concerning causal connections 
between objects. He claims that causality is just a product of the imagi-
nation, not a property of the objective world. Causality is an important 
concept in the philosophy of animal minds: what is the cause of animal 
behavior? An issue that constantly appears in the philosophy of animal 
minds is the methodological starting point: it is difficult to verify our 
views on what happens in animal minds (see Chapter 2). We must base 
all inferences concerning animal cognitive capacities on perceptions 
of animal behavior. Given this, it is surprising to hear a skeptic such as 
Hume say that animals are beings “endowed with thought and reason as 
well as men” and that the grounds for animal thinking are “so obvious, 
that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant” (T 1.3.16, 176). In 
the following, I will first explain how Hume justifies this claim. After 
that, I will focus on its content: what does Hume mean by reason? I will 
conclude this chapter by comparing the ethical implications of the ap-













6. Hume and the experience of rational animals
6.1. HUME ON ANIMAL EXPERIENCE 
Hume’s theory of the understanding is quite different from Kant’s view, 
already in relation to the concepts on which it is built. Before focusing 
on animal reason, I will briefly define the concepts with which he is 
operating. For Hume, perceptions are mental contents. They are either 
impressions or ideas. Impressions are immediate sensations, and ideas 
are based on them. (T 1.1.1., 1.) Ideas can be characterized as “faint 
images” of impressions (ibid.). The difference between impressions and 
ideas is roughly the same as that between sensations and thoughts: im-
pressions are felt whereas ideas are thought. Perceptions can be simple 
or complex. The impression of an apple is complex. It is composed of 
numerous simple impressions such as certain shades of color and taste. 
The same division can also be made at the level of ideas. Hume’s theory 
is empirical: the foundation of knowledge and concepts lies in experi-
ence, in immediate perceptions. 
 
The mind can combine its successive perceptions according to three 
principles or qualities: resemblance, temporal or spatial contiguity, as 
well as cause and effect. They are acts of the understanding and are not 
to be found in the objects themselves. (T 1.1.4., 10.) Experience has 
taught us that when we put a piece of paper in the fire, it burns. We do 
not, however, perceive any necessary connection between the fire and 
the burning of the paper. It is just a custom developed through many 
similar situations that has made us expect the burning of the paper when 
we put it in the fire. Memory is important here: empirical learning would 
not be possible without it. 
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For Hume, imagination and memory are closely related capacities. The 
difference between them is to be found primarily in the vivacity of the 
idea.
We find by experience, that when any impression has been pres-
ent with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; 
and this it may do after two different ways: Either when in its 
new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivac-
ity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an 
idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. 
The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first man-
ner, is call’d the memory, and the other the imagination. (T 1.1.3., 
10, see also T 1.3.5., 84.) 
Another factor that distinguishes between these capacities is the amount 
of combination they allow: “Wherever the imagination perceives a dif-
ference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation” (T 1.1.3., 10). 
Through the combination of ideas, the imagination can produce fictive 
ideas such as a unicorn or a mermaid. Hume’s understanding of imagi-
nation varies according to the context: “When I oppose imagination 
to the memory, I mean the faculty by which we form our fainter ideas. 
When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our 
demonstrative and probable reasonings.” (T 1.3.9.n, 117). Memory is 
tied to the original impression which retains its vivacity; imagination has 
fewer restrictions for combinations, but at the cost of vivacity. Hume’s 
notion of imagination is less technical than Kant’s. For Kant, memory 
is a subfaculty of imagination, and Kant keeps it strictly separated from 
reason.
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6.2. ANIMAL REASON 
 
Hume is quite certain that animals have reason, and one does not even 
have to be an expert on animal psychology to notice this. What exactly 
is this animal reason that Hume is so convinced of? Can his claim be 
understood as the opposite of what Descartes and Kant say? Do they talk 
about the same thing when using the word ‘reason’, or do they have dif-
ferent understanding of the nature of reason? I argue that Hume counts 
more mental acts under reason than Kant does, so the disagreement con-
cerning animal reason is not entirely genuine. However, their attitude to 
the implications of our assumptions (or knowledge) concerning animal 
minds is different: Kant’s view complies with Morgan’s canon by as-
cribing animals as low cognitive capacities as necessary to explain their 
behavior; Hume’s view corresponds more to our intuitive understanding 
of animals as beings that are cognitively similar to us. 
Let us first see how Hume argues for his claim. It is based on the follow-
ing two rules of causal reasoning: 1. “There must be a constant union 
betwixt the cause and effect” and 2. “The same cause always produces 
the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same 
cause” (T 1.3.15, 173). If we have learnt that two objects, A and B, often 
accompany each other so that A → B, and we meet an object C that is 
similar to B, we can analogically infer that A → C. The more B is simi-
lar to C, the more certain the inference is (T 1.3.12, 142; EHU IX, 104). 
For example, having learnt that pieces of paper easily burn in a fire, a 
person coming across cardboard for the first time can infer that this will 
also happen to cardboard since, in many respects, it is similar to paper.  
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Now, these principles can also be applied to comparative psychology:
’Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to 
those we ourselves perform, that we judge their internal likewise 
to resemble ours […]. When any hypothesis, therefore, is ad-
vanced to explain a mental operation, which is common to men 
and beasts, we must apply the same hypothesis to both […]. (T 
1.3.16, 176)
The aim of human action is often to increase pleasure and to avoid pain. 
Animal behavior is similar to human behavior in this respect and, by 
using the first rule of causal reasoning, we can infer that animal behav-
ior has the same cause, namely conscious thinking. This is different 
from Descartes’ and Kant’s idea that all animal action can be explained 
through instincts and sensibility. Hume claims that they commit to the 
so-called double standard in explaining animal and human behavior: a 
similar phenomenon is explained through different mechanisms depend-
ing on the species. Also Kant recognizes that human and animal action 
have a great number of similarities, and thus sees animals as analogies 
of humanity. He, however, claims that we should use this only as a 
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Hume thinks that we can reliably infer from animal behavior that 
animals are capable at least of: (1) empirical learning, (2) instrumental 
reasoning, (3) sympathy, and (4) instincts. Let us take a brief look at 
each of these. Empirical learning is based on the power of perception,  
memory and imagination. Rather than a reflective, conscious skill, it is 
an automatic custom:
It is custom alone which engages animals, from every object that 
strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their 
imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the 
other, in that particular manner, which we denominate belief. No 
other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, 
as well as lower classes of sensitive beings. (EHU IX, 106)
On the basis of the immediate sense perceptions, animals infer things 
they have learnt to associate with them. For example, the sight, taste and 
other relevant immediate perceptual properties of an acorn make a squir-
rel think about its taste and nutritional value. This inference entails prac-
tical (not theoretical) understanding of the principle that the same events 
arise from the same reasons; meaning that it is possible to use causal 
inferences in practice without a theoretical understanding of causal rela-
tions. Furthermore, this requires memory. (EHU IX, 104–5.) 
 
All this happens automatically, and it is a custom rather than a reflected 
reasoning. This custom is still not entirely instinctual and unconscious, 
but amounts to a belief. Practical causal reasoning does not, however, 
require much cognitive effort. In Hume’s example, a man who comes 
to a river understands with hardly any conscious cognitive efforts, what 
would follow if he fell in the water (T 1.3.8, 103). This automatic infer-
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ence affects the behavior of the man and his experience of being at the 
riverside —he probably walks with caution—and it is nevertheless an 
inference that is composed of a belief that has a content (such as the 
beliefs “The river is wet” and “I will get wet if I fall”). 
 
The second capacity that Hume ascribes to animals, instrumental reason-
ing, means that animals are able to choose a suitable means to an end. 
They are capable of the instrumental use of causal inference. (T.1.3.16, 
176.) Instrumental reasoning is a subtype of empirical learning. Through 
this capacity, an acquired custom can be applied to new situations. 
Instrumental reasoning requires ability to discern at the level of causes 
and effects which of the several concurrent events is the cause of a given 
effect (EHU IX, 105–6). Understanding the basic rules of causal infer-
ence is necessary for instrumental reasoning. Animals can learn that 
similar effects have similar causes and that two causes must be different 
if they have different effects (T 1.3.15, 174). In instrumental reasoning, 
this knowledge is used as the principle of action. 
 
Thirdly, animals are capable of sympathy, “the communication of pas-
sions” (T 2.2.12, 398). Through sympathy, animals are able to recognize 
each other’s moods. A dog, for instance, discerns whether another dog is 
challenging him to a serious fight or inviting him to play. The recogni-
tion of moods can be explained in two ways: as behavior reading or as 
mind reading, which is a cognitively complex understanding that other 
animals also have a point of view (see the discussion concerning the 
theory of mind in animals in Chapter 2.3.). The dog in the first example 
does not need to understand the point of view of the other dog as a 
hostile or a playful mood, but only what kind of intentions her behavior 
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suggests and, on this basis, she can adjust her own behavior. Sympathy 
can therefore be understood as a subtype of instrumental reasoning. 
Instincts are the fourth mental capacity that Hume ascribes to animals.  
Instincts are often regarded as innate automatic reactions that do not pro-
vide any kind of consciousness, but Hume regards them also as a source 
of knowledge, as important as reason. Instincts, for example, guide birds 
to build nests. In fact, Hume sees also reason as a kind of instinct; we do 
not know how it really works. (EHU IX, 108).  
 
Hume’s approach to the relation between reason and instincts differs 
remarkably from the one suggested by Descartes, for whom instincts are 
completely unconscious and only reason, as a generically different ca-
pacity, is a necessary condition for consciousness. Hume brings reason 
and instincts closer together but this does not mean assimilating them. 
Reason retains its characteristics, but is not elevated to any exclusive 
position. By counting it as an instinct, Hume emphasizes that it is as 
natural a capacity as any other tendency. Hume’s project can be labelled 
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6.3. IS ANIMAL REASON EQUAL TO HUMAN REASON? 
 
Although Hume argues that there are no specific human mental capaci-
ties that animals would not have, there are still some things that are 
possible only for human minds. Only a rational human mind can be 
independent of impressions. This relation to impressions constitutes the 
most fundamental difference between human and animal minds. This 
affects the following three aspects in particular: the variety of passions, 
the ways of reasoning, and the attachment to the current context.  
 
First, humans have a wider selection of passions and motives. The 
objects of the passions of animals are always bodily whereas humans 
can also have passions whose objects are imaginary. Only humans can 
be passionate about ideals such as equality, freedom and ideology, and 
these ideals can motivate their actions. Animals care about concrete 
things such as nourishment, and their motivation of action constitutes 
bodily states and perceptions and innate inclinations (this applies also to 
a great deal of human behavior).54 
 
Secondly, animal reasoning is always associative, whereas humans are 
able to make inferences at the level of ideas through demonstrative 
reasoning, which concerns the relations between ideas. Practical causal 
reasoning and instrumental reasoning are based on custom and they 
use repeated impressions as their material. Hume calls the relations of 
resemblance, spatial and temporal contiguity and causation qualities or 
natural relations, and they are rather automatic and unconscious  
 
54  On Hume’s theory of passions, see for example T 2.1.1., 276; and on passions of 
animals, see T 2.1.12., 326.
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functions of the mind in contrast to the relations of identity, qualitative 
and quantitative relations and contrariety, which are based more on the 
comparison of ideas (T 1.1.5, 8; T 1.3.1, 23). Humans can reason at the 
abstract level and deliberate, for example, the truth conditions of the 
laws of logic.  
Along with the tangible matter of logical inferences to their form, hu-
mans also can also detach themselves from their current subjective situa-
tion. In other words, humans have the ability to decenter. That means 
that human thinking is not tied to the current context (me–here–now). 
This is necessary for societal and moral thinking, where the focus can 
shift from what is subjective and immediate to a more general point of 
view. By this, Hume does not suggest that human reasoning is in any 
way “higher” or “better” than animal reasoning, but just a different kind 
of reason that is suited for human needs.  
 
Human society is fundamentally different from animal societies in that 
human societies are based on artificial institutions, such as property 
(Pitson 1993, 312). According to Hume, human individuals need support 
from the community since we have numerous wants but poor means for 
attaining them whereas the means of animals are more proportionate to 
their wants. For example, a carnivorous lion is strong and brave whereas 
a sheep, which is satisfied in eating easily attainable grass, does not need 
the strength and temperament of the lion. For humans, society provides 
the force, ability and security, which we—as individuals—would be 
short of on our own. (T 3.2.2, 484–5.) 
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A short answer to the question whether animal reason is equal to human 
reason is affirmative: animal reason in its essence, as a power to causal 
reasoning, is exactly similar to human reason. However, even though 
animals have the same reason as humans, they are not capable of using it 
in its full potential. The scope of things to which they can apply reason 
is remarkably smaller than it is for humans. Besides these three aspects, 
there is still one crucial difference between human and animal minds: 
morality. In Hume’s view, however, morality is however not based on 




6.4. COMPARISON OF THE HUMEAN AND THE KANTIAN 
VIEWS OF ANIMAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Seeing the difference between animal and human minds as a differ-
ence in degree instead of a difference in kind has an effect on the way 
in which we relate to the role of sense perceptions and reason. I am 
particularly interested in the question of to what extent the disagreement 
between the two positions concern animal experience and to what extent 
it is only terminological, concerning the content of the concepts. 
Even though Descartes, Kant and Hume give different answers to the 
question whether animals have reason—Descartes and Kant giving a 
negative answer and Hume an affirmative one—they do not, in fact, 
disagree that much on the question of what kind of cognitive opera-
tions animals are capable. For the most part, their disagreement rather 
concerns the definition and limits of reason. Hume allows a wider use 
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of the concept of reason whereas Descartes and Kant count only a small 
part of it as “real” reason. They do not disagree on the question, what 
kind of reason is possible only for humans. In the following, I will put 
the Cartesian view aside and compare the Humean view only with the 
Kantian view. 
 
Now the constituent parts we are operating with here are (1) the objec-
tive world (as the matter for sensibility), (2) sense perceptions con-
cerning the objective world (the interaction between the subject and 
the object), and (3) the spontaneity of reason. According to Hume, the 
spontaneity of reason intermingles with sense perceptions. This inter-
mingled reason constitutes animal reason; the independent use of reason 
is reserved for humans. Kant agrees with Hume on this latter point, but 
claims that animal behavior is not to be explained by attributing reason 
to them, but through sensible imagination. 
 
The disagreement between Kant and Hume concerns the explanation of 
animal behavior. Hume says that they have reason because they clearly 
are capable of practical causal reasoning. Kant agrees that animals are 
capable of it, but not because they had reason but because they have 
imagination. In the following, I will focus on the level of sense percep-
tions. How is the role of the sensibility different for Kant and Hume, 
and how does it affect animal experience? Does it have any effect on the 
sensible experience whether reason is seen as a package or in degrees? 
In other words, is the experience of Humean animals that also use rea-
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Disagreements concerning the nature of animal experience are likely if 
consciousness is considered commensurate with reason.55 If we accept 
this, it logically follows that Kant cannot ascribe phenomenal con-
sciousness to animals; and that, in the Humean view where reason and 
consciousness come in degrees, the more a being is capable of using 
understanding, the more conscious is its experience. 
 
Hume proceeds bottom-up from the shared fundamentals to the more 
refined capacities and greater independence from impressions. He sees 
reason as a natural and instinctive way to comprehend the world which 
can be further exercised independently from the objects of the experi-
ence. Kant proceeds top-down from the distinctive human cognitive 
capacities that are beyond the reach of animals. For Kant, understanding 
is a discursive capacity, and beings that have it can apply it to the objects 
of experience or thought. In this respect, the experience of beings that 
have understanding is therefore different from the experience of beings 
that do not have it. 
 
Especially the conceptualistic interpretation emphasizes this difference. 
According to the nonconceptualistic interpretation, it is not as exten-
sive; and perceptual content is seen as enabling rich experience. Still, 
even from the nonconceptualistic viewpoint, Kant must give different 
accounts for the mechanisms of human and animal behavior, that is, he 
must use the double standard that Hume criticizes and avoids. 
 
 
55  The Cartesian view is a clear example of this kind of approach, at least according to its 
standard interpretation. Other proponents of this view include Norman Kemp Smith and 
Donald Davidson (see Chapter 3).
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How exactly are these views different from each other besides the terms 
they use? Let us approach this problem through an example. Senni, a 
golden retriever, has learnt that if she offers her paw when asked she 
gets a treat. Now, if she sees that her owner, Olivia, is holding a treat, 
Senni desperately tries to get it by offering her paw even if she is not 
asked to do so. Hume would regard this as a clear example of the in-
strumental use of reason. Senni uses reason: she is exercising a species 
of causal inference, and we can conclude this simply by observing her 
behavior. 
 
Kant would say that we can well explain Senni’s behavior without at-
tributing reason to her. Through experience, Senni has learnt that every 
time when she offers her paw, it is likely that she will get a treat. The 
cognitive operations at work are memory, anticipation and reproduction. 
The pleasure of chewing a treat or the action of offering a paw is not im-
mediately present in the visual representation of the treat; Senni must be 
able to associate them with each other. According to Kant, if Senni were 
using reason, as Hume claims, she would be able to form the judgment, 
“My offering a paw leads to my getting the treat.” Reason adds the 
capacity to conceptualize the experience. This, in turn, makes it pos-
sible to assess it and its motives: is it good for me to pursue a treat? Why 
does Olivia reward my offering a paw with a treat? Where else does the 
similar relation pertain? 
 
Also Hume would agree that this is something Senni is incapable of, 
since it operates at an abstract, conceptual level. The capacity of reason 
would not, however, have to affect Senni’s experience of the situation, 
at least if we accept the nonconceptualistic interpretation. It could, 
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however, make things slightly more complicated in broadening Senni’s 
perspective in the manner described above. The experience is conscious 
already without the capacity of reason. 
 
At the core of the whole issue about animal rationality is the question 
of the mechanism of association and causal reasoning. As the example 
showed, what Kant and Hume disagree over is how it should be ex-
plained. The principle of causation is to be located in the abstract part of 
reason. According to Hume’s bottom-up reasoning, we come to the idea 
of causality through empirical experience whereas for Kant, causality is 
one of the categories of the understanding and, as such, is not applicable 
to the sensible association of animals. The sensible association is to be 
explained through a different process, imagination. 
Both Kant and Hume regard association as a passive, sensible capacity 
that does not require extensive use of understanding. It is based rather on 
imagination (Kant) and custom (Hume). Both Hume and Kant argue that 
causality is a function of the mind rather than a feature of the objective 
world. Moreover, Kant points out that the world itself has to function ac-
cordingly, otherwise it would be impossible to find any kind of regulari-
ties there. The objective world, however, does not generate causality for 
the mind to pick up. Causality is generated by the mind to conceptualize 
certain kind of perceptions. Both Hume and Kant agree that understand-
ing causal relations at the abstract level is possible only for humans.
 
Kant and Hume agree on the function of the objective world and the 
spontaneity of reason; and their disagreements here are terminological: 
for Kant, the spontaneity of reason alone constitutes understanding, and 
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for Hume it is only a part of understanding, that which is not dependent 
on impressions. Their disagreements concern passive sensibility. Hume 
claims that understanding operates already on this level by picking out 
regularities from perceptions whereas Kant claims that it is imagination 
that does all this, not understanding. Prima facie it seems that Hume’s 
view offers a simpler explanation for what is happening in the mind 
whereas Kant is multiplying entities beyond necessity by having imagi-
nation at the sensible level, and understanding at the discursive level. 
In explaining causal reasoning, Hume increases the ratio of abstract 
thinking and decreases the role of impression. This makes it easier to 
explain animal intelligence. Now that not all animal minds are in one 
uniform group, there is room for variance in animal rationality without 
having to commit to a double standard in explaining similar animal 
and human action through different mechanisms. Kant explains causal 
reasoning in animals through association. 
Another important difference is their attitude to animal minds. Kant’s 
starting point is that we cannot really know what it is like to be an ani-
mal and what cognitive operations they are capable of; and since their 
behavior can be explained without ascribing reason to them, it is reason-
able to assume that they have only sensibility. Hume, on the contrary, 
maintains that it is certain that animals have reason and that they think. 
Hume is a skeptic concerning empirical matters and the objectivity of 
causal relations, and thinks that we can be as certain of the principle of 
animal action as we can of other empirical matters. Although we cannot 
look into animal minds or communicate with them by using language 
we can infer fairly reliably that their actions are based on using reason in 
the same way as we do. 
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6.5. DISCUSSION: RELEVANCE TO ETHICS 
 
To conclude, I want to briefly discuss the role of the view of animal 
experience in animal ethics by comparing Kantian and Humean ethics. 
Hereby I want to show how the discussion concerning animal experi-
ence can have relevance in ethical argumentation—this is the case 
in Kant’s view; but the moral status of animals can also be grounded 
on other factors than what kind of experience they are assumed to be 
capable of—this is the case in Hume’s view. I will not, however, assess 
these arguments or commit to them since that is outside of the scope of 
this work. 
 
Since the approaches of Kant and Hume to the cognitive difference 
between humans and animals are different, it would be easy to assume 
that their approaches to animal ethics would also be different. The is-
sue is not, however, as simple as that. The views of Kant and Hume 
concerning the foundations of morals are also very different from each 
other, Kant stressing the role of reason and Hume the role of sensibility. 
Despite these striking differences, their views on the proper treatment of 
animals agree to a surprising degree. 
In Kant’s deontological ethics, the focus is on the motives of moral 
action instead of its effects. Natural inclination or sympathy is not an 
acceptable motive for moral action since they are contingent properties 
that some people have and some do not. Kant searches for a universal 
moral law, and contingent properties are not a proper foundation for it. 
The foundation of morals is to be found in reason. Moral actions are 
based on correct reasoning according to the universal and authorita-
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tive laws of the reason. We have a duty to respect these laws and to act 
according to them. Will is the capacity of reason to produce action, and 
good will is the capacity to generate correct moral action. Actions done 
out of good will and duty result from correct reasoning and they have 
moral value. 
 
The universal principle for all moral action is the categorical impera-
tive: “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS, Ak. 4:421) 
The categorical imperative concerns the form of moral action and not 
the content. It is a test for the reasoning of the practical reason: a good 
reasoning is not contradictory. We cannot rationally will that contradic-
tory principles would become universal laws. For instance, breaking a 
promise contradicts the concept of a promise, and were it to become a 
universal law, the concept of a promise would lose its meaning. 
 
The so-called humanity formula of the categorical imperative is interest-
ing in discussing animal ethics: “So act that you use humanity, whether 
in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS, Ak: 4:429). Since this 
formulation orders us to respect humanity, it is one reason for the low 
status of animals in Kant’s ethics. However, it should be kept in mind 
that the essential element in humanity is rationality as the capacity of 
setting ends to oneself, not the belonging to the human species. (GMS, 
Ak. 4:437; see also Religion 6:26–7; KU, Ak. 5:426–7). Animals are 
mere things, that is, beings that have no reason. Their existence depends 
on nature and they have only instrumental value, whereas persons have 
inherent value. (GMS, Ak. 4:428.)  
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The categorical imperative sets a qualitative condition for the mental 
capacities for moral agents: moral agents must have reason and will. 
Animals have neither. Moral action is independent of contingent states 
of affairs and thus free, that is, it corresponds to the universal moral 
laws of the reason. Moral agents are autonomic beings that act according 
to moral laws (MS, Ak. 6:223). Free moral action is action according to 
the agent’s best judgment. It requires the capacity to make intellectual 
choices based on good will independent from sensible desires. 
 
Kant claims, moreover, that humans do not have direct moral duties 
toward animals. For Kant, rationality is a decisive differentiating factor 
between animal and human minds. The capacity to set ends for oneself 
is integral in this factor. Rationality is what makes beings ends in them-
selves. (MM, Ak. 29:897, 907.) Animals are therefore not beings that 
have to be treated as ends in themselves. Kant does not, however, mean 
to claim that we are allowed to treat animals however we please, even 
though he accepts treating animals merely as a means to our purposes. 
 
Kant writes a great deal about duties to other humans but not as much 
about duties to animals. In Collin’s lecture notes he briefly discusses 
duties to animals: “animals exist only as a means”, because they are not 
self-conscious and they do not have the power of judgment. He, howev-
er, concludes from this only that we do not have direct duties to animals. 
He does not say that we have no duties to them; instead, “our duties 
toward them are indirect duties to humanity” (Collin, Ak. 27:459). 
 
If I hurt a hedgehog, I would act wrongly in the moral respect, even 
though I have no direct moral duty to the hedgehog not to hurt him, but 
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because it is against moral duties to humanity. Hurting an animal is a 
manifestation of the low moral quality of the agent, and this trait will 
probably manifest itself in other circumstances where rational creatures 
might be involved. It can be argued that following the maxim of cruel 
treatment of animals leads to a contradiction, and therefore it cannot be 
willed to become a universal law. 
 
Kant regards animals as analogies of humanity (see Chapter 5), and 
therefore the way I treat animals reflects my way of treating people. 
Nevertheless, if humans gain a huge benefit from the instrumental use of 
animals, even if it necessarily includes cruelty, it is morally acceptable 
(unnecessary cruelty is however not acceptable). (Collin, Ak. 27:459–
60.) According to Kant’s example, “[i]f a master turns out his ass or his 
dog, because it can no longer earn its keep, this always shows a very 
small mind in the master” (Collin, Ak. 27:459). The attitude to animals 
suggested in this passage contradicts the currently accepted practice of 
slaughtering productive animals that are no longer productive. 
 
A central difference between the ethics of Kant and those of Hume is 
the role of reason, which is manifested in the relationship towards the 
categorical imperative, which is the decisive principle in moral ques-
tions for Kant and which for Hume is irrelevant. For Kant, reason is the 
ultimate source of morality whereas for Hume it has only an instrumen-
tal role. The foundation of morality is instead to be found in passions 
and sentiments that Kant considers too vague to establish the universal 
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Hume argues for his view by discerning the roles of reason and passions. 
Reason is concerned about the relations between facts; or “the discovery 
of truth or falsehood” (T. 3.1.1, 458), morality being “more properly felt 
than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2, 470). Our passions, in particular the feelings 
of pleasure and displeasure, determine what we pursue in life. We use 
the information provided by reason in this purpose, and in this respect 
reason is subordinate to passions. What we choose to do is tied to the 
idea of the expected pleasure or avoidance of displeasure gained from 
it: “[t]he very essence of virtue […] is to produce pleasure, and that of 
vice to give pain” (T 2.1.7, 295). Also our sensitivity to the approval or 
disapproval of others can be a basis for our moral feelings. Sympathy 
as a mechanism of understanding or the capacity to feel the passions 
of others enables us to transcend from the subjective point of view to a 
common one. Passions and sentiments motivate actions, not reason (T 
2.3.3, 413).  
 
So far this sounds like something animals could also have: refined use 
of reason is not needed for morality, and passions such as the feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure are important in it. Hume claims, however, that 
animals are not moral agents. The perception of moral qualities requires 
a special moral sense. Animals do not have it, which makes them inca-
pable of perceiving them. This entails that the same act— stealing, for 
example—can be morally wrong if performed by a human, and outside 
morality if performed by an animal (for Hume’s argument, see T 3.1.1, 
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How does all this affect our relation to animals? Although Hume’s view 
of animals seems to be quite high, he does not write much on animal 
ethics. There is, however, one exception in his Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (3.1, 190):
Were there a species of creature intermingled with men, which, 
though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both 
of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and 
could never […] make us feel the effects of their resentment; the 
necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by 
the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but 
should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice 
with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, 
exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could 
not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but 
absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the 
other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permis-
sion is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our 
compassion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our 
lawless will […]. This is plainly the situation of men, with regard 
to animals. (My emphasis)
Animals do not belong to the same moral community with us, but this 
does not mean that we can use and treat them any way we please. We 
should, instead, be benevolent, compassionate and kind toward them if 
we are, as we should, to act according to “the laws of humanity.” For 
Hume, humanity is the source and the motive of all virtuous action: 
“No action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human 
nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its moral-
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ity” (T 3.2.1, 479, emphasis removed). The objects of moral concern are 
not restricted to our own species, but to all creatures we feel sympathy 
towards (T 3.2.1, 481). Human nature has a tendency to feel sympathy 
to animals, which gives us a motive to ensure that the animals on our 
responsibility are well.56 Animals can be moral objects without being 






In this chapter, I have made two claims. My first concerned the ap-
proaches of Kant and Hume to reason. Kant and Hume understand 
reason differently and therefore we cannot compare their views on 
animals without first defining what each one means by reason. In this 
way, we can see that what Hume explains as animal use of reason is 
for Kant only the use of sensible association. Hume does not argue that 
animal reason were identical to human reason, and when we look at the 
operations of reason he excludes from animals, we can see that Hume’s 






56  Of course, not all animals are “possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, 
that they [are] incapable of all resistance” or unable to “make us feel the effects of their re-
sentment.” It is easy to find an example of animal resistance by trying to wash a cantankerous 
housecat. But even if animals were not capable of expressing their opinion to us, we would still 
be morally obliged to treat them well, and the fact that animal resistance to bad treatment is 
often obvious gives us even a stronger obligation to do so.
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My second claim concerned the views of Kant and Hume on treating
animals. Reason has a large role in Kant’s ethics. It would therefore be
easy to think that if we accepted the idea that animals have reason, as
Hume does, it would radically affect their moral status. Hume’s ap-
proach to ethics is quite different from Kant’s: Hume thinks that there
is not much that reason has to do with it; morality rather belongs to
sensibility. Now, we would think that this gives us even stronger support
for the high moral status of animals. 
However, in both theories, the actual faculties of animals have little to
do with how we should treat them. Kant bases our indirect duty to treat
animals well on the view of animals as analogies of rationality while
their moral status still remains lower than that of rational humans. For
Hume, the ultimate motivation for the good treatment of animals lies in
the natural tendency of humans to feel sympathy across species, not in
the mental capacities of animals. The metaphysical view of the minds of
animals does not straightforward imply any particular view of the moral
status of animals. It is important to understand that the moral decisions
concerning animals require other kind of justification than just premises
that concern their mental capacities and what they enable. Both Kant
and Hume argue that whatever the cognitive capacities of animals might
enable or exclude, due to the apparent fact that animals seem to have
similar interests as humans do, they should be treated with respect. 
Just as Kant’s and Hume’s views concerning the differences between
animal and human minds are very different, so are their approaches to
ethics. What Kant regards as the sole possible foundation of morals is
from Hume’s viewpoint completely insufficient, and vice versa.  
However,the conclusions that Kant and Hume draw in both issues are 
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very similar despite the completely different foundational assumptions 
and routes to these conclusions. Kant bases morality on the universal 
truths of reason, and concludes that we have an indirect duty to treat 
animals well. The good treatment of animals shows that we are good 
human beings. The fact that we notice that the principle of animal be-
havior is the same as ours is sufficient to obligate us to take animals into 
account in the moral respect, not so much for the sake of the animals 
but because of our humanity. Also Hume argues that since we can feel 
sympathy for animals and since we have no reason to assume that they 
had a different principle of action as we do, we are morally obliged to 
treat them well. 
To sum up, both Hume and Kant think that animals matter because they
show strong signs of having interests just like we do. We know that our
interests matter and we expect other people to honor them, as far as they
are cognitively capable of it. This obligates us to honor the interests
of other beings as well, and this includes animals, even if they cannot
honor our interests. However, the extent to which we take the interests
of animals into account depends solely on our good will (in Kant’s
terms) or the laws of humanity (in Hume’s term). Humans obligate us
morally more strongly because of their rationality which has an inherent
value (in Kant’s view), or which makes them members of the moral
community (in Hume’s view). 
The theory of evolution is a challenge to Kant’s view of animals and of
animal ethics. If there is no strict dividing line between rational and non-
rational creatures, we need to redefine the scope of beings that deserve
to be treated as ends-in-themselves and are therefore objects of direct
moral concern. Hume’s view avoids this difficulty by allowing gradual
changes. 
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An issue that deserves further investigation is whether humans really are 
the only moral beings. Current research no longer completely excludes 
the idea of moral nonhuman animals (see Rowlands 2012 for an exten-
sive overview on the subject). The idea of animals as possible moral 
subjects raises a multitude of questions concerning primarily the mental 
capacities of animals and the foundation of morality. If some species of 
animals show sufficiently strong signs of moral behavior, the views of 
Kant and Hume of animals as beings beyond morality is refuted. The 
task of the philosophers is to specify the theoretical and cognitive crite-
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study has been an answer the question posed right at the beginning 
of the introduction: What is the role of sensibility in Kant’s philosophy, 
and how is it manifested in animals? I have argued that the role of sensi-
bility is wider than usually thought. This makes some animals capable of 
quite complex cognitive operations. Animals are not completely under 
the influence of flowing sensible representations, reacting to the stimuli 
they contain determined through their physiological constitution. This is 
a part of being an animal, but not the whole picture. 
 
I claim that it is compatible with Kant’s view that animals do feel their 
sensible representations, and that they can use the information provided 
by them in planning their action. They have the capacity to keep past 
representations in the mind and reproduce them even without the actual 
presence of the object itself. Furthermore, it is possible, within the 
sphere of sensibility, to classify the object according to one’s own inter-
ests without this amounting to the use of the forms of the understand-
ing. All this is still linked to their current context, of which they cannot 
detach themselves. 
 
I have also argued that Descartes, Kant and Hume do not disagree as 
much on the actual mental capacities of animals as on the terms in which 
this is being expressed, that is, the definitions and scope of the con-
cepts of sensibility and reason. For Descartes, sensibility is mechanical 
receptivity and reactivity. Depending on the interpretation of Descartes, 
this either feels like something or does not feel like anything. According 
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to the standard interpretation, the ability to think is required in order to 
feel one’s sensations. It can also be argued that Descartes’ view does not 
exclude animal experience, but I think this is more a development of his 
theory than an interpretation of it. 
 
Kant considered it necessary to accept that animals have minds since 
they clearly move determined by their sensible representations rather 
than by laws of physics. Sensibility provides a perceptual contact to the 
objective world; and having sensible representations is a sign of having 
a mind. I have broadened the common understanding of what sensibility 
does in Kant’s philosophy, and also narrowed the role of reason in ex-
perience. In other realms, such as in ethics, reason has a significant role, 
but not in experience. Experience is rich already at the non-conceptual 
level. The phenomenal conscious experience does not require concepts. 
It certainly feels like something; it includes the discomfort of wants 
and needs and the comfort of fulfilling them. What it does not manage 
is putting these experiences and undertakings into judgments. It always 
remains particular and tied to the current context. 
 
One could ask why Kant did not simply say that since animals have 
the capacity of keeping mental pictures in mind and making distinc-
tions, they are in fact using some kind of elementary concepts that do 
not require explicit naming and ultimate abstraction. After all, ascribing 
representational contents to animals was no problem for Hume among 
several other early modern philosophers. I have emphasized that Kant 
wanted to keep the roles of sensibility and reason clearly separate. The 
former is needed for perception, the latter for judgment.
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But as we have seen, sensibility is not only about perception. It is also 
memory and reproduction, planning, orienting; trying to succeed better 
next time. All this can happen without conceptually understanding it, 
whereby all this remains still quite mechanic, as relatively immediate re-
actions without much possibility of directing one’s behavior, with no ac-
cess to generality and universality. For Hume, one central role of reason 
is causal reasoning. Since causal relations cannot be perceived through 
the senses, they must be products of the mind. Hume also counts rather 
automatic inferences and conditionings as uses of reason. Reason is for 
him fundamentally an instinct. 
 
Kant explains elementary causal conditionings through association that 
is made possible through sensible imagination. Reason adds understand-
ing of the causal relation; however, the lack of reason does not prohibit 
using the relations between objects that reason classifies as causal. In 
other words, causality is a way of conceptualizing a certain relation 
between objects, but reason changes nothing in the objects nor adds 
anything between them. Without reason, the objects that can be under-
stood as having this relation to each other can be perceived, and if they 
are repeatedly perceived with each other, imagination starts to associate 
them with each other without this amounting to an understanding of a 
causal relation. 
 
Throughout this study, I have pointed out that these early modern views 
are unaffected by the theory of evolution, and that the theory of evolu-
tion might challenge the differentialistic view. The theory of evolution 
does not, however, imply that the difference between human and animal 
minds is necessarily only a difference in degree. Language was a major 
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argument for Descartes against animal minds, and it even today it can be 
used as an argument, if not against animal minds, at least for the superi-
ority of human mind in conceptual understanding. 
 
Great apes are considered cognitively very similar to us but this does 
not exclude the possibility of a relevant difference in kind. For example, 
Cheney and Seyfarth (2007, 279) claim that “it remains indisputable that 
the human mind differs qualitatively from that of other apes.” By this 
qualitative difference, they refer to unique human traits such as “speech, 
teaching, elaborate tool use, and culture.” The neurological foundation 
of these capacities lies in brain areas that also are uniquely developed in 
humans.57 
Here, the relevance of our understanding of the kind of the difference 
between animal and human minds could be questioned. What difference 
does it make if we thought—as Kant did—that reason is an exclusive 
human capacity; or if we follow Hume in seeing reason as a shared 
capacity between animals and humans? What issues does our view of 
animal minds affect, and how? First of all, it is of utmost importance 
first to define what is meant by reason and what counts as sensibility in 
each relevant context so that we know how our view relates to others. As 
I have shown, there is a huge variation in the ways of using these con-
cepts. What Hume counts as understanding in animals is for Kant still in 
the sphere of sensibility.  
57  However, soon after having said this, Cheney and Seyfarth continue by showing how 
apes also do have these capacities, but in a far simpler form. Now this sounds like a 
quantitative difference. This comes close to Hume’s view of animals: humans do not have 
any extra capacities compared to animals, but they are capable of a far larger use of their 
capacities.
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Prima facie ascribing reason to animals might seem like a more animal-
friendly and morally more recommendable practice than denying it. 
Claiming that animals do not have reason easily associates with the 
implication that reason is the most precious of all mental qualities. This 
is, however, not necessarily the whole truth. As I have shown, the role of 
reason does not have to be this decisive. For Kant, reason is responsible 
only of such cognitive tasks that require concepts; and for Hume, reason 
is a natural instinct that enables action according to representations. The 
views of the cognitive difference can come very close to each other even 
though the terms used in describing these views clearly contradict each 
other. Only when this definition of sensibility and reason is carefully 
made we can assess and compare different views of animal experience. 
 
To conclude, I want to discuss briefly the possible application of the re-
sults of this study to animal ethics. As such, our views of animal experi-
ence do not, without relevant further premises, imply any kind of ethical 
standpoint in regard to the treatment of animals. I leave such premises 
open to further studies. However, if experience is to entail the capacity 
to suffer, this is important in animal ethics. As Bentham (1982, 28n) has 
famously stated, what matters in the treatment of animals is the capacity 
to suffer, not the capacity to reason.  
 
If a being is capable of suffering, it is important to do our part to ensure 
that we minimize this. In practice this means that we care for the welfare 
of the animals for which we are responsible. This is not fulfilled by 
following the minimal claims of the Protection of Animals Act. It is nec-
essary that they be followed, but not necessarily sufficient. If we claim 
that this species is rational while that one is not, this does not necessarily 
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make the former species morally superior. That one particular species 
is in certain respects, for instance, in rationality, similar to us, does not 
directly, without further theoretical suppositions, mean that the species 
would intrinsically have a higher moral worth than others. It means only 
that we are in the position to understand this particular species in this 
particular respect more than others that are cognitively more different 
from us. 
We can take deep sea fishes as an example of a species whose mental 
equipment is very different from ours. They are adapted to conditions 
we could not survive in, conditions characterized by enormous pressure 
and a complete lack of daylight. To survive in these conditions, these 
creatures have developed special capacities such as the sense of changes 
of pressure, or bioluminescence. It is, however, highly probable that 
distress is a mild word to describe how an anglerfish experiences the 
rapid decrease of pressure that slowly makes it almost explode when it is 
hauled out of the sea by a fisherman. 
However, this is not the same distress as humans would experience 
when exposed to a similar conditions. We would be terrified not only by 
the pain but also by the desperate feeling that our unfinished life projects 
will never be accomplished and that our death will dramatically change 
the lives of our loved ones. Still, we can ask whether the experiences of 
two very different species can be compared with each other at all. 
 
What is similar between me and the anglerfish is sensibility, even if 
it operates through very different means in the anglerfish than in me. 
Perhaps the anglerfish is also capable of some kind of reproduction 
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and memory. Nevertheless, due to this one resemblance, the capac-
ity to become affected through the environment, we are capable of at 
least a suspicion of the understanding, of what it is like to be a deep sea 
creature and what matters to the creature. We are even more capable of 
taking into account the interests of other animals that are more similar to 
us than the deep sea creatures.There always is the possibility that we are 
wrong, and that the experience of other animals is in reality something 
very different from what we expect, but as Hume argues in the quotation 
presented in Chapter 6.5. (Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
3.1, 190), we should nevertheless treat other species with respect, just in 
case that this matters to them and because we can.  
Kant’s view of animals as beings with sensible minds already adds men-
tality to the Cartesian view of animals; and experience to the standard 
reading of Descartes. Already this ascribing of minds makes animals 
more similar and thus more accessible to us and increases our moral 
obligations to them. Now compassion is possible and justified, even 
though it plays no role in Kant’s deontological ethics. However, if it 
were indisputable that some nonhuman species had reason in the strict 
Kantian sense, it would affect its moral value. Rationality as a capac-
ity to set ends for oneself makes beings ends in themselves, that is, it 
guarantees their inherent moral value. This in turn would force Kant 
to say that there is a difference in degree between humans and other 
rational species, and a difference in kind between rational species and 
non-rational species. 
This study has shed some light on what sensible experience can amount 
to. I have been as conclusive as possible in this matter but this topic can 
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always be broadened. One issue that I have omitted but which deserves 
a closer look is whether schemata could be attributed to animals. The 
function of the schemata is to guide us in applying concepts to percep-
tions (see Chapter 4.3.).  
 
Another important topic that also remains for further investigation is the 
relation of the early modern views to the current views of animal experi-
ence. This requires collaboration with cognitive ethologists: how is this 
view applicable to practice? Is it old-fashioned; is there perhaps proof of 
such conceptual capacities of animals that Kant cannot explain through 
imagination? If we find such capacities, it does not mean that Kant 
was wrong. What Kant was primarily interested in was sensibility, not 
animal minds. It was only his hypothesis that animals are an example 
of merely a sensible way of perception. Such findings would only show 
that this hypothesis does not concern all nonhuman animal species, but 
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